United States v. Castillo ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
REVISED DECEMBER 14, 2005
F I L E D
November 3, 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 03-20944
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee - Cross-Appellant
v.
RICARDO ANGEL CASTILLO
Defendant - Appellant - Cross-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston
Before KING, Chief Judge, and BARKSDALE and CLEMENT, Circuit
Judges.
KING, Chief Judge:
The United States, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant in
this matter, appeals the district court’s decision to depart
downwardly from the sentencing range established by the UNITED
STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES (“U.S.S.G.” or the “Guidelines”) on the
grounds that: (1) the defendant’s HIV-positive status constituted
an extraordinary medical condition warranting a downward
departure under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4; and (2) comments made by the
prosecutor at sentencing about the defendant’s HIV-positive
1
status were malicious and endangered the defendant’s safety,
thereby justifying a departure under § 5K2.0.1 For the following
reasons, we find that the district court abused its discretion
when it departed downwardly on these bases, VACATE the district
court’s sentence, and REMAND this case for resentencing.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 12, 2002, United States Customs agents, who had
previously received a tip that Defendant Ricardo Castillo would
receive two kilograms of heroin from a seaman within the next
several days, initiated surveillance on Castillo’s Houston
apartment and on his boat, the CEC MIRAGE, which was docked at
the San Jacinto Port of Houston. On the evening of November 13,
the surveillance team followed Castillo to a Wal-Mart store,
where they observed him talking on his cellular telephone. At
approximately the same time, the surveillance team at the CEC
MIRAGE observed Geronimo Lipit, the CEC MIRAGE’s chief cook,
disembark the boat while carrying a white shopping bag. Shortly
thereafter, the surveillance team at Wal-Mart observed Castillo
meet Lipit in the Wal-Mart parking lot and get into Castillo’s
car. Houston police officers then stopped Castillo’s vehicle.
1
As explained below, Castillo’s attorney filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which
he stated that, although a notice of appeal originally had been
filed on behalf of Castillo, in his estimation an appeal would
present no legally nonfrivolous questions. The government
subsequently cross-appealed, challenging the district court’s
downward departure.
2
After his vehicle was stopped by the police, Castillo
consented in writing to a search of the car. The police found
two kilograms of heroin sewn inside a pair of men’s athletic
shorts in the white bag that Lipit had been carrying, which had
been placed behind the driver’s seat. After waiving his rights,
Lipit informed the police that additional heroin was sewn into
athletic shorts underneath his jeans. He further stated that the
heroin belonged to Castillo, and he informed the police that he
and Castillo were going to deliver it to a third party. The
total amount of the seized heroin was 3.8 kilograms.
On December 4, 2002, Lipit, in a debriefing with Customs
agents, explained how he acquired the heroin. According to
Lipit, while the CEC MIRAGE was docked in Colombia, a Colombian
man told him that he could earn $5000 by delivering heroin to
Castillo. Lipit agreed to this arrangement, picked up the
heroin, and delivered it to Castillo after the CEC MIRAGE arrived
in Houston. According to Lipit, Castillo was supposed to pay him
his $5000 fee after the delivery occurred.
On December 11, 2002, Castillo and Lipit were charged in a
two-count indictment with: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(i), and 846; and (2) aiding and
abetting possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or
more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A). On February 3, 2003, Castillo pleaded guilty to the
3
indictment without a plea agreement.
Prior to sentencing, the parties were provided with a copy
of the probation officer’s presentence investigation report
(PSR), which recommended a total offense level of twenty-nine, a
criminal history category of I, and a Guideline sentencing range
of 87-108 months imprisonment. Castillo subsequently filed
written objections to the PSR regarding factual matters that did
not affect the Guidelines calculation. On May 9, 2003, Castillo
filed an “unopposed motion to continue sentencing and motion to
file this motion and corresponding order under seal.” In this
motion, Castillo stated that he had provided information to law
enforcement and expected that it would lead to a motion for a
downward departure from the government. He asked that the motion
be filed under seal “due to the sensitive nature of the
information contained herein.” The same day, the district court
granted Castillo’s request for a sixty-day continuance and sealed
the motion and order.
