Stovall v. Woods ( 2003 )


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  •                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    ____________________
    No. 02-41164
    Summary Calendar
    ____________________
    ROBERT A. STOVALL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    S.O. WOODS, JR., Chief of Texas Department of Criminal
    Justice State Classification Committee; B. ORMSBY,
    Correctional Officer; TRACY ALLEN, Chief of Unit
    Classification Committee; EDDIE WILLIAMS, Unit Warden;
    B. LORD, Correctional Officer; RICKY D. TARVER, Captain;
    L. ANDERSON, Correctional Officer; J. HORNBUCKLE,
    Correctional Officer; REGINALD BROWN, Law Library
    Supervisor; ROSEMARY HANICAK, Unit Health Administrator;
    GARY GOMEZ, Regional Director; ROCHELLE MCKINNEY,
    Registered Nurse; D. LAUDERDALE, Registered Nurse;
    MICHAEL JACKSON, Correctional Officer; B. BAILEY,
    Correctional Officer; KEITH RUSSELL, Supervisor;
    U.P. SORRELS, Correctional Officer; C. SHULL, Correctional
    Officer; TARA CLARK, Correctional Officer; P. TINCHER,
    Correctional Officer; D. ARMFIELD, Correctional Officer;
    MICHAEL DABNEY, Unit Disciplinary Hearing Officer;
    DAVID ALRIDGE, Correctional Officer; U.P. GLOVER, Nurse; TIM
    WEST, Warden; Timothy Vanbibber, Unit Grievance Coordinator,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    (1:99-CV-260)
    _________________________________________________________________
    February 19, 2003
    Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Robert A. Stovall, Texas inmate # 790244,    proceeding pro se
    and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), appeals the denial of his motion to
    supplement his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     complaint and the subsequent
    dismissal of that complaint.     He claimed malicious prosecution,
    harrassment, and deliberate indifference to his medical needs,
    alleging that defendants filed disciplinary charges against him
    for, inter alia, his refusal to shave, despite knowing of his
    condition (irritated skin) for which he had been issued a clipper
    shave pass exempting him from the shaving requirement.       Stovall
    also alleged he is HIV-positive and had been denied access to
    medical treatment.
    The   district   court    adopted    the   Magistrate   Judge’s
    recommendation that Stovall’s claims be dismissed as frivolous and
    for failure to state a claim.     That report did not address the
    claimed harassment or deliberate indifference to medical needs.
    Stovall appeals this omission.    However, he does not address the
    harassment issue in his brief.       We will not consider issues an
    appellant has failed to raise.   Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy
    Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748 (5th Cir. 1987).      And, for his
    deliberate indifference claim, Stovall only contends defendants
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    2
    were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by
    filing disciplinary charges against him for failing to shave.
    To obtain relief under § 1983, Stovall must, inter alia,
    demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right. E.g., Allison
    v. Kyle, 
    66 F.3d 71
    , 73 (5th Cir. 1995).             We review a dismissal
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2) of a complaint as frivolous for an
    abuse of discretion; a dismissal for failure to state a claim, de
    novo.   Berry v. Brady, 
    192 F.3d 504
    , 507 (5th Cir. 1999).
    Stovall    mentions   on    appeal    only   that   he    was    charged   in
    disciplinary case 970373246 for refusing to shave.                   He claims he
    was treated with deliberate indifference to his serious medical
    condition, but he does not explain the circumstances attendant to
    that treatment.    Stovall does not mention a denial of due process;
    he does not explain what treatment, if any, was denied; and he does
    not claim he was deprived of a protected liberty interest.
    Although     we   apply    less   stringent    standards         to   parties
    proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel and
    liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants, such litigants must
    still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the requirements
    of FED. R. APP. P. 28.   E.g., Grant v. Cuellar, 
    59 F.3d 523
    , 524 (5th
    Cir. 1995); Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Finally, the denial of Stovall’s motion to file a supplement
    to his complaint was not an abuse of discretion.              Lewis v. Knutson,
    
    699 F.2d 230
    , 239 (5th Cir. 1983).
    3
    In sum, Stovall’s appeal is without arguable merit and is
    dismissed as frivolous.     See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2; Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).      This dismissal and the district
    court’s dismissal of Stovall’s § 1983 complaint as frivolous each
    count as “strikes” under the three-strikes provision of 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).   See Adepegba v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 387-88 (5th Cir.
    1996); 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii).      Stovall is cautioned that,
    if he accumulates a third “strike” under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g), he
    will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed
    while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility, unless he is
    under imminent danger of serious physical injury.       See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).
    DISMISSED; THREE-STRIKES WARNING ISSUED
    4