United States v. Canales ( 1999 )


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  •                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    _____________________
    No. 98-40503
    _____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DANIEL EDUARDO PEINADO-CANALES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (97-CR-390-4)
    _________________________________________________________________
    September 13, 1999
    Before DUHÉ, BARKSDALE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    Primarily at issue in Daniel Eduardo Peinado-Canales’ appeal
    from his conviction and sentence for conspiracy and possession with
    intent to distribute cocaine is whether the district court’s
    unobjected-to   questioning   of    Peinado   and   Government   witnesses
    deprived Peinado of a fair trial.         We AFFIRM.
    I.
    A jury found Peinado guilty of conspiracy to possess with
    intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , and
    possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). The district court denied Peinado’s motion for
    1
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    new trial and sentenced him to concurrent 188-month terms of
    imprisonment.
    II.
    Peinado contends that the evidence was insufficient to support
    his convictions; that the district court’s questioning of him and
    other witnesses deprived him of a fair trial; that he is entitled
    to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and that his
    Sentencing Guidelines offense level should have been reduced, based
    on his role in the offense.
    A.
    In reviewing a properly-preserved sufficiency challenge, we
    must determine whether “any reasonable trier of fact could have
    found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt”.   United States v. Martinez, 
    975 F.2d 159
    , 160-61 (5th Cir.
    1992) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 
    507 U.S. 943
     (1993).
    The evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is viewed in the
    light most favorable to the verdict.     E.g., United States v. Resio-
    Trejo, 
    45 F.3d 907
    , 910 (5th Cir. 1995).      “All credibility
    determinations and reasonable inferences are to be resolved in
    favor of the verdict.”   
    Id. at 911
    .    The evidence need not “exclude
    every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent
    with every conclusion except that of guilt”.       
    Id.
       In short, we
    determine only whether the jury made a rational decision, not
    whether the jury’s verdict was correct on the issue of guilt or
    innocence. E.g., United States v. Jaramillo, 
    42 F.3d 920
    , 923 (5th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    514 U.S. 1134
     (1995).
    - 2 -
    To establish a violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , the Government
    must prove: “1) the existence of an agreement between two or more
    persons to violate federal narcotics laws; 2) the defendant’s
    knowledge of the agreement; and 3) the defendant’s voluntary
    participation in the agreement”.                 United States v. Gonzalez, 
    79 F.3d 413
    , 423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 869
     (1996).                       To
    establish a violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1), the Government must
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly
    possessed a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it.
    
