Eason v. Engineered Prod Inc ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 00-30141
Summary Calendar
_____________________
CARRIE EASON, Individually and
as Class Representative,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ENGINEERED PRODUCTS, INC.;
W C I OUTDOOR PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 99-CV-853
_________________________________________________________________
August 23, 2000
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
I
This appeal presents intentional tort and defamation claims
under Louisiana law. The plaintiff, Carrie Eason, a former
plastics worker employed by Engineered Products, Inc. (“EPI”),
alleges that she was injured as a result of EPI’s “intentional
production and management practices” that were “substantially
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
certain” to lead to the onset of carpal tunnel syndrome. Eason
further alleges that one of EPI’s component suppliers, White
Consolidated Industries (“WCI”), was jointly liable for her
injuries. Specifically, she alleges that WCI supplied EPI with
many of the molds that were used by EPI, and her injuries resulted
from having to cut excess plastic poured into these WCI molds.
Finally, Eason alleges that she was defamed by EPI’s publication of
false statements to the Louisiana Department of Employment
Securities regarding the reason for her termination. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. It reasoned
that Eason’s intentional tort claims were untimely because they
were filed more than one year after she became aware of the
defendants’ conduct and the resulting injuries. We affirm.
II
As an initial matter, we make two observations. First, Eason
is procedurally barred from raising a claim for retaliatory
discharge under Louisiana’s Worker’s Compensation scheme because
she raised the claim for the first time on appeal. See Daly v.
Sprague, 675 F.2d 716, 722 (5th Cir. 1982)(stating that claims “not
raised to the district court will not be addressed when presented
for the first time at the appellate level”). Second, Eason is
barred by the Louisiana Worker’s Compensation scheme from alleging
any claim for negligence against EPI. See La.Rev.Stat.Ann
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§ 23:1032(A)(1)(a) (West 2000)(stating that “except for intentional
acts . . . the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or
his dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or
disease. . . shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies, and
claims for damages”).
III
We thus turn to Eason’s intentional tort claims against EPI
and WCI. With respect to Eason’s claim against EPI, as we have
previously noted, the district court stated:
Plaintiff’s affidavit makes it clear she was aware of the
allegedly wrongful conduct on the part of EPI--forcing
employees to remove excess flashing caused by production
tools in disrepair--before she was officially diagnosed
the carpal tunnel syndrome. In addition, Plaintiff
became undeniably aware of both damages and causation in
April of 1997, when she was formally diagnosed. As such,
even though Plaintiff could, at least hypothetically,
establish continuous acts on behalf of EPI and resulting
damages, her argument still must fail as she had full
knowledge of her injury allegedly caused by EPI in April
1997. As such, any entitlement to the continuing tort
doctrine would have ended upon diagnosis. As diagnosis
occurred over one year prior to filling suit, Plaintiff’s
action against EPI is time barred.
As to Eason’s claim against WCI, the district court stated:
Plaintiff bears the burden of showing a series of
unlawful, continuous, and related acts with resulting
continuous damage. This Court finds Plaintiff cannot
sustain such a burden. The only act on behalf of WCI
that could have conceivably contributed to Plaintiff’s
condition is that it supplied molds to be used in the
machines owned and operated by EPI. Plaintiff has
proffered no evidence tending to show any continuous acts
on behalf of WCI. The Court finds that supplying molds
cannot, as alleged by Plaintiff, constitute the request
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continuous acts on behalf of WCI. As the continuing tort
doctrine is inapplicable, Plaintiff is not entitled to an
extension of the prescriptive period and the claim
against WCI is time barred.
We agree with the district court. Eason alleges that EPI
committed the tort by implementing manufacturing
practices/procedures that it knew would result in her suffering
some form of injury. Assuming this act constitutes a tort by EPI
against Eason, her cause of action matured when Eason suffered the
alleged injury--the onset of carpal tunnel syndrome. There simply
were no further tortious acts on the part of EPI that could supply
the basis for a continuing tort.
As noted by the district court, it is undisputed that Eason
was aware of the allegedly tortious practices of EPI prior to April
1997. Further, in April 1997, Eason was formally diagnosed with
carpal tunnel syndrome and made aware of the fact that the injury
was employment related. Consequently, the statute of limitations
began to run in April 1997. Eason did not file the instant suit
until May 13, 1999, a full two years after the latest possible date
from which the applicable one year limitations period could
arguably have begun. Her claim against EPI is therefore
prescribed.
With respect to WCI, assuming that the act of supplying of
molds to EPI constitutes a tortious act, the applicable one-year
statute of limitations began to run when Eason became aware of the
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fact that WCI supplied EPI with the molds that ultimately caused
her injury. It is undisputed that Eason was aware of all of the
relevant facts as of April 1997. There were no continuing acts on
the part of WCI upon which a tort claim could be based. Thus, as
noted above, because Eason did not file her claim against WCI until
May 1999, any intentional tort claim against WCI is likewise
prescribed.
IV
Finally, with respect to Eason’s defamation claim against EPI,
Louisiana law is clear: any communication between an employer and
the Louisiana Department of Employment Security is privileged so
long as the statement was not made in bad faith. See Melder v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 731 So. 2d 991, 999 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir.
1999). Eason has failed to come forward with any evidence
establishing that the allegedly false information published by EPI
to the Louisiana Department of Employment Security was conveyed
with malicious intent. Therefore, her defamation claim fails as a
matter of law.
V
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district
court is
A F F I R M E D.
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