Chambers v. Johnson ( 1999 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-11205
ROY GLENN CHAMBERS,
Petitioner-Appellee,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
December 2, 1999
Before REAVLEY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
Roy Glenn Chambers was convicted in 1984 of two counts of
failure to appear at trial for burglary. He was sentenced to
twenty-five years imprisonment, a sentence enhanced for previous
felony convictions. Chambers seeks habeas relief on the basis of
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Supreme Court decided
Batson while Chambers' direct appeal was pending in state court.
Chambers contends that his prosecutors' use of peremptory strikes
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The magistrate judge agreed with Chambers and the district court
adopted the recommendation to grant habeas relief. The Director
maintains that Chambers' claim is barred for want of a
contemporaneous objection to the strikes, and regardless should be
dismissed as a delayed petition under Rule 9(a) of the habeas
rules. We find that the magistrate judge abused his discretion in
refusing to consider the merits of the Director's 9(a) defense. We
VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for
proceedings in which the defense may be considered.
I
During jury selection in Chambers' trial, the prosecutor used
his peremptory strikes to exclude three black members of the
venire. After the petit jury was selected but before they were
sworn, the trial judge asked the parties whether they had any
"objections to the jury as seated." The state made no objections,
and the trial judge said to Chambers’ attorney, "[y]ou have a
matter you want to urge, but other than that any objection?" to
which Chambers' attorney replied "[o]ther than that." After this
reply, the jury was sworn and directed to enter the jury room. The
court dismissed the venire, and then heard the defense counsel's
objection.
Chambers' counsel stated:
[t]hose three people . . . were blacks and they were the
only blacks among the first thirty-two. And we would
object on that ground, and that Mr. Chambers is being
denied a true jury of his peers and would, therefore,
state that the prejudice shown him would cause it to be
in line for a mistrial.
This colloquy ensued:
2
THE COURT: Any response to that?
MR. ISAACKS [prosecutor]: Four, five and thirty-two were
just three of ten people struck. The preemptory [sic]
strikes were not used solely on the basis of a person’s
race, if that’s what the defense attorney is objecting
to.
THE COURT: I don’t know if that’s it or not. I think
the objection is there are no blacks on the seated jury.
MR. LAMB [defense counsel]: That’s correct, Judge.
THE COURT: There aren't any. I will let the record
reflect there are none on the seated jury. I don't
recall frankly how many were on the jury panel, whether
the names you mentioned were or not even black. I can't
comment on that. I do know, at least by name, that there
are three Hispanics on the jury itself. That may or may
not mean anything.
Mr. Lamb, I'm going to overrule your objection and
deny your motion for mistrial at this time based on that.
I'm not sure that I can make the State or the defendant
ever state specifically why they exercised the preemptory
[sic]. Mr. Isaacks has said it's not based on race, at
least alone. I don't think I can go any further, at
least, I'm not willing to. So I deny that motion.
(emphasis supplied).
Although Chambers pursued direct and discretionary review of
his conviction, he did not raise the Batson issue until he filed a
state application for habeas review with the Court of Criminal
Appeals, which the court denied. In its judgment the court
accepted the State's contention that under Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S.
255 (1986), the Batson claim could not be pressed in a collateral
attack. That was error. Allen held that Batson had no retroactive
effect for habeas petitioners whose convictions were final when
Batson was announced. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 257-58. As the
magistrate judge correctly decided, because Chambers' direct appeal
3
was pending when Batson was decided, he may pursue any claim he may
have under Batson. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 258 n.1 (defining
finality to include exhaustion of availability of appeal); see also
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1986)(holding that Batson
applies retroactively to cases pending on direct review when the
decision was announced).
II
Chambers filed a federal habeas petition in July 1996. Two of
his three claims were denied, but the magistrate judge set an
evidentiary hearing for the Batson claim, the only subject of this
appeal. The Director first asserted his defense arising under Rule
9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases at the evidentiary
hearing, when the testimony of the prosecutors from Chambers’ trial
showed that they could not remember why the black members of the
venire were struck.1 The magistrate judge requested the parties to
brief the 9(a) issue. The court found that the Director had waived
the defense of laches under 9(a) by not presenting it in a
responsive pleading at an earlier point in time, implicitly
refusing leave to amend to conform to the evidence.