    Id.
    “When evidence is sufficient to establish the defendant’s
    participation in a conspiracy to possess narcotics, the defendant
    will be deemed to possess the drugs through the co-conspirator’s
    possession.”        
    Id.
             Possession may be actual or constructive.
    United    States      v.    Ayala,    
    887 F.2d 62
    ,    68   (5th    Cir.    1989).
    Constructive possession is “the knowing exercise of, or the knowing
    power    or   right    to       exercise,   dominion      and   control   over    the
    proscribed substance”.            
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).     “One who ... exercises control over a motor vehicle in
    which    contraband        is   concealed   may    be     deemed   to   possess   the
    contraband.”       United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 
    838 F.2d 1346
    ,
    1349 (5th Cir. 1988).
    There   was     ample      evidence   to    establish     Peinado’s      knowing
    possession of cocaine and participation in a cocaine-distribution
    conspiracy.    The Government’s witnesses included two co-defendants
    who had pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, as well as DEA
    - 3 -
    Agents    who    were    involved       in   conducting      surveillance      and    an
    undercover police officer to whom the cocaine was delivered.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was
    evidence that Peinado served as a “contact” between the cocaine
    supplier and the purported purchaser, and was to have received
    $20,000 from the supplier for his services; that he attended a
    meeting in Guadalajara, Mexico, at which the sale of 100 kilograms
    of cocaine was discussed; that he came to McAllen, Texas, on 10
    October 1997, to arrange for the delivery of the cocaine; and that,
    after    a   car      containing   the       cocaine   arrived      in   McAllen,    he
    accompanied the undercover officer (posing as the purchaser) to the
    parking lot where the car was parked and gave the car keys to the
    officer, and then observed the officer open the trunk of the car,
    which contained burlap sacks containing “bricks” of cocaine.
    In addition, Peinado’s arrival at the McAllen motel where some
    of the co-conspirators were staying and the parking lot transaction
    were    videotaped      by   a   DEA    Agent     conducting       surveillance;     the
    videotape       was    admitted    into       evidence.      The    Government     also
    introduced into evidence audio tapes of telephone conversations
    between the co-conspirators, including Peinado, and the undercover
    officer.
    B.
    Peinado     contends      that    the      district    court      impermissibly
    questioned him and Government witnesses.                     But, as he concedes,
    because he did not object at trial, we review only for plain error.
    See United States v. Spires, 
    79 F.3d 464
    , 465-66 (5th Cir. 1996).
    - 4 -
    “Under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), this court may correct forfeited errors
    only when the appellant shows (1) there is an error, (2) that is
    clear or obvious, and (3) that affects his substantial rights.                 If
    these    factors   are    established,     the     decision    to   correct   the
    forfeited error is within the sound discretion of the court, and
    the court will not exercise that discretion unless the error
    seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
    judicial proceedings.” United States v. Waldron, 
    118 F.3d 369
    , 371
    (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
    “[A] federal judge is not a mere moderator of proceedings”.
    Moore v. United States, 
    598 F.2d 439
    , 442 (5th Cir. 1979).               He “may
    comment on the evidence, may question witnesses and elicit facts
    not yet adduced or clarify those previously presented, and may
    maintain the pace of the trial by interrupting or cutting off
    counsel as a matter of discretion”.            
    Id.
     (citations omitted); see
    also FED. R. EVID. 614(b) (“The court may interrogate witnesses,
    whether called by itself or by a party.”).
    Nevertheless,       “[b]ecause         it    is    the       government’s
    responsibility—not       the   district    court’s    function—to     prove   all
    elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court
    must    maintain   an    appearance   of   impartiality       and   detachment”.
    United States v. Filani, 
    74 F.3d 378
    , 385 (2d Cir. 1996).                     Our
    court has cautioned against extensive questioning of a defendant by
    a district court because, “[w]hen a defendant takes the stand in
    his own behalf, any unnecessary comments by the court are too
    likely to have a detrimental effect on the jury’s ability to decide
    - 5 -
    the case impartially”.     United States v. Middlebrooks, 
    618 F.2d 273
    , 277, modified on reh’g on other grounds, 
    624 F.2d 36
     (5th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    449 U.S. 984
     (1980).        “This is particularly
    true during a defendant’s direct examination, when his credibility
    is being established.”    United States v. Saenz, 
    134 F.3d 697
    , 709
    (5th Cir. 1998).
    It is “[o]nly when the judge’s conduct strays from neutrality
    [that] the defendant [is] denied a constitutionally fair trial”.
    United States v. Carpenter, 
    776 F.2d 1291
    , 1294 (5th Cir. 1985)
    (district judge’s comment that he “had yet to hear a defense” not
    reversible   error).     “In   determining   whether   the   trial   judge
    overstepped the limits imposed on the judge’s conduct, [we] must
    view the proceedings as a whole”, 
    id.,
     “considering factors such as
    the context of the remark, the person to whom it is directed, and
    the presence of curative instructions”.       United States v. Lance,
    