On September 9, 2003, five days before Castillo was
scheduled to be sentenced, Castillo filed a “sentencing
memorandum and motion to file this pleading under seal.” In this
memorandum, Castillo argued that the district court should depart
downward from the sentencing range established by the Guidelines
for two reasons. First, he contended that the district court
should depart downward because of a disparity between how the
government rewarded him for his cooperation versus how it
4
rewarded Lipit for his cooperation. According to Castillo, both
he and Lipit cooperated with the government, but only Lipit stood
to receive a motion for downward departure by the government as a
result of that cooperation. Second, Castillo moved for a
downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 because he was HIV-
positive, which, in his view, constituted an extraordinary
physical impairment. The sentencing memorandum noted that
Castillo had been HIV-positive since 1993, had Hepatitis C, and
suffered from muscle soreness and a groin rash. Castillo also
noted in his sentencing memorandum that “[t]he probation officer
had submitted to the Court a confidential document describing Mr.
Castillo’s condition.” In fact, the PSR’s Second Addendum noted
that “a confidential page to the PSR” describing Castillo’s
condition had been submitted to the court under FED. R. CRIM. P.
32(c)(3)(A).2 Specifically, in a sealed envelope attached to
2
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(A) refers to the 2002 revised
edition of the Federal Criminal Code and Rules. See FEDERAL
CRIMINAL CODE AND RULES 154 (West 2002 2d revised ed.). FED. R. CRIM.
P. 32(d)(3), from the 2005 edition, is the corresponding rule for
information that must be excluded from the presentence report.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(3) states:
(3) Exclusions. The presentence report must exclude
the following:
(A) any diagnoses that, if disclosed, might
seriously disrupt a rehabilitation program;
(B) any sources of information obtained upon a
promise of confidentiality; and
(C) any other information that, if disclosed, might
result in physical or other harm to the defendant
or others.
5
Castillo’s sentencing memorandum was a two-page document entitled
“Information Excluded From the Presentence Report Pursuant to
Rule 32(c)(3)(A) F.R.C.P.” According to the government, this
document was never disclosed to it.
On September 15, 2003, the day of sentencing, the government
filed its response to Castillo’s sentencing memorandum. The
government did not file its response under seal. In its
response, it stated that Castillo had not provided the government
with substantial assistance, and it argued that Castillo’s HIV-
positive status was not, in and of itself, an appropriate basis
for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4. Unbeknownst to
the government, its response to Castillo’s sentencing memorandum,
along with Castillo’s sentencing memorandum, were both sealed by
the district court. Although the district court had issued a
separate order sealing Castillo’s motion for continuance based on
cooperation, it did not issue an order sealing either his
sentencing memorandum or the government’s response. According to
the government, it never knew that either its response or
Castillo’s sentencing memorandum was filed under seal.
Later in the day on September 15, the district court held
its sentencing hearing for Castillo. The court, adopting the
PSR, first found that Castillo’s total offense level was twenty-
nine, his criminal history category was I, and the applicable
Guidelines range was 87-108 months imprisonment. The district
court then asked Castillo’s lawyer to speak on her client’s
6
behalf. She replied that she wanted to discuss the issues raised
in her sentencing memorandum but did not want to “go into all the
detail that’s in there, given that I filed it under seal.” Then,
after discussing Castillo’s cooperation with the government, she
began to discuss Castillo’s “condition.” The court inquired if
drugs were available at the detention center for Castillo, and
Castillo’s lawyer, citing her sentencing memorandum, responded
that “the very nature of jail conditions is dangerous for a
person in his situation.” The court then asked whether Castillo
was “currently ill or not currently ill.” Castillo’s attorney
replied that Castillo’s medical records were “pretty vague,” that
Castillo had “muscle aches and the persistent rash that may or
may not be related to his condition,” and then said “I don’t
know.” She also told the court that “I can’t say to the court
that he qualifies.” The court then asked additional questions
about the availability of medications for Castillo, and
Castillo’s lawyer once again said that “my real argument is that
in his current condition, he should qualify for a downward
departure given his increased susceptibility in the jail.” After
Castillo’s counsel finished discussing Castillo’s medical
condition, Castillo addressed the court and asked for
forgiveness.
After Castillo addressed the court, the prosecutor began his
presentation, stating first that Castillo had not yet provided
the government with substantial assistance. The court then told
7
the prosecutor that it did not understand the government’s
written response to the motion for downward departure on health
grounds and asked for clarification on the government’s position.
