Romaguera v. Gegenheimer , 169 F.3d 223 ( 1999 )

Revised January 8, 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
__________________________________________
No. 97-30866
_________________________________________
PHYLLIS ROMAGUERA; ET AL,
Plaintiffs,
PHYLLIS ROMAGUERA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
JON GEGENHEIMER,CLERK OF COURT, 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, EX OFFICIO RECORDER OF MORTGAGES AND CONVEYANCES,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA; ET AL,
Defendants,
JON GEGENHEIMER, CLERK OF COURT, 24TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT, EX OFFICIO RECORDER OF MORTGAGES AND CONVEYANCES,
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA,
Defendants-Appellants.
__________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
__________________________________________
December 24, 1998
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1991, Phyllis Romaguera and two other employees of the
Jefferson Parish Clerk’s Office (“plaintiffs”) brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor of Louisiana and Jon
Gegenheimer (“Gegenheimer”), in his official capacity as the
Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the drug-testing policy at the clerk’s office and to have
Louisiana’s statute regulating public-sector drug testing
declared unconstitutional. The plaintiffs also requested
attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that a temporary
restraining order (“TRO”) be issued and that the hearing on the
preliminary injunction be consolidated with the trial on the
merits for a permanent injunction. The district court granted
the motion.
After the consolidated hearing and trial, the district court
issued a permanent injunction enjoining the random drug-testing
of a major portion, but not all, of the employees at the clerk’s
office. The district court concluded that it was unnecessary to
reach the constitutionality of the Louisiana drug-testing
statute. The court also dismissed the Governor of Louisiana as a
defendant in the case.
Gegenheimer appealed the district court’s judgment,
contending that the parties did not realize that the preliminary-
injunction hearing would be consolidated with the trial on the
merits for a permanent injunction. On appeal, this Court vacated
the district court’s judgment and remanded for a trial on the
merits. We concluded that the district court had modified its
prior consolidation order in open court by agreeing to limit the
2
preceding to a preliminary-injunction hearing. On remand, two of
the plaintiffs were voluntarily dismissed, leaving Phyllis
Romaguera (“Romaguera”) as the sole plaintiff in the case.
After a trial on the merits, the district court entered
final judgment enjoining the random drug-testing of Romaguera and
declared that the random testing of specified groups of employees
at the clerk’s office was unconstitutional. The district court’s
judgment was entered on May 6, 1996.
On May 16, 1996, Gegenheimer filed a motion for new trial,
which the district court denied on September 27, 1996.
Gegenheimer then unsuccessfully sought leave to file an out-of-
time appeal.
On April 14, 1997, Romaguera filed a motion for attorneys’
fees. This filling occurred 343 days after the entry of final
judgment and 199 days after the denial of Gegenheimer’s motion
for new trial. Gegenheimer opposed Romaguera’s motion as
untimely under FED.R.CIV.P. (54)(d)(2). The district court
entered an order allowing Romaguera to proceed with her request
for attorneys’ fees. The district court subsequently awarded
Romaguera attorneys’ fees in the amount of $57,272.09. The
district court then amended its judgment on joint motion of the
parties so that it would accurately reflect a prior stipulation
between the parties regrading attorneys’ fees. The amended
judgment awarded Romaguera $54,165 in attorneys’ fees and
$3,272.09 in expenses. Gegenheimer appealed to this Court.
3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two issues presented before this Court: (1)
whether Romaguera’s request for attorneys’ fees was barred by
FED.R.CIV.P. 54(d)(2); and (2) if it was not barred, whether the
district court’s award for attorneys’ fees was excessive.
Section 1988 grants district courts discretionary authority
to award reasonable attorneys’ fees to prevailing parties in
civil rights actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). In resolving
whether the request for attorneys’ fees was timely we apply a de
novo standard of review because resolution of the issue turns to
a large extent on the district court’s interpretation of Rule
54(d)(2). See Bellaire Gen. Hosp. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Mich., 97 F.3d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 1996)(reviewing de novo a
district court’s interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure). The appropriate standard of review for resolving the
second issue, whether the amount awarded for attorneys’ fees was
excessive, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bell v.
Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
Rule 54(d)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
(A) Claims for attorneys’ fees and related
nontaxable expenses shall be made by motion unless the
substantive law governing the action provides for the
recovery of such fees as an element of damages to be
proved at trial.
4
(B) Unless otherwise provided by statue or order
of the court, the motion must be filed and served no
later than 14 days after entry of judgment . . . .
Accordingly, to be entitled to attorneys’ fees, a party must
(1) request attorneys’ fees in its pleadings and (2) file a
timely motion for attorneys’ fees under Rule 54(d)(2) within
fourteen days after the entry of final judgment. United
Industries, Inc. v. Simon-Hartley, Ltd., 91 F.3d 762, 766 (5th
Cir. 1996). Unless modified by statute or court order, a party’s
failure to file a timely motion for attorneys’ fees under Rule
54(d)(2) serves as a waiver of the request. Id.