    853 F.2d 1177
    , 1182 (5th Cir. 1988).         To rise to the level of
    error, “the district judge’s actions, viewed as a whole, must
    amount to an intervention that could have led the jury to a
    predisposition of guilt by improperly confusing the functions of
    judge and prosecutor”. United States v. Flores, 
    63 F.3d 1342
    , 1360
    (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
    cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 825
    , 1022 (1996).
    1.
    When asked on direct examination about the purpose of his trip
    to McAllen, Peinado responded that it was to take delivery of a
    used pickup truck he was purchasing from “Aron” (one of the alleged
    - 6 -
    co-conspirators).    The following colloquy between Peinado and the
    district court ensued:
    THE COURT: Sir, we heard a lot of tapes
    in your presence and people identified that
    voice as being yours. Was it your voice?
    THE WITNESS:   No, sir.
    THE COURT:   So you’re not on that tape at
    all?
    THE WITNESS:   No, sir.
    THE COURT:    Well, you’re going to be
    asked these things, you understand? We saw a
    videotape, and in the videotape, it appears
    that you’re present, including the time when
    the keys are delivered to somebody and the
    trunk is opened. It appears.
    THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.
    THE COURT:   Is that you?
    THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.
    THE COURT:     Do you hand the keys to that
    person?
    THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.
    THE COURT:   And you were present?
    THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: Why did you hand the keys to
    that person? What was your intention?
    THE WITNESS: I talked to the person who
    was going to take the pickup truck to me,
    which was Mr. Renato, and he told me to go to
    the Whataburger restaurant, for us to meet
    there.   And so that when we were there, he
    told me that the pickup truck was going to be
    about a half hour in coming. So then he told
    me that he was going to leave me the key to a
    vehicle so that the person who would -- who
    would arrive in the pickup truck, that he
    could go back in that vehicle.
    - 7 -
    THE COURT: How do you explain that the
    trunk was opened in your presence, if that
    vehicle was only there so that somebody could
    return once they delivered the pickup truck to
    you?
    THE WITNESS: When that person arrived,
    the one we see in the video, I asked him where
    the pickup truck was. And he said to me that
    the pickup truck was at his hotel.
    THE COURT: That’s what the man who just
    testified told you?
    THE WITNESS:    Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: That turned out to be a law
    enforcement officer?
    THE WITNESS:    That’s correct, sir.
    THE COURT:    By the way, have you seen the
    pickup?
    THE WITNESS:    No, sir.
    THE COURT:    And they were going to
    deliver it to you and you were going to take
    it?
    THE WITNESS:    Yes, sir.
    THE COURT:    Had you paid for it?
    THE WITNESS:    Mr. Aron and I had agreed.
    THE COURT:     How could you      agree   on
    something if you hadn’t seen it?
    THE WITNESS:    That’s why I came over
    here, to see it and see if I liked it. If I
    liked it, I was going to take it.
    THE COURT:    All right.   You’re going to
    be asked these      questions.    You understand
    that?
    THE WITNESS:    Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: And is that your explanation
    as to why you were there?
    - 8 -
    THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: Is it your testimony that you
    didn’t know anything about what was in that
    trunk?
    THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.
    THE COURT:   Is it your testimony that
    everybody is coming here and saying that they
    started this whole transaction with you in
    Guadalajara, and you came over here with them
    and you were in different hotels, that all of
    that is not true?
    THE WITNESS: No, that we saw each other
    in Guadalajara and I came over to the hotel, I
    did come over.
    THE COURT:     No, they said that you
    actually got involved in this matter for the
    sale and purchase of this big amount of
    cocaine in Guadalajara.   They said that you
    were the point man.
    THE WITNESS:   That’s not the way it is,
    sir.
    THE COURT:   That’s what I’m asking you.
    THE WITNESS: No, what happened is, they
    always talked about a cigar business. I never
    did know what they were doing.
    THE COURT:       A   cigar   business   in   the
    United States?
    THE WITNESS:   No, in Reynosa.
    THE COURT:   Okay.
    After this questioning, counsel concluded the direct examination by
    asking Peinado about his contacts with the co-conspirators who had
    testified against him.   The court then asked two more questions:
    THE COURT: Is it your testimony that you
    knew nothing whatsoever about what turned out
    to be cocaine in that vehicle?
    THE WITNESS:   Yes, sir.
    - 9 -
    THE COURT: Is it your testimony further
    that you had nothing whatsoever to do with any
    transaction involving the cocaine in question?
    THE WITNESS:    That is correct, sir.
    In support of his new trial contention, Peinado relies on
    Saenz, 
    134 F.3d 697
    , which involved the same district judge, and in
    which our court found plain error and reversed Saenz’s conviction
    because of the judge’s overinvolvement in questioning witnesses,
    including the defendant.          In so doing, our court relied on the
    following    factors:      (1)    the    questioning        had    the        effect   of
    expressing the judge’s disbelief in the defendant’s explanation of
    events,     
    id. at 710-13
    ;    (2)     the     questioning          of     Saenz    was
    particularly damaging because the case turned on a credibility
    choice between Saenz and one government witness (an alleged co-
    conspirator),      regarding     Saenz’s        involvement       in        the   alleged
    narcotics conspiracy, 
    id. at 712-13
    ; (3) the questions did not
    address collateral matters, but instead went to the heart of the
    case, id.; and (4) the jury instructions that the court had no
    opinion about the case were not curative in the light of the
    prejudicial impact the questioning may have had on Saenz’s defense.
    