The following exchange ensued:
[The prosecutor]: My entire point--and she’s right, I
couldn’t find any Fifth Circuit law on this particular
point and so basically what I did was I went to the other
circuits, as did she, and in my citation to the United
States v. Johnson [sic United States v. Rabins], the
Eighth Circuit case--it’s cold and it’s difficult for me
to stand beside Mr. Castillo knowing his physical
condition and the sympathy that I have for him, but the
fact of the matter is, this isn’t the first time in the
country that this has happened and they use terms like
“full-blown AIDS” and “advanced AIDS” literally in the
cases--
THE COURT: Well, you’re the first person who said that
and you know this is filed under seal. So, why would you
do that in this courtroom?
[The prosecutor]: My apologies. I did not know that.
THE COURT: Yes, you did know that.
[The prosecutor]: Well, I received a faxed copy from--
THE COURT: No one has said that except for you today. No
one has said that except for you.
[The prosecutor]: My apologies. It was not--it was
thoughtless and--
THE COURT: It was completely unnecessary, thoughtless,
and rude. Y’all have a seat. I’m going to come back to
you.
A forty-five minute recess was then held. When the court
returned to Castillo’s case, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: All right. United States of America versus
Ricardo Angel Castillo. We were in the middle of this
sentencing in which we were discussing the defendant’s
sentencing memorandum and specifically the issues that
8
had been raised by [defense counsel] related to the item
that was filed under seal that the Court and the lawyers
only had permission to know about and review with the
specific written permission of the defendant, which we
obtained today, specifically the defendant’s HIV status
and whether or not he had AIDS.
Counsel all are aware of the fact that this information
was provided to the Court as a specific separate sealed
piece of information that could only be disclosed to the
Court under seal with confidence, with the defendant’s
specific signature. Despite the fact that [the
prosecutor] was aware of that, he deliberately in open
court, in the presence of many other people, including
fellow prisoners of this defendant, disclosed the
defendant’s status, indicating even the possibility that
he might have full-blown AIDS, which is a direct
violation of the confidential nature of this type of
disclosure.
I can only determine from that action that the counsel
acted out of stupidity or maliciously and deliberately to
try to disclose that information in front of other
prisoners in an effort to create harm or danger for this
defendant. [The United States Attorney] assures me that
[the prosecutor] is a bright and able attorney, which
leaves me with only the choice of it being a deliberate
act on counsel’s part. And I am going to be taking that
into consideration in determining the--counsel’s action
in determining the appropriateness of departure in this
case. I just want counsel to know that.
The court then asked Castillo’s lawyer if she had anything to
add, and she declined to say anything further. The prosecutor
also declined to add anything further. The court, however, was
not finished admonishing the prosecutor, and the following
exchange then took place:
THE COURT: Okay. Did you know that you weren’t supposed
to discuss stuff that’s under seal, particularly where
the only reason that we have it is by virtue of written
permission from the prisoner?
[The prosecutor]: Your Honor, I have never received
material under seal from defense counsel. I saw--no, I
9
got them in this case. This is the very first time
that’s ever happened, that I’ve ever done that in my
career. When I got them, I thought that meant they’re no
longer under seal. It is not my intention to flaunt the
Court’s order. I honestly--it was an honest mistake. I
regret more than you could possibly know any
embarrassment that I caused the defendant. It was not my
intention.
THE COURT: It’s not embarrassment. You put him in
potential danger, physical danger by saying that in front
of other prisoners. You know that. You can’t even
imagine that there could be any other outcome of you
blurting that out, screaming it out when [defense
counsel] and I were specifically careful. You noticed
that neither one of us said HIV or AIDS, didn’t you?
[The prosecutor]: Honestly, Your Honor--
THE COURT: Did you think there was anything sort of
strange about the fact that we were both sort of dancing
around the nature of the illness?
[The prosecutor]: I apologize. I don’t know what else I
can tell you. I’ve dealt with HIV positive prisoners
before in state practice, and it’s never done under seal.
THE COURT: Did you know that this is information that’s
specifically excluded from the presentence investigation
report?
[The prosecutor]: No, ma’am.
THE COURT: Nobody told you that?
[The prosecutor]: When I got--my involvement as to the
defendant’s HIV status began Thursday evening when I
received a fax from defense counsel. Prior to that, I
didn’t know anything about it.
THE COURT: It’s not even allowed to be included in the
presentence investigation report, which is why you just
got it on Thursday evening when you probably got her
sentencing memorandum. It can’t even be included and
given to the Court period, unless the defendant gives me
specific written permission to know the information at
the time of sentencing which I got this morning, his
specific written permission for me to have this
information and to consider it in the context of
10
sentencing. It has to be done under seal. It comes in
a separate sealed envelope. It’s not part of the PSI.
It’s not supposed to be disclosed publicly.
