United States v. Jordan ( 2002 )


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  •                   IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-10038
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MONTOYA JORDAN; LEWIS HENRY ANTHONY,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:00-CR-117-6-A
    --------------------
    May 13, 2002
    Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges
    PER CURIAM:*
    Montoya Jordan and Lewis Henry Anthony have appealed their
    jury convictions of conspiracy to possess and possession of stolen
    mail, and bank fraud.     We AFFIRM.
    Appellants’ contention that the evidence was insufficient to
    support   their    convictions,   based    principally   on   the   alleged
    unreliability of the accomplice testimony, is without merit.            See
    United States v. Robles-Pantoja, 
    887 F.2d 1250
    , 1254-55 (5th Cir.
    1989).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 01-10038
    -2-
    Anthony argues that the district court abused its discretion
    by admitting into evidence his prior conviction of bank fraud.
    This evidence was admissible because it was relevant to issues
    other    than   Anthony’s   character;   its   probative   value   was   not
    substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect; and it met the
    other requirements of FED. R. EVID. 403.        See FED. R. EVID. 404(b);
    United States v. Richards, 
    204 F.3d 177
    , 199-201 (5th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    531 U.S. 826
     (2000).
    Jordan contends that the district court’s admission into
    evidence of an undercover police officer’s testimony entitles him
    to reversal, although the court struck the testimony because of a
    discovery violation and instructed the jury to disregard it.
    Jordan’s contention lacks merit because his counsel expressed
    satisfaction with the district court’s limiting instruction; there
    was no motion for a mistrial; and the court did not commit plain
    error.    See United States v. Norris, 
    780 F.2d 1207
    , 1212 (5th Cir.
    1986).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining
    the Government’s objection to a question by Anthony’s counsel on
    cross-examination of a postal inspector, who testified to the chain
    of custody of forged checks and other items sent to a laboratory
    for fingerprint analysis.         The question, whether Anthony had
    voluntarily provided a handwriting specimen, clearly exceeded the
    scope of direct examination; and Anthony has not shown that the
    district court’s ruling resulted in any prejudice to his defense.
    See FED. R. EVID. 611(b); United States v. Route, 
    104 F.3d 59
    , 64
    (5th Cir. 1997).
    No. 01-10038
    -3-
    Contrary to Jordan’s next contention, there was ample evidence
    which proved that the offenses were committed in the Northern
    District of Texas, as alleged in the indictment. See United States
    v. Carreon-Palacio, 
    267 F.3d 381
    , 391-93 (5th Cir. 2001).
    Anthony contends that he was denied a fair trial as a result
    of the district court’s erroneous evidentiary rulings, considered
    both individually and cumulatively.         This lacks merit because
    Anthony has not shown that any such errors were made by the
    district court.    See United States v. Lindell, 
    881 F.2d 1313
    , 1327
    (5th Cir. 1989).
    Anthony asserts that the district court reversibly erred by
    ordering him to pay restitution to two financial institutions which
    lost money as a result of cashing forged checks.      It was proper,
    however, for the court to base its order of restitution on either
    Anthony’s conviction of conspiracy to possess checks stolen from
    the mail or his conviction of bank fraud.      See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A;
    United States v. Hughey, 
    147 F.3d 423
    , 437 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Anthony now contends, for the first time, that some of the
    losses claimed by the banks did not occur within the time periods
    alleged in the indictment.    However, he would not be entitled
    to relief on this new claim unless he could show plain error.     See
    United States v. Vasquez, 
    216 F.3d 456
    , 459 (5th Cir.),         cert.
    denied, 
    531 U.S. 972
     (2000).    “Questions of fact capable
    of resolution . . . at sentencing [such as this] can never
    constitute plain error.”     United States v. Lopez, 
    923 F.2d 47
    , 50
    (5th Cir. 1991); accord United States v. Chung, 
    261 F.3d 536
    , 539
    No. 01-10038
    -4-
    (5th Cir. 2001).    Thus Anthony is not entitled to any relief
    relative to the restitution order.
    The judgments of conviction of Lewis Henry Anthony and Montoya
    Jordan are due to be, and they are hereby, AFFIRMED in all
    respects.
    AFFIRMED.