A strict reading of Rule 54(d)(2) and this Court’s decision
in United Industries, Inc., would seem to indicate that Romaguera
waived her claim for attorneys’ fees by failing to file a motion
within fourteen days after the entry of final judgment. In
United Industries, the prevailing party failed to raise the issue
of attorneys’ fees during litigation and failed to file a motion
within fourteen days of entry of final judgment. Id. The issue
was raised nearly a year after the entry of final judgment and
this Court properly denied the party’s request because it was
untimely under Rule 54(d)(2). Id.
This Circuit has previously held that one of the key
functions of Rule 54(d)(2) is to ensure that parties properly
notify their counterparts of their requests for attorneys’ fees.
5
Id. at 766,(citing FED.R.CIV.P. 54 advisory committee’s note
(subdivision (d)). Rule 54(d)(2) sets out the minimum
requirements needed to effectuate a valid notice of the request.
The failure to file the request would ordinarily result in a
request being denied. However, a court may deem a notification
sufficient if it satisfies the intended purposes of Rule
54(d)(2). Id.
In the case before us, the particular events that transpired
excused Romaguera from having to file a motion for attorneys’
fees. In its “Order and Reasons,” accompanying its 1992
judgment, the district court acknowledged Romaguera’s request by
stating: “The plaintiffs have requested attorneys’ fees under 42
U.S.C. § 1988. This shall be addressed at a separate hearing.”
The district court’s 1992 judgment was subsequently vacated by
this Court. Then on remand, the district court entered judgment
in favor of Romaguera after holding a trial on the merits. In
its “Findings and Conclusions on Remand,” the district court
again stated: “The plaintiffs have requested attorney’s fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This shall be addressed at a separate
hearing.”
We hold that the district court’s acknowledgment of
Romaguera’s request served to notify opposing counsel of the
request, thereby satisfying Congress’ intended purpose under Rule
54(d)(2). Had the court not addressed the issue, or refrained
6
from giving the impression that a hearing would be scheduled by
the court, Romaguera would have been required to file the motion
under Rule 54(d)(2). As a consequence of the court’s
acknowledgment of the request, however, a filing was not needed
and the subsequent filing by Romaguera simply served as a
reminder to the court that it had failed to set a hearing date.
Gegenheimer’s second argument is that, if Romaguera did not
waive her claim for attorneys’ fees, the district court abused
its discretion in failing to reduce Romaguera’s fee award.
Gegenheimer bases this upon (1) her unsuccessful defense of the
district court’s judgment during the interim appeal and (2) her
limited success in the case. In the district court, the parties
stipulated that the total fees and expenses of Romaguera’s
counsel for the entire course of the litigation amounted to
$57,437.09. Gegenheimer does not dispute that Romaguera is a
“prevailing party” under § 1988 or the reasonableness of the
hourly rate charged by Romaguera’s counsel. He merely contends
that Romaguera’s fee award should have been reduced based upon
the asserted grounds.
In awarding attorneys’ fees, the district court is required
to consider not only the product of the hours worked multiplied
by the billing rate, but also whether the plaintiff failed on
alternative claims and whether the award is excessive in light of
the plaintiff’s overall level of success. Hensley v. Eckerhart,
7
461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). When the plaintiff raises several
claims and those claims involve a common core of facts or related
legal theories, the district court need not attempt to divide
counsel’s hours among the claims. Instead, it should focus on
“the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff
in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.”
Id. at 435. The most critical factor in determining a fee award
is the “degree of success obtained.” Id. at 436. While counsel
obtaining “excellent results” are entitled to a fully
compensatory fee, those with limited success may not be. Id.
Regarding Gegenheimer’s first assertion, that the plaintiff
should not be compensated attorneys’ fees for the interim appeal,
we hold that the appeal was strategically sound in light of the
confusion that occurred at the district court level concerning
the preliminary hearing. Gegenheimer’s second point, however,
presents a problem and must be addressed in more detail.
In their complaint, Romaguera and the other two plaintiffs
sought to enjoin Gegenheimer’s entire drug-testing policy. The
policy consisted of five categories of testing: (1) pre-
employment; (2) post-accident; (3) random; (4) reasonable
suspicion; and (5) return-to-duty. The plaintiffs also sought to
have Louisiana’s statute regulating public-sector drug testing
declared unconstitutional. Finally, the plaintiffs sought class
certification.
8
Romaguera dropped four of the five categories covered in the
policy, the constitutional issue was dismissed by the court and
Romaguera no longer sought class certification after the court’s
initial judgment was vacated. The level of success to
Romaguera’s claim was limited to the issue on random testing.
In determining the proper award for attorneys’ fees, a
district court must determine what is a reasonable expenditure in
light of the plaintiff’s success. Id. at 433. In this case, the
district court failed to discuss how the other points were
relevant to Romaguera’s random testing claim. We conceded that
random testing was the category most applicable to Romaguera.
However, we fail to see the justification for awarding attorneys’
fees for the other claims. Therefore, we conclude that the
attorneys’ fees award constituted an abuse of discretion by the
district court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly we AFFIRM the district court in its granting
Romaguera’s request for attorneys’ fees. We VACATE the amount of
attorneys’ fees awarded and REMAND this issue to the lower court,
instructing it to award attorneys’ fees consistent with this
opinion.
9