[Defense counsel] and I went to great lengths to try to
make sure that it wasn’t--that the exact nature of the
illness was not discussed. And you just like thumbed
your nose at the whole deal. I was like what’s he--I
mean, you leave me with only--I can’t believe that you
would not have understood or known that this was
information that was specifically excluded, because you
read the presentence investigation report and you saw
that it wasn’t in there. I mean, did you not surmise
that that was there for some reason--that it wasn’t in
there for a reason?
[The prosecutor]: All I can tell you, Your Honor, is that
from my former practice in the state of Ohio, I have
dealt with HIV defendants and it was never under seal.
It was never my intention to flaunt the Court’s order.
It was never my intention to violate any rule. I
honestly did not know.
The court then granted Castillo’s request for a downward
departure and sentenced him to fifty-seven months imprisonment.
The court stated the following as the basis for its departure:
Although it is not clear to the Court the exact current
medical status of [Castillo’s] condition, that is,
whether he is HIV positive or he has AIDS, the Court is
taking that condition into consideration specifically in
this case in determining that a downward departure should
be granted for two reasons. One, the Court is departing
downward under 5H1.4 based on the Court’s finding that he
has an extraordinary medical condition.
The Court is additionally departing downward under 5K2.0,
finding that counsel’s action this morning deliberately
placed the defendant in danger of--in possible danger and
repercussions from fellow prisoners, in that counsel
disclosed in the presence of other persons incarcerated
with this defendant the nature of the defendant’s HIV
status, suggesting even the possibility that he might
have full-blown AIDS, in a manner that the Court believes
is designed to potentially impact his Eighth Amendment
rights. And that could place the defendant in
unnecessary danger and subject him to needing additional
11
protection, and that a departure on that basis is
warranted to avoid any failure to protect issues that
might arise from the unauthorized disclosure of his
medical condition to other prisoners who were in the
courtroom this morning.
Subsequently, the court attached a written statement of reasons
to its judgment, noting the following as the grounds for its
downward departure:
The Court finds the defendant has an extraordinary
physical condition which warrants a departure pursuant to
USSG § 5H1.4. In addition, the Court downwardly departs
pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0 and finds counsel for the
Government was malicious and deliberate in disclosing the
defendant’s confidential medical information to the
public during sentencing proceedings putting the
defendant in danger and repercussion from fellow
prisoners which warrants special prisoner protection.
At no time did the government object to the district court’s
decision to depart downwardly under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. Prior to
sentencing, the district court advised counsel for both parties
that “[t]he lawyers will have a final opportunity to make any
objections before the sentence is finally imposed.” Immediately
following sentencing, the district court gave counsel that
opportunity, yet the government made no such objection:
THE COURT: [D]o you know of any reason why the sentence
should not be imposed as stated?
[The prosecutor]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Then the sentence will be imposed as stated.
On March 22, 2004, counsel for Castillo filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which
he stated that, although a notice of appeal had been filed on
12
behalf of Castillo, he believed that an appeal would present no
legally nonfrivolous questions. Accordingly, he moved to
withdraw from the case. On September 10, 2004, before the court
ruled on the motion to withdraw, the government cross-appealed,
challenging the district court’s decision to grant Castillo’s
request for a downward departure. Castillo’s attorney responded
by submitting a brief arguing that the district court did not
commit reversible error by downwardly departing based on
Castillo’s medical condition and the prosecutor’s comments. On
March 9, 2005, the court requested counsel for Castillo to file,
in light of United States v. Booker, --- U.S. ----, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005), either a supplemental Anders brief explaining why his
appeal was still frivolous or a motion for leave to withdraw his
Anders brief and to substitute a brief on the merits of the
appeal. Castillo’s attorney responded by filing another Anders
brief stating that, despite Booker, he still believed that no
meritorious issues for appeal exist in this case.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Castillo was sentenced on September 15, 2003, well before
the Supreme Court decided Booker on January 12, 2005. See
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 738. In United States v. Smith, 417 F.3d
483, 488-93 (5th Cir. 2005), we discussed the standard of review
that we now use post-Booker when reviewing a district court’s
13
decision to depart from the sentencing range established by the
Guidelines. We held that Booker directed us to return
essentially to the abuse-of-discretion standard employed prior to
2003, stating:
Prior to 2003, our review of departure decisions was for
abuse of discretion, pursuant to § 3742(e). In April
2003, Congress amended § 3742(e), altering our standard
of review with respect to the departure decision to de
novo. Under this scheme, while the decision to depart
was reviewed de novo, the degree of departure was still
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Then, in January 2005,
the Supreme Court in Booker excised § 3742(e), leaving
the appellate courts to review sentences for
reasonableness. The Court explained that it was
essentially returning to the standard of review provided
by the pre-2003 text, which directs us to determine
whether the sentence is unreasonable with regard to
§ 3553(a). Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and its
factors guide us in determining whether a sentence is
unreasonable.
