Smith v. Barnhart ( 2003 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-50554
    Summary Calendar
    GARY D. SMITH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. EP-00-CV-197-NG
    February 26, 2003
    Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Gary D. Smith appeals the denial of his application for Social
    Security disability benefits alleging that he was disabled because
    of severe gastroenteritis, hearing loss, impinged shoulders, sinus
    bradycardia, hypertension, leukocytoclatic vasculitis, vertigo, bad
    back, granuloma, contact dermatitis, degenerative joint disease of
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R.47.5 the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    the feet, toes, ankles, knees, hips, lower back, upper back, neck,
    shoulders, elbows, wrists, hands and fingers, bad feet, allergic
    rhinitis, hay fever, sinusitis, a depressive disorder, obsessive-
    compulsive disorder, breathing difficulties, and fibromyalgia.
    Smith argues that the “district court” failed to consider what
    effect his combined mental and physical impairments had on his
    ability     to   engage    in   substantial    gainful     employment.      In
    particular, he complains that the ALJ did not find that his alleged
    fibromyalgia and/or his mental condition were disabling.              He also
    contends    that   the    district   court    erred   in   finding   that   his
    impairments did not meet or equal the listing of impairments and in
    finding that the ALJ did not fail to fully develop the medical
    evidence.
    Although the record contains a diagnosis of fibromyalgia in
    June 1982, some nine years before Smith retired from the Army,
    there was no evidence that this condition was disabling. After his
    retirement (not shown to be for disability), Smith was able to
    handle his own affairs and kept busy with various activities
    despite being unemployed. The assessment of fibromyalgia presented
    to the Appeals Council was made more than two years after the date
    Smith was last insured for disability benefits and is therefore
    irrelevant.      Torres v. Shalala, 
    48 F.3d 887
    , 894 n.12 (5th Cir.
    1995).
    The ALJ noted Smith’s allegation that a mental impairment
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    relative to depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder limited
    his ability to perform basic work activities.             He also noted,
    however, that Smith had never sought treatment for complaints of
    any emotional or mental symptoms and that he told a psychiatrist
    that he was experiencing some psychiatric symptoms but overall had
    adapted well to civilian life and was not under any psychiatric
    care.   He noted that a mental status evaluation described Smith as
    within normal limits.    The ALJ noted that Dr. Rodriguez-Chevres, a
    psychiatrist, had diagnosed the possible presence of obsessive-
    compulsive disorder, and cyclothymic disorder or bipolar mood
    disorder, but had concluded that any psychiatric condition that
    might be present did not significantly limit Smith’s social or
    industrial adaptability.      Finally, the ALJ noted Dr. Rodriguez-
    Chevres’ conclusion that Smith was competent to handle his own
    affairs.
    The   ALL’s   reasons   for   finding   lack   of   disability   were
    considerable.   The greatest evidence of disability came from Smith
    himself, whose testimony the ALJ found not entirely credible.          The
    ALJ noted that there was a significant disparity between Smith’s
    reported symptoms and the objective findings regarding his overall
    condition.   
    Id. To the
    extent Smith’s allegations conflicted with
    the medical evidence, the resolution of that conflict was within
    the province of the ALJ.     See Greenspan v. Shalala, 
    38 F.3d 232
    ,
    237 (5th Cir. 1994); Seders v. Sullivan, 
    914 F.2d 614
    , 617 (5th
    3
    Cir. 1990).   The ALL’s findings regarding impairment severity were
    reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.         Moreover, there
    was   sufficient   evidence   upon   which   the   ALJ   could   determine
    disability such that additional evidence was not necessary.
    AFFIRMED.
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