    Id. at 713
    .       Our court also noted that, because “the trial was
    short and the disputed issues were neither confusing nor complex”,
    there was less “need for the court frequently or actively to
    question witnesses”       than    in    “a   complex   or     lengthy         case    with
    multiple witnesses”.      
    Id. at 703, 704
    .
    The Government counters that Saenz is limited by its unique
    circumstances, relying on United States v. Cantu, 
    167 F.3d 198
     (5th
    - 10 -
    Cir. 1999), another case involving the same district judge.                  Cantu
    contended that his conviction should be reversed because the
    judge’s questioning of the Government’s witnesses “was pervasive,
    often leading, and designed to rehabilitate the credibility of
    government    witnesses       or   undermine       counsel       for   Defendant’s
    questioning on cross-examination”.              
    Id. at 203
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted).        Our court disagreed, stating that Cantu was
    distinguishable from Saenz in three important respects: (1) rather
    than resting on the testimony of a single witness, as in Saenz, the
    case    against   Cantu    featured      numerous       substantive    witnesses,
    including both co-conspirators and law enforcement officers; (2)
    unlike Saenz, Cantu did not testify in his own defense, so the
    district court did not have the opportunity to question him; and
    (3) the judge’s questioning of witnesses in Cantu was not as
    extensive    as   in   Saenz,    where   the     court’s      questioning   of   the
    defendant constituted almost one quarter of the direct examination.
    