Smith, 417 F.3d at 489-90. Subsequently, in United States v.
Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 416 (5th Cir. 2005), we re-stated this
abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing departures from the
sentencing range established by the Guidelines.
Additionally, after Booker, we continue to review a district
court’s findings of fact in relation to the Guidelines for clear
error. United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 270 n.2 (5th Cir.
2005). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Cooper, 274
F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted);
14
see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948). “A district court ‘abuses its discretion if it bases
its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence.’” Smith, 417 F.3d at 486-87 (quoting United
States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 860 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also
United States v. Brady, 417 F.3d 326, 332-33 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting that after Booker a district court exceeds or abuses its
discretion in exercising departure authority when “its decision
rests on an error of law . . . or a clearly erroneous factual
finding, or . . . its decision--though not necessarily the
product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding--
cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions”)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
The government challenges both of the district court’s
reasons for downwardly departing at sentencing. First, the
government contends that the district court erred in downwardly
departing under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 based on its finding that
Castillo, who is HIV-positive, had an extraordinary physical
impairment justifying a departure. According to the government,
Castillo’s medical condition does not warrant a downward
departure under § 5H1.4, the departure is unjustified by the
facts, and the departure does not advance the objectives of 18
15
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).3 Second, the government contends that the
district court erred in downwardly departing under U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.0 based on its finding that the prosecutor’s comments about
Castillo’s HIV-positive status at sentencing placed Castillo in
danger. According to the government, a departure under § 5K2.0
on this ground is wholly unsupported by the record and does not
advance § 3553(a)’s objectives.
Castillo responds by arguing that most of the government’s
claims on appeal were not made in the district court and should,
therefore, be reviewed for plain error. Castillo then states, in
a short and cursory fashion, that the district court did not err
when it downwardly departed. The government replies that it
preserved its challenge to the district court’s departure under
§ 5H1.4 by filing prior to sentencing a written memorandum
challenging this ground for departure. The government concedes
that it did not object at sentencing to the district court’s
downward departure under § 5K2.0, but it argues that an objection
was not required under the circumstances because the decision to
depart was a surprise and making an objection would have been
futile.
3
The government additionally argues that the district
court’s departure on both of its stated grounds is impermissible
under § 3553(b)(1). In Booker, however, the Supreme Court
excised § 3553(b)(1) of the Guidelines. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at
764-65. Accordingly, while § 3553(a) still remains in effect,
§ 3553(b)(1) is no longer in effect, and we will not consider the
government’s arguments that rely solely on that provision.
16
A. Downward Departure Under U.S.S.G. § 5H4.1
We first address the district court’s downward departure on
the basis of § 5H1.4. As an initial matter, we note that the
government preserved its objection to a downward departure on
this ground. First, prior to sentencing, in its written response
to Castillo’s sentencing memorandum, the government clearly set
forth the basis for its objection to a departure under § 5H1.4.
Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 51, the prosecutor did not have to
reiterate orally this written objection at sentencing or state an
exception to the court’s ruling in order to preserve the
objection for appeal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 51 (“Exceptions to
rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. . . . A party may
preserve a claim of error by informing the court--when the court
ruling or order is made or sought--of the action the party wishes
the court to take . . . .”). Second, at sentencing, the
prosecutor attempted to reiterate orally the objection contained
in the government’s response to Castillo’s sentencing memorandum,
explaining that this circuit has not recognized a defendant’s
HIV-positive status as a ground for departure and that in all
cases from other circuits where an HIV-positive defendant
received a downward departure under § 5H1.4, the defendant was
not only HIV-positive but also had “full-blown AIDS” or “advanced
AIDS.” It was at this point in the proceedings that the district
court interrupted the prosecutor and accused him of maliciously
17
endangering the defendant. Under this unique set of
circumstances, the fact that the prosecutor did not fully state
his objection does not render the objection inadequate. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 51 (“If a party does not have an opportunity to object
to a ruling or order, the absence of an objection does not later
prejudice that party.”); United States v. Bernal, 814 F.2d 175,
182-83 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that an objection was adequate
when the judge cut short the objection and the “defendant was not
afforded the opportunity to explain his objection fully”).
