Allstate Life Ins v. Saucier ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 02-60301
Summary Calendar
_______________________
ALLSTATE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
versus
ANDREA SAUCIER, ET AL,
Defendants,
ANDREA SAUCIER,
Defendant-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN GIL FEDT ESTATE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(01-CV-376)
October 21, 2002
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
The Estate of Steven Gil Fedt (Estate) appeals the
district court’s grant of Saucier’s motion for summary judgment and
its consequent rejection of the Estate’s motion for summary
judgment. On appeal, the Estate makes two contentions. We reject
both contentions and affirm the decision of the district court.
First, the Estate contends that Saucier waived her right
to proceeds under Fedt’s Allstate insurance policy in a property
settlement agreement executed between Saucier and Fedt in
connection with their divorce. Second, the Estate contends that
the final judgment of divorce and property settlement agreement bar
Saucier from asserting a claim to the insurance policy proceeds
under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. This
court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, Mowbray v. Cameron County, 274 F.3d 269, 278 (5th Cir. 2001),
and may affirm the grant of summary judgment on any ground
supported by the record, McGruder v. Will, 204 F.3d 220, 222 (5th
Cir. 2000).
In July, 1999, Fedt purchased a $500,000 life insurance
policy from Allstate, naming Saucier as the primary beneficiary.
In October 1999, Fedt and Saucier married, then separated in May
2000. Following their final separation, Fedt designated Andrea
Fedt, now Andrea Saucier, as the sole beneficiary of his Allstate
insurance policy. Upon their divorce in September 2000, the final
judgment of divorce incorporated a separation and property
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settlement agreement, which provided in part that each party
“relinquish any claim that they might now have, or may have in the
future, against any . . . accounts, funds or securities now held in
the name of the other . . . .” After the divorce, Saucier remained
the sole beneficiary on Fedt’s Allstate insurance policy. The
policy states, “Unless changed, the beneficiary named in the
application is the payee to whom we will pay the death benefit.”
(R. 12).
Saucier did not waive her right in the property
settlement agreement to proceeds under the Allstate insurance
policy, and the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
do not bar her from asserting a claim to such proceeds. Under
Mississippi law, general contract rules apply in construing post-
nuptial agreements, and such agreements must be considered as a
whole in determining the intent of the parties. Roberts v.
Roberts, 381 So. 2d 1333, 1335 (Miss. 1980). In this case, the
Fedt-Saucier property settlement agreement cannot reasonably be
interpreted to cover the proceeds of the insurance policy. The
agreement specifically identifies separate ownership of valuable
assets such as a house and car but does not mention the insurance
policy. Furthermore, proceeds from the life insurance policy
cannot reasonably be considered funds held by Fedt or funds that
would ever come into his possession.
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The Estate cites three cases from this Court to establish
that former spouses may waive their right in divorce decrees to
life insurance policy proceeds, but these cases deal with insurance
policies covered by ERISA and federal common law. See Manning v.
Hayes, 212 F.3d 866 (5th Cir. 2000); Clift v. Connecticut Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 210 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2000); Brandon v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 18 F.3d 1321 (5th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, this Court found
valid waivers in Clift and Brandon only when there was specific
language in the divorce decrees regarding the insurance policies.
In this case, the language of the property settlement agreement
between Fedt and Saucier would not lead a reasonable person to
“under[stand] that she was waiving her beneficiary interest in the
life insurance policy at issue.” Clift, 210 F.3d at 271-72.
Since there are no issues of material fact that preclude
the entry of summary judgment in Saucier’s favor, we affirm the
district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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