    Id.
     at 203 & n.22.      Our court concluded:         “[A]lthough the district
    court’s questioning in the present case may bear some similarity to
    that in Saenz, the unique combination of factors that led to a
    reversal in Saenz is absent here”.              
    Id. at 203
    .
    Two of the factors relied on by our court to distinguish Cantu
    from Saenz are not present here.           As in Saenz, and unlike in Cantu,
    Peinado   testified     and     asserted    a    lack    of    knowledge    of   the
    conspiracy.       Before Peinado’s counsel was able to elicit his
    defense, however, the district judge took over the examination, and
    his questioning constituted approximately one third of the direct
    - 11 -
    examination; thus, the judge’s involvement was even more extensive
    than in Saenz.   And, as in Saenz, Peinado’s trial lasted only two
    days, the disputed issue (whether Peinado knowingly was involved in
    the conspiracy) was neither confusing nor complex, and the record
    does not reflect that counsel were unprepared or wasting time. See
    Saenz, 
    134 F.3d at 704, 713
    .   Thus, there was little need for the
    court’s extensive involvement in questioning Peinado.
    The other factor mentioned in Cantu, however, also serves to
    distinguish this case from Saenz.       As in Cantu, and unlike in
    Saenz, the Government presented the testimony of several co-
    conspirators concerning Peinado’s involvement in the conspiracy,
    the testimony of law enforcement officers who surveilled the scene
    of the drug transaction, and physical evidence (audio and video
    tapes) of Peinado’s presence at the scene of the transaction.
    It is well to remember that we are reviewing only for plain
    error. Arguably, there was error. But, viewing the proceedings as
    a whole, and considering the overwhelming evidence of Peinado’s
    guilt, including audio and video tapes of his involvement in the
    drug transaction, the fact that the trial as a whole was conducted
    in an impartial manner, and the court’s jury instructions that it
    had no opinion about the case,2 we are convinced that the district
    2
    In its preliminary instructions to the jury before the
    Government called its first witness, the court stated:
    “[A]lthough we are in Federal Court and
    Federal Judges can express their opinion, I
    don’t have an opinion about the case. And I
    hope to remember to tell you this at the
    conclusion of the case. In Federal Court, I
    can ask questions. Don’t give it any more or
    - 12 -
    judge’s error (questioning of Peinado), if any, did not “amount to
    an intervention that could have led the jury to a predisposition of
    guilt       by    improperly   confusing   the    functions   of   judge   and
    prosecutor”.        See Flores, 
    63 F.3d at 1360
    .     Accordingly, under our
    plain error standard, the error, if any, was not so substantial or
    prejudicial as to require reversal.              See Carpenter, 
    776 F.2d at 1296
    .       In any event, under the final prong of our plain error
    review (not necessary to reach here), our refusal to correct the
    forfeited error would not affect the fairness, integrity or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.3
    less importance than if anybody else asks it.
    You see, I don’t want to invade what is your
    province. So if I lead you to believe that I
    have an opinion about the case, you disregard
    it. I do not have an opinion about the case.
    And if I remember, I’m going to tell you that
    at the conclusion of the case.       If I do
    anything to lead you to believe that I do,
    please disregard it.
    In the jury charge, the court stated:
    Remember I told you when we started this
    case that ... I did not have an opinion about
    the case.    I still don’t.     So if I did
    anything that led you to believe that I have
    an opinion about the case, you disregard it.
    Remember, that’s your thing, and I don’t want
    to get involved with your thing.
    We recognize, of course, that some questioning of witnesses or
    the defendant by a district judge may be “so prejudicial that even
    the strongest instructions to the jury to disregard” it is
    inadequate. See Carpenter, 
    776 F.2d at 1295-96
    . But, viewing the
    proceedings as a whole, we conclude that such is not the situation
    here.
    3
    The court’s questioning of Peinado, although not reversible
    plain error, was very closely akin to cross-examination; and it is
    quite possible that some of the questions could have been construed
    by the jury as indicating the judge’s disbelief of Peinado’s
    - 13 -
    2.
    Peinado also challenges, again for the first time on appeal,
    the propriety of the district court’s questioning of several of the
    Government’s witnesses. For example, he complains of the questions
    to co-conspirators concerning Peinado’s identity, his presence with
    the other co-conspirators at times during the conspiracy and what
    he may have heard about the cocaine transaction, and each co-
    conspirator’s prior involvement in drug trafficking.                     He also
    challenges the questioning of law enforcement officers, including
    questions about identifying the parties that were the subject of
    the surveillance, verifying the times the recordings were made,
    estimating the number of officers involved in the investigation,
    and the average street value per kilogram of cocaine.
    Although this questioning was quite extensive, none of the
    questions    complained   of    rise    to     the   level    of   infringing   on
    Peinado’s    right   to   a    fair    trial.        Even    assuming   that    the
    questioning was improper, we conclude that it did not affect
    Peinado’s substantial rights.          Again, there was no plain error.
    C.
    Post-conviction, Peinado moved for a new trial, contending
    that co-conspirator Arias’ attempt to withdraw his guilty plea
    testimony.     As in Saenz and Cantu (both rendered after trial of
    this case,   so the district judge did not have the benefit of their
    analyses),   such overinvolvement in the questioning of witnesses,
    especially   criminal defendants, provides fertile ground for appeals
    and places   convictions at risk of reversal.
    No doubt, for the trial of the case at hand, the length and
    type of questioning challenged on appeal would not have occurred
    had the district judge had the benefit of Saenz and Cantu.
    - 14 -
    after testifying at Peinado’s trial constituted newly discovered
    evidence.      “[M]otions   for   new    trial   on   the   basis   of   newly
    discovered evidence are disfavored ... and therefore are viewed
    with great caution”.     United States v. Ugalde, 
    861 F.2d 802
    , 808
    (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
    490 U.S. 1097
     (1989).           Such motions
    are generally “suited to cases in which the proffered evidence goes
    directly to proof of guilt or innocence”.         
    Id. at 807-08
     (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    We consider four factors in determining whether a new trial
    should be granted:    (1) whether the evidence was newly discovered
    and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) whether
    the defendant exercised due diligence in discovering the evidence;
    (3) whether the evidence is material, and not merely cumulative or
    impeaching; and (4) whether the evidence is likely to produce an
    acquittal. E.g., United States v. Sullivan, 
    112 F.3d 180
    , 183 (5th
    Cir. 1997).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a
    new trial.    At a hearing on Arias’ attorney’s motion to withdraw as
    counsel, Arias informed the court that he wished to reinstate his
    guilty plea.    During the ensuing plea colloquy, Arias provided no
    exculpatory evidence concerning Peinado’s role in the conspiracy
    and, in fact, testified (consistent with his testimony at Peinado’s
    trial) that Peinado helped make arrangements for the cocaine
    delivery.
    D.
    - 15 -
    Finally, Peinado bases error on the denial of a reduction in
    his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines based on his
    minimal participant role in the offense.   See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a).
    Peinado had the burden of proving this minimal role.     See United
    States v. Brown, 
    7 F.3d 1155
    , 1160 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993).         The
    factual finding to the contrary is reviewed only for clear error,
    see United States v. Buenrostro, 
    868 F.2d 135
    , 137-38 (5th Cir.
    1989), cert. denied, 
    495 U.S. 923
     (1990), and is entitled to “great
    deference”.   United States v. Devine, 
    934 F.2d 1325
    , 1340 (5th Cir.
    1991), cert. denied, 
    502 U.S. 929
    , 1047, 1064, 1065, 1092, 1104
    (1992).
    A “minimal participant” is one who is “plainly among the least
    culpable of those involved in the conduct of the group”.   U.S.S.G.
    § 3B1.2, comment. (n.1).    Because most offenses are committed by
    participants of roughly equal culpability, it is intended that the
    minimal-role adjustment “be used infrequently”.   U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2,
    comment. (n.2); United States v. Nevarez-Arreola, 
    885 F.2d 243
    , 245
    (5th Cir. 1989).
    At sentencing, the court disagreed with Peinado’s minimal
    participation objection, finding that “he can’t get any more points
    or any less points either because of his conduct”.   This finding is
    not clearly erroneous.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, Peinado’s convictions and sentence
    are
    AFFIRMED.
    - 16 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98-40503