Having concluded that the government preserved its objection
to a downward departure under § 5H1.4, we turn to whether the
district court’s departure on this basis was appropriate.
Section § 5H1.4 states:
Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is
not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
departure may be warranted. However, an extraordinary
physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward;
e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home
detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than,
imprisonment.
While this court has never addressed the precise issue of whether
a defendant who is HIV-positive can be said to suffer from the
sort of extraordinary physical impairment that would justify a
downward departure under § 5H1.4, our circuit precedent suggests
that, without more, being HIV-positive is not a sufficient ground
for a departure.
In United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir.
1997), we held that the defendant’s “sarcoidosis, a chronic
18
inflammation of multiple organs[,]” did not constitute a physical
impairment warranting a departure. In reaching this conclusion,
we stated that the district court had failed to explain why the
defendant’s medical condition “should be treated as an
exceptional one.” Winters, 105 F.3d at 208. Additionally, we
cited our decision in United States v. Guajardo, 950 F.2d 203,
208 (5th Cir. 1991), in which we held that a departure was not
warranted for a defendant who suffered from “cancer in remission,
high blood pressure, a fused right ankle, an amputated left leg,
and drug dependency.” Id. (citing Guajardo, 950 F.2d at 208).
In the present case, the district court, like the district court
in Winters, failed to offer any explanation for why the
defendant’s medical condition should be treated as an exceptional
one. See id. Instead, the district court merely noted that
Castillo was HIV-positive, stated that it was “not clear” if he
had AIDS, and then, without explanation, summarily granted
Castillo’s request for a downward departure on the basis that he
suffered from an extraordinary medical condition.4 Because the
district court never stated its reasons for granting a downward
departure on this ground, we do not know why it felt that a
departure was appropriate. In fact, following the logic of cases
4
Castillo’s counsel also admitted that nothing in the
record indicated that Castillo was suffering from full-blown
AIDS. Additionally, Castillo’s counsel admitted that while
Castillo suffered from a groin rash and muscle soreness, she
could not say that these symptoms were related to his HIV-
positive status.
19
like Winters and Guajardo, we cannot see how a defendant’s HIV-
positive status alone constitutes an extraordinary medical
condition in light of the fact that, e.g., a drug-addicted
individual with cancer, hypertension, no left leg, and a damaged
right ankle did not, in our view, suffer from an extraordinary
medical condition warranting a departure. See Guajardo, 950 F.2d
at 208. Moreover, other circuits that have addressed this issue
have found that a defendant’s HIV-positive status alone is
insufficient to justify a departure under § 5H1.4. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hernandez, 218 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2000);
United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224, 235-36 (1st Cir.
1999); United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 729 n.15 (8th Cir.
1995); United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1275-76 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Thomas, 49 F.3d 253, 260-61 (6th Cir.
1995); see also United States v. DePew, 751 F. Supp. 1195, 1199
(E.D. Va. 1990), aff’d 932 F.2d 324 (4th Cir. 1991). We also
note that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), which is still in effect post-
Booker, states that a sentencing court shall consider the need
for the sentence imposed:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
20
treatment in the most effective manner . . . .
In the present case, the district court’s downward departure
under § 5H1.4 did not advance the objectives of § 3553(a)(2)(A),
(B), or (C). Moreover, in light of the fact that both the
district court and defense counsel stated that the Bureau of
Prisons could adequately treat Castillo’s medical condition, the
downward departure also failed to advance the objectives of
§ 3553(a)(2)(D). Accordingly, following the logic of Winters,
Guajardo, and our sister circuits, we conclude that a defendant’s
HIV-positive status alone does not constitute an extraordinary
medical condition warranting a downward departure under § 5H1.4,
and we find that the district court’s departure on this basis,
which did not advance the goals of § 3553(a)(2), constituted an
abuse of discretion.
B. Downward Departure Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0
We turn next to whether the district court abused its
discretion when it downwardly departed under § 5K2.0 based on the
prosecutor’s comments about Castillo’s HIV-positive status.5 We
5
Section 5K2.0 permits a district court to depart
downwardly “if the court finds that there exists a[] . . .
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence
different from that described.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that a
district court may grant a downward departure based on an
individual’s susceptibility to abuse in prison. See Koon v.
