United States v. Martinez ( 1999 )


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  •                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-51228
    SA-98-CR-267-ALL
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    CARLOS MARTINEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    December 13, 1999
    Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellant Martinez pleaded guilty to obstructing commerce
    by robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence.                   On
    appeal, he raises a sentencing issue, and preserves for future
    appeal the contention that the Hobbs Act is unconstitutional when
    applied to the commission of an individual, purely local robbery.
    Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
    From   a    Guidelines    range    that,    after    much initial
    jockeying, would have yielded a sentence of 37-46 months on the
    robbery count, the district court departed upward to impose a 60-
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    1
    month sentence.      When this was added to the mandatory 60-month
    consecutive sentence for the firearm count, Martinez received a
    sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.          He contends that the district
    court erred in applying an upward departure based on U.S.S.G. §
    5K2.17,   which    suggests   an   upward    departure       if   the   defendant
    possesses “a high-capacity, semiautomatic firearm in connection
    with a crime of violence. . .”       The section also suggests that the
    extent of any increase “should depend upon the degree to which the
    nature of the weapon increased the likelihood of death or injury in
    the circumstances of the particular case.”               Appellant contends
    that, although he used an AK-47 rifle during the offense, it was
    not a “high-capacity, semiautomatic firearm” referenced in the
    Guideline,   and    furthermore,    his     use   of   the    weapon     did   not
    significantly increase the risk of harm, as the Policy Statement to
    that Guidelines requires.       See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 531.
    Whether the AK-47 falls within this Guideline, it is
    argued, may depend upon the size of the magazine it carried.                   If
    the magazine had the capacity to hold more than 10 cartridges, it
    would qualify, but if it had only a five cartridge capacity, it
    would not.    This factual issue is not settled in the record.                  No
    case law further elaborates on the definition of a high-capacity,
    semiautomatic firearm.        The government’s brief seems to assume,
    with common sense to back it up, that an AK-47 is, inherently, the
    type of weapon contemplated by this Guideline.
    Ultimately,    however,    this    issue    is     not   critical    to
    affirming the departure.        The district court relied not only on
    2
    section 5K2.17, but also on the “multiple carjacking-type behavior”
    that was involved in the defendant’s crime.                   Under the Guidelines,
    a   court   may    depart    upward   if       it   finds    the    existence     of   an
    aggravating       circumstance    that     was      not     adequately    taken    into
    consideration by the Guidelines.               18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b).       This court
    affirms an upward departure if the district court gives acceptable
    reasons for departing, and the extent of the departure (not here
    contested) is reasonable.          United States v. Nevels, 
    160 F.3d 226
    ,
    229 (5th Cir. 1998), (cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 
    119 S. Ct. 1130
    (1999).     Finally, even if the district court erred or abused its
    discretion in departing upward based upon section 5K2.17, a remand
    will not be required if this court determines that the district
    court would have imposed the same sentence without relying upon
    this factor.       Koon v. United States, 
    518 U.S. 81
    , 113 (1996); see
    also Williams v. United States, 
    503 U.S. 193
    , 203 (1992).
    The Koon/Williams rationale is fully dispositive here.
    Martinez’s and his cohorts’ armed robbery of Renters Choice, Inc.,
    an appliance and equipment rental business located in San Antonio,
    was particularly egregious.           The robbers terrorized the victims
    while   they      stole   the   company    cash,      made    one    of   the   victims
    partially disrobe, and systematically took business merchandise and
    loaded it into several vehicles.               Not only did the robbers take an
    employee’s Hyundai, but they also stole one of the business’s
    delivery trucks by appropriating the keys at gunpoint, to haul off
    more merchandise.         The district court was legitimately repelled by
    this drawn-out, highly intimidating sequence of events, and the
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    court specifically focused on the multiple carjacking-type behavior
    in awarding the upward departure.
    Contrary to appellant’s argument, it seems obvious that
    this   behavior   alone   warranted       the   moderate,   13-month   upward
    departure.    Martinez does not suggest that such a departure was
    legally inappropriate, but only that “these facts do not constitute
    the very threatening and personal form of car theft in a typical
    carjacking offense.”      We disagree.      Because we are convinced that
    the court was fully entitled to, and would have departed upward
    based solely on the extreme circumstances of the offense, we do not
    need to explore the status of the AK-47 alone.
    The sentence and judgment of the district court are
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-51228

Filed Date: 12/14/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014