United States v. Rodriguez-Mesa ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED APRIL 17, 2006
March 15, 2006
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 04-41757
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
JULIAN RODRIGUEZ-MESA
Defendant - Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before KING, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-appellant Julian Rodriguez-Mesa pleaded guilty to
one count of transporting an alien and was sentenced to nineteen
months in prison and two years of supervised release. The
question presented in this appeal is whether the district court,
in sentencing Rodriguez-Mesa, erred in applying the enhancement
for “intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury to another person” for Rodriguez-
Mesa’s transportation of an illegal alien. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.1(b)(5) (2003) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
-1-
Although we conclude that the district court did not err in
applying the Guidelines, we must nevertheless VACATE and REMAND
for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 7, 2004, Julian Rodriguez-Mesa drove a Plymouth
Voyager minivan to the Sarita, Texas border patrol checkpoint.1
After observing that Rodriguez-Mesa appeared to be nervous, the
border patrol agent at the primary inspection point directed him
to a secondary inspection for further investigation. At the
secondary inspection, agents discovered a male occupant, later
identified as Rosendo Ponce-Mata, a citizen of Mexico, in a
compartment that had been built in the center console of the
minivan. The compartment was located between the front seats of
the vehicle, and there was a door located on top of the
compartment. The compartment covered half of Ponce-Mata’s body,
including his head and his torso, but his legs extended on to the
floorboard of the front passenger’s side of the vehicle.
Rodriguez-Mesa and Ponce-Mata were advised of their Miranda
rights and both agreed to make statements to the border patrol
agents. Rodriguez-Mesa admitted that he was transporting Ponce-
Mata in order to rid himself of a $400 debt that he owed to a man
1
Rodriguez-Mesa was accompanied by Annie Rojas, who rode
in the front passenger’s seat. Rojas was processed and released
at the checkpoint.
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by the name of Ricardo Garcia of Houston, Texas. Rodriguez-Mesa
stated that he picked up the minivan from Garcia and that Ponce-
Mata was already inside the vehicle when he took possession of
the minivan.
In his statement, Ponce-Mata told the agents that he had
crossed into the United States illegally, without documentation,
and that he had made arrangements to be smuggled from Mexico to
Houston for $2000. Ponce-Mata claimed that when Rodriguez-Mesa
picked him up on July 7, 2004, Rodriguez-Mesa instructed him to