21
begin by addressing Castillo’s contention that we must review the
government’s objection to this departure for plain error because
the government did not object below.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 51, which governs the preservation of error
in the sentencing context, states that “[i]f a party does not
have an opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence
of an objection does not later prejudice that party.” The
advisory committee notes to FED. R. CRIM. P. 51 state that “[t]his
rule is practically identical with rule 46 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure” and state that these rules are construed in
the same manner, thus making civil cases regarding the
preservation of error authoritative with respect to the
interpretation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 51. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 51
advisory committee’s notes (1944 adoption). With respect to the
preservation of error, this court has held that the purpose of a
contemporaneous objection is to enable the district court to
correct its error in a timely manner. See Hartford Lloyd’s Ins.
Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
United States v. Mendiola, 42 F.3d 259, 260 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994).
Generally, if a party fails to timely raise an issue in district
court, we will review it for plain error unless the party made
its position clear to the district court and to have objected
would have been futile. Russell v. Plano Bank & Trust, 130 F.3d
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111-12 (1996).
22
715, 720 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A party may be excused from the
requirement of making a specific objection only where the party’s
position previously has been made clear to the trial judge and it
is plain that a further objection would be unavailing.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Taita Chem. Co. v. Westlake
Styrene, LP, 351 F.3d 663, 667-68 (5th Cir. 2003).
In the present case, Castillo never requested a downward
departure under § 5K2.0, and the district court never suggested
that it would downwardly depart, sua sponte, under § 5K2.0 until
the end of the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, the prosecutor
had no reason to know that an objection to a departure under
§ 5K2.0 would be appropriate until the district court began
berating him for his comments. Moreover, once the district court
began berating him, the prosecutor attempted at least nine times
to apologize to the court and to explain his actions, stating
that he never meant to harm the defendant. The district court,
however, was unmoved by the prosecutor’s protestations,
interrupted him on several occasions, and clearly did not believe
his explanations. Additionally, the district court effectively
called the prosecutor a liar, stated that he was “rude” and
“thoughtless,” and found that he “deliberately” and
“intentionally” attempted to harm the defendant. In the words of
the district court:
I can only determine from that action that [the
prosecutor] acted out of stupidity or maliciously and
deliberately to try to disclose that information in front
23
of other prisoners in an effort to create harm or danger
for this defendant. [The United States Attorney] assures
me that [the prosecutor] is a bright and able attorney,
which leaves me with only the choice of it being a
deliberate act on counsel’s part. . . . You put him in
potential danger, physical danger, by saying that in
front of other prisoners. You know that. You can’t even
imagine that there could be any other outcome of you
blurting that out, screaming it out . . . .
(emphasis added). The district court then stated:
This Court is additionally departing downward under
§ 5K2.0, finding that counsel’s actions this morning
deliberately placed the defendant in danger of--in
possible danger and repercussions from fellow prisoners,
that counsel disclosed in the presence of other persons
incarcerated with this defendant the nature of the
defendant’s HIV status, suggesting even the possibility
that he might have full-blown AIDS, in a manner that the
Court believes is designed to potentially impact his
Eighth Amendment rights.
(emphasis added). These sentiments were restated in a written
statement of reasons attached to the district court’s judgment,
which read:
[T]he Court downwardly departs pursuant to USSG § 5K2.0
and finds counsel for the Government was malicious and
deliberate in disclosing the defendant’s confidential
medical information to the public during sentencing
proceedings putting the defendant in danger and
repercussion from fellow prisoners which warrants special
prisoner protection.
(emphasis added). In light of the district court’s evident
anger, its unusual hostility toward the prosecutor (including its
attacks on his personal integrity and truthfulness), its
unwavering opinion that the prosecutor had maliciously endangered
the defendant, and the prosecutor’s protestations to the
contrary, requiring a formal objection by the prosecutor--above
24
and beyond his repeated protestations--would have been futile,
would not have served the purposes behind requiring
contemporaneous objections, and would have clearly “exalt[ed]
form over substance.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 51; Taita Chem. Co.,
351 F.3d at 667-68; Russell, 130 F.3d at 720; Teachworth, 898
F.2d at 1060; 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 842 (2d ed. 2004) (“The general rule requiring
counsel to make clear to the trial court what action they wish
taken should not be applied in a ritualistic fashion. If the
problem has been brought to the attention of the court, and the
court has indicated in no uncertain terms what its views are, to
require an objection would exalt form over substance.”).
Accordingly, we find that, under the unique set of circumstances
presented by this case, the government did not waive its
objection to the downward departure under § 5K2.0 by failing to
object formally to it at sentencing.