1
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides:
Delayed Petitions. A petition may be dismissed if it
appears that the state of which the respondent is an
officer has been prejudiced in its ability to respond to
the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner
shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not
have had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable
diligence before the circumstances prejudicial to the
state occurred.
4
First we must explain why it is necessary to reach the
question of laches when the absence of a Batson issue is so
conspicuous. Having been directed to an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of the Batson claim by the district court, the Director
conceded to the magistrate judge that Chambers proved a prima facie
case under Batson. The Director's concession is troubling. The
objection lodged at trial was that there were no black persons on
the seated jury. At best it was a Swain objection, and
understandably so since that was the legal regime at the time of
trial.2 Of course, Chambers has the benefit of Batson since his
case was pending on appeal when Batson was decided as we explained.
With no assistance from the Director, the district court and in
turn the magistrate judge failed to realize that under controlling
decisions of this court a Batson objection must be asserted before
the venire is dismissed, and that a timely objection is an
essential condition to the assertion of the Batson claim. See,
e.g., Wilkerson v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1063 (5th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1989);
Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 369 (5th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 667 (5th Cir. 1986). As Judge Reavley has
explained for this court, the Batson "right" is grounded in a
process. See Thomas v. Moore, 866 F.2d 803, 805 (5th Cir. 1989).
On objection a party must articulate race-neutral reasons for a
2
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1965), required a
showing of systematic race discrimination in jury selection beyond
the defendant's own case to establish a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. Batson overruled Swain.
5
peremptory challenge; absent an objection there is no Batson
violation. See id. That said, we will not relieve the Director of
his concession any more than we will supply an objection that
Chambers never made.
III
At the hearing it became clear that the prosecutors could not
remember the specific reasons that they struck three black members
of the venire, and the prosecutor who actually made the strikes had
long since lost his notes from Chambers' trial. With the passage
of over thirteen years since Chambers' trial and the issue of a
timely Batson objection not considered, the result was preordained.
As the magistrate judge observed, the outcome now turned on whether
the court would allow the state to invoke the defense of laches
under Rule 9(a) of the federal habeas rules. Chiding the state for
letting some months go by before the hearing without filing a
responsive pleading asserting laches, the magistrate judge refused
to consider the defense.
Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases codifies
an equitable defense of laches. See, e.g., Walters v. Scott, 21
F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1994). It is also true that "laches" is
among the affirmative defenses listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c),
requiring a responsive pleading. But accepting that a Rule 9(a)
defense must be supported by a pleading does not answer the
question of when an amendment asserting the defense is allowed.
Specifically, an affirmative defense under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) is
not waived when a defendant who failed to assert it in a responsive
6
pleading "raised the issue at a pragmatically sufficient time, and
[the plaintiff] was not prejudiced in its ability to respond."
Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir.
1986)(alterations in original).
There has been no showing that the defense was not raised at
a pragmatically sufficient time or that Chambers was prejudiced in
his ability to respond. Perhaps there is more, but on this record
the ruling strikes one as blind formalism on the one hand and
extraordinary tolerance on the other. An insistence on timeliness
has its virtues. Here, however, the magistrate judge held the
state's feet to the fire but granted relief to a petitioner who
waited over nine years after exhausting his state remedies to file
a federal habeas petition. During this time the state's ability to
defend was lost. The prosecutor who struck the three members of
the venire testified at the evidentiary hearing that race was not
a reason for the challenges, but could not recall the specific
reasons for the strikes, such as occupation, work history, and so
forth. We are persuaded there is no unfair surprise attending the
consideration of the effects of Chambers' nine-year delay in filing
his federal habeas petition upon the State's ability to defend
itself. We VACATE the judgment granting relief and remand for
further proceedings. On remand the magistrate judge will consider
the defense, allowing Chambers a fair opportunity to respond.
VACATED and REMANDED.
7