Amer Home Assurance v. Unitramp Ltd ( 1996 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 96-20006
    Summary Calendar
    AMERICAN HOME ASSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Counter Defendant
    Appellee,
    versus
    UNITRAMP LIMITED and
    UNITRAMP, S.A.,
    Defendants-Counter
    Claimants-Appellants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (CA-H-95-522)
    June 20, 1996
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Unitramp Limited and Unitramp, S.A. appeal the judgment of the
    U.S. District Court declaring that American Home Assurance Company
    owes them no indemnity for losses they incurred in a shipping
    *
    Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions that
    have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
    the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
    expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
    Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published.
    mishap.    They   further   appeal    the   district     court's    award    of
    attorneys' fees to American Home.         We vacate the district court's
    judgment and remand for further proceedings.
    I.
    Unitramp was the time charterer of the M/V Glenita, a general
    cargo vessel owned by Ugland.        On June 8, 1993, Enjet Refining,
    Inc. delivered 450 tons of fuel to the M/V Glenita at Enjet's
    Ingleside facility near Corpus Christi, Texas.            Unitramp ordered
    that the fuel be kept in segregated bunkers while a laboratory
    analysis of the fuel was performed.         The M/V Glenita departed for
    Mobile, Alabama on June 9.      In Mobile, the ship took on a cargo of
    coal.   The M/V Glenita departed Mobile on June 13, 1993 bound for
    Casablanca.
    On June 14, 1993, while the M/V Glenita was at sea, Unitramp
    received the report of the laboratory analysis of the fuel.                 The
    report disclosed an unacceptably high level of water in the fuel.
    Ugland informed Unitramp that the fuel could not be used.           Unitramp
    directed the M/V Glenita to proceed to Tampa, Florida, where Enjet
    refueled the ship.
    Unitramp sued Enjet for losses it incurred as a result of the
    delay caused by the need to refuel the M/V Glenita.            Enjet filed
    for bankruptcy    while   the   Unitramp    suit   was   pending,    but    the
    bankruptcy court lifted the automatic stay and permitted Unitramp
    to continue prosecuting its lawsuit against Enjet.            Unitramp and
    Enjet subsequently settled the dispute for $210,000.
    2
    Unitramp then sought to recover its judgment from Enjet's
    insurer,   American   Home.    American    Home   had   issued   Galveston
    Terminal, Inc. a comprehensive liability policy effective from June
    12, 1992 to noon on June 12, 1993.        The policy named Enjet as an
    additional assured and covered liability arising from operations at
    scheduled locations.     Enjet's Ingleside facility was not one of
    those covered locations.      American Home renewed the policy.        The
    renewed policy was effective as of noon on June 12, 1993 and
    covered Enjet's Ingleside facility.
    Both policies defined an "occurrence" as:
    an event or a continuous or repeated exposure to
    conditions which unintentionally, from the standpoint of
    the Assureds, causes injury, loss, damages or destruction
    during the policy period. Any number of such injuries,
    damage or destruction resulting from a common cause or
    from exposure to substantially the same conditions shall
    be deemed to result from one occurrence.1
    The policies further provided that "[o]perations or products in
    existence prior to the inception of this policy which cause or
    result in bodily injury or property damage during the policy period
    are covered by this policy."
    American Home sued Unitramp, seeking a declaratory judgment
    that it owed Unitramp no indemnity under its policies.            Unitramp
    counterclaimed, seeking a declaration to the contrary. The crux of
    the litigation centered on when the covered "occurrence" happened:
    1
    The renewal policy omits the term "loss" from this
    definition.   The parties do not contend that the difference in
    policy language affects this appeal.
    3
    when the fuel was loaded on board the ship or when Unitramp
    discovered that the fuel was unacceptable.          The district court
    agreed with American Home that, under the terms of the policy,
    liability attached at the time of the causative event, not at the
    time damage was discovered.    Since Enjet delivered the bad fuel at
    a time when American Home's policy did not cover Enjet's Ingleside
    facility, no coverage existed. The district court awarded American
    Home declaratory relief and, subsequently, $7,750 in attorneys'
    fees.
    II.
    On   appeal,   Unitramp   argues    that,   under   Texas   law,   an
    "occurrence" is not when the act causing the damage is committed,
    but rather when the damage from that act is actually sustained.
    According to Unitramp, it did not sustain any damage until it
    discovered that the fuel was bad, that is, on June 14, 1993 when
    the M/V Glenita was at sea.
    In Snug Harbor, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins., 
    968 F.2d 538
    , 544 (5th
    Cir. 1992), we observed that "Texas courts have concluded that the
    time of an occurrence is when a claimant sustains actual damage--
    not necessarily when the act or omission causing that damage is
    committed."   See Dorchester Development v. Safeco Ins., 
    737 S.W.2d 380
    , 383 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1987, no writ); Cullen/Frost Bank of
    Dallas v. Commonwealth Lloyd's Ins. Co., 
    852 S.W.2d 252
    , 257 (Tex.
    App.--Dallas 1993, writ denied).       In this case, the district court
    held that liability attaches at the time of the causative event.
    4
    Although we are inclined to agree with the district court's reading
    of the policy language, both Texas courts and this circuit have
    construed similar policy language as requiring an analysis of when
    the damage manifested itself.
    We therefore VACATE the district court's judgment and REMAND
    for a determination of when Unitramp sustained actual damage.   We
    also VACATE the district court's award of attorneys' fees.
    5