Having concluded that the government did not waive its
objection to the district court’s downward departure under
§ 5K2.0, we turn to whether the district court abused its
discretion in departing on this ground. We conclude that the
district court’s factual finding--that the prosecutor
deliberately and maliciously made comments that endangered the
defendant’s safety--is wholly unsupported by the record and is
clearly erroneous. To begin with, nothing in the record suggests
that the defendant was ever endangered. To the contrary, the
25
government, in its brief on appeal, argues that the public
disclosure of Castillo’s HIV-positive status would make him less
likely to be the victim of a physical attack in prison because
other inmates would want to avoid possible exposure to his bodily
fluids.
Regardless of whether the government’s argument is correct,
the fact remains that the record contains not a shred of evidence
suggesting that the disclosure of Castillo’s HIV-positive status
would endanger his safety, and the district court never explained
how it knew that the prosecutor’s comments would lead to such
danger. The district court also did not order the Bureau of
Prisons to take any special security precautions with respect to
Castillo’s incarceration, which suggests that it was not overly
concerned about his safety. Accordingly, because the district
court’s factual finding that the prosecutor endangered Castillo
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made, it is clearly erroneous. See Cooper, 274 F.3d at 238.
The district court’s factual finding that the prosecutor
deliberately and maliciously disclosed Castillo’s HIV-positive
status is also clearly erroneous. No rule in the Southern
District of Texas prohibits a prosecutor from disclosing or
discussing a defendant’s HIV-positive status at sentencing.
Furthermore, the district court never ordered confidentiality at
sentencing or took any steps to preserve confidentiality at
sentencing (such as holding an in camera sentencing hearing or
26
sealing the courtroom). Likewise, the district court never
ordered that the parties refrain from mentioning Castillo’s HIV-
positive status. The only rule pertaining to the disclosure of
Castillo’s HIV-positive status that is potentially applicable to
the present case is FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(3), which prohibits the
probation officer from including certain confidential information
in the PSR. In accordance with this rule, the probation officer
filed information about Castillo’s medical condition under seal.
This rule, however, imposed no obligations whatsoever on what the
prosecutor could say at sentencing. Moreover, the prosecutor in
the present case claims that he did not even know about the
sealed information from the probation officer. When the
prosecutor filed his response to Castillo’s sentencing memorandum
(discussing Castillo’s HIV-positive status), he did not file it
under seal, and the district court did not issue an order sealing
it. Finally, certain statements made by the district court
relating to its factual finding that the prosecutor acted
deliberately and maliciously--e.g., its statement that the
prosecutor said that Castillo “might have full-blown AIDS, which
is a direct violation of the confidential nature of this type of
disclosure”--are factually false (e.g., the prosecutor never said
that Castillo might have full-blown AIDS).
In short, the prosecutor acted appropriately and did not
violate any rule or court order by mentioning the word “AIDS” at
27
sentencing.6 The prosecutor cannot be said to have acted
maliciously or deliberately simply because he failed to
understand the impromptu, implicit code system that apparently
existed between the district court and defense counsel.
Accordingly, based on our review of the record, the district
court’s finding that the prosecutor acted deliberately and
maliciously leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed and is, therefore, clearly erroneous. See Cooper,
274 F.3d at 238; see also Creech, 408 F.3d at 270 n.2. Because
the factual findings supporting the district court’s downward
departure under § 5K2.0 are clearly erroneous, the district court
abused its discretion by downwardly departing under § 5K2.0. See
Smith, 417 F.3d at 486-87; see also Brady, 417 F.3d at 332-33.7
Accordingly, we find that the district court abused its
discretion when downwardly departing under § 5H1.4 and § 5K2.0.
Because § 5H1.4 and § 5K2.0 were the sole bases for the district
court’s downward departure, we vacate Castillo’s sentence and
remand for resentencing.
C. Counsel’s Anders Motion
6
In fact, we note that although the prosecutor first
mentioned the word “AIDS” at sentencing while discussing relevant
case law, it was the district court, not the prosecutor, who
first disclosed that Castillo had AIDS.
7
We also note that the district court’s downward
departure under § 5K2.0, like its downward departure under
§ 5H1.4, does not appear to have advanced the goals of
§ 3553(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
28
Because of our disposition of the government’s claims on
cross-appeal, as discussed supra, Castillo’s counsel now has new
obligations to represent Castillo on remand of this case for
resentencing. Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the sentence imposed by
the district court and REMAND this case for resentencing.
29