Filed Date: 9/14/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021

Authorities (20)

United States v. Joseph Omotunde Filani , 74 F.3d 378 ( 1996 )

United States v. Waldron , 118 F.3d 369 ( 1997 )

United States v. Thomas J. Sullivan H.J. Sallee, \"Mickey\" , 112 F.3d 180 ( 1997 )

United States v. Jack William Carpenter , 776 F.2d 1291 ( 1985 )

United States v. Javier Lopez Cantu , 167 F.3d 198 ( 1999 )

United States v. Francisco Nevarez-Arreola , 885 F.2d 243 ( 1989 )

United States v. Baltazar Saenz , 134 F.3d 697 ( 1998 )

United States v. George Ayala, Raul Alfredo Portillo, and ... , 887 F.2d 62 ( 1989 )

United States v. Jose Ramon Hernandez-Palacios , 838 F.2d 1346 ( 1988 )

United States v. Jaramillo , 42 F.3d 920 ( 1995 )

United States v. Manuel Flores, United States of America v. ... , 63 F.3d 1342 ( 1995 )

United States v. Brown , 7 F.3d 1155 ( 1993 )

United States v. Spires , 79 F.3d 464 ( 1996 )

united-states-v-robert-james-devine-jr-john-leon-robinette-aka-john , 934 F.2d 1325 ( 1991 )

United States v. Luis Martinez , 975 F.2d 159 ( 1992 )

Bobby Lee Moore v. United States , 598 F.2d 439 ( 1979 )

United States v. Gary Lee Lance, Willie Love, and Rebecca ... , 853 F.2d 1177 ( 1988 )

United States v. Juan Gonzales and Ramsey Ramiro Muniz , 79 F.3d 413 ( 1996 )

United States v. Pedro Resio-Trejo , 45 F.3d 907 ( 1995 )

United States v. Leonard Orozco Buenrostro , 868 F.2d 135 ( 1989 )

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