Winfield v. Cain ( 2003 )


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  •                      IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-30334
    Summary Calendar
    LAWYER WINFIELD, JR.,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 97-CV-3596-E
    --------------------
    March 18, 2003
    Before JONES, STEWART and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Lawyer Winfield, Jr., Louisiana prisoner # 83494, appeals
    the    district       court’s      denial      of   his   28    U.S.C.    2254   petition
    challenging the reasonable doubt jury instruction at his trial.
    Winfield argues that the jury instruction for reasonable doubt
    given to the jury in his criminal trial was unconstitutional under
    Cage       v.   Louisiana,       
    498 U.S. 39
       (1990).       He     notes   that   the
    instruction         in    his     case    contained       all   three     phrases   found
    objectionable            in     Cage,     i.e.,     “grave      uncertainty,”       “moral
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 02-30334
    -2-
    certainty,” and “substantial doubt,” as well as the articulation
    requirement condemned in Humphrey v. Cain, 
    120 F.3d 526
    , 530-31
    (5th Cir. 1997), adopted in relevant part, 
    138 F.3d 552
     (5th Cir.
    1998)(en banc).
    Winfield’s reliance on Humphrey is misplaced. This court
    cannot consider the “articulation requirement” to be problematic
    “as the Supreme Court has never expressed disfavor with such
    language.”     Mulheisen v. Ieyoub, 
    168 F.3d 840
    , 844 n.2 (5th Cir.
    1999). The AEDPA allows application only of Supreme Court rulings.
    See id.; 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).      Pursuant to § 2254(d), a federal
    court must defer to a state court’s resolution of both pure
    questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact unless the
    state court’s determination was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable
    application” of clearly established federal law as determined by
    the Supreme Court.     See Hill v. Johnson, 
    210 F.3d 481
    , 485 (5th
    Cir. 2000); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1).
    Although    Winfield’s   instruction       contained   the   three
    problematic phrases contained in the Cage instruction and in the
    unconstitutional instruction in Morris v. Cain, 
    186 F.3d 581
     (5th
    Cir. 1999), it also contained the alternative definition, “abiding
    conviction” of the defendant’s guilt, which was lacking in both
    Cage and Morris.     This alternative definition of reasonable doubt
    places Winfield’s instruction within the realm of the instructions
    found suitable in Victor v. Nebraska, 
    511 U.S. 1
    , 14-16 (1994).
    Accordingly,     Winfield’s   reasonable     doubt    instruction      passes
    No. 02-30334
    -3-
    constitutional muster.   See 
    id.
     The state court’s denial of relief
    on this claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law
    as determined by the Supreme Court.   2254(d)(1).
    AFFIRMED.