Murrell v. Casterline , 307 F. App'x 778 ( 2008 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 25, 2008
    No. 07-30153
    Summary Calendar                   Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    GETZELL JOHNSON MURRELL, SR
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    CARL CASTERLINE; LES PHILLIPS; CINDY PIKE; STEVE AYCOCK;
    HARRIS HATCHETT; ROBERT TAPIA; FREDRICK JEFFERSON;
    M CANNON; LANE GREMILLION
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 1:03-CV-257
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Getzell Johnson Murrell, federal inmate # 87468-011, appeals the district
    court’s dismissal of his pro se suit filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
    Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971), following
    summary judgment for the defendants. Murrell alleged that the defendants
    were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs because they exposed
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 07-30153
    him to secondhand cigarette smoke while he was incarcerated at the federal
    prison in Pollack, Louisiana.
    Murrell argues that the district court erred when it granted the
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment because his evidence shows that the
    defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when they refused
    to enforce a no smoking policy. This court reviews the grant of a motion for
    summary judgment de novo. Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 
    95 F.3d 1320
    , 1326
    (5th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when, considering all of the
    allegations in the pleadings, depositions, admissions, answers to interrogatories,
    and affidavits, and drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party, “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law..” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Little
    v. Liquid Air Corp., 
    37 F.3d 1069
    , 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). If the moving
    party meets his burden of showing that no genuine issue exists, the burden
    shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence or set forth specific facts
    showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
    Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 256-57 (1986). The nonmovant cannot satisfy his summary
    judgment burden with conclusional allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or
    only a scintilla of evidence. 
    Little, 37 F.3d at 1075
    .
    To succeed on a Bivens cause of action, the plaintiff must demonstrate a
    constitutional violation. Garcia v. United States, 
    666 F.2d 960
    , 966 (5th Cir.
    1982). Murrell’s argument that the district court applied the wrong test to
    decide the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is unavailing. To state an
    Eighth Amendment violation based on exposure to secondhand smoke, a
    prisoner must prove objectively that he is “being exposed to unreasonably high
    levels of ETS.” Helling v. McKinney, 
    509 U.S. 25
    , 35 (1993). Second, the
    No. 07-30153
    prisoner must show subjectively that prison authorities demonstrated a
    “deliberate indifference” to his plight. 
    Id. With regard
    to Helling’s objective prong, the magistrate judge took judicial
    notice of a June 2006 Surgeon General’s report that concluded that there is no
    safe level of exposure to secondhand smoke and concluded that Murrell met
    Helling’s first prong. Because the defendants did not object to the magistrate
    judge’s report and recommendation and did not file a cross-appeal, they are
    precluded from appellate review of their argument that Murrell failed to
    establish this prong. See Matter of Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 
    14 F.3d 1088
    , 1091
    n.1 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Murrell has established that a genuine issue of material fact exists
    concerning whether the defendants were subjectively deliberately indifferent to
    his plight. Whitley v. Hunt, 
    158 F.3d 882
    (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other
    grounds, Booth v. Churner, 
    532 U.S. 731
    (2001); Rochon v. City of Angola,
    
    122 F.3d 319
    , 320 (5th Cir. 1997). Murrell’s summary judgment evidence shows
    that the defendants knew that Murrell was allergic to environmental tobacco
    smoke (ETS) and that ETS caused him to have migraines and high blood
    pressure. Murrell specifically asked the defendants to enforce the no smoking
    policy. His evidence, particularly the sworn statements of two other inmates,
    indicates that prison officials essentially looked the other way when inmates
    smoked in their cells or in other no smoking areas. He also asked prison officials
    to house him with inmates who did not smoke and gave the officials the inmates’
    names. The prison responded that it was not feasible to move him. Accordingly,
    the district court erred when it granted the defendants’ motion for summary
    judgment. Moreover, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See
    
    Rochon, 122 F.3d at 320
    .
    No. 07-30153
    Murrell also argues that summary judgment was inappropriate because
    the defendants did not timely respond to his request for admissions and his
    requests should have been deemed admitted. Under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 36(a), requests for admissions are deemed admitted if not answered
    within 30 days. See Hulsey v. Texas, 
    929 F.2d 168
    , 171 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a), a matter in a request for admissions is
    admitted unless the party to whom the request is directed answers or objects to
    the matter within 30 days.”). Any matter admitted under Rule 36 is deemed
    conclusively established unless the court permits withdrawal of the admission.
    FED. R. CIV. P. 36(b).       Further, if the requests for admissions concern an
    essential issue, the failure to respond to requests for admission can lead to a
    grant of summary judgment against the non- responding party. Dukes v. South
    Carolina Ins. Co., 
    770 F.2d 545
    , 548-49 (5th Cir. 1985). In this case, the
    plaintiff's requests were served March 13, 2006, and responses were not filed
    until May 2, 2006. The requests for admissions that defendants failed to timely
    respond to concerned the essential issues of this claim. The deemed admissions
    conclusively establish that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
    Murrell’s serious medical needs. Thus, the deemed admissions also provide a
    basis for concluding that the grant of summary judgment to defendants was
    erroneous. See, e.g., Hill v. Breazeale, 197 Fed. Appx. 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2006).1
    1
    Upon remand, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b), the district court could,
    on motion, permit the deemed admissions to be withdrawn or amended “if it would promote
    the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded that it would
    prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the merits.” FED.
    R. CIV. P. 36(b). However, even if the deemed admissions were set aside, summary judgment
    would nonetheless be inappropriate because, as discussed above, the summary judgment
    evidence shows that a material issue of genuine fact exists regarding whether the defendants
    were deliberately indifferent.
    No. 07-30153
    The district court’s dismissal of Murrell’s suit is VACATED, and the case
    is REMANDED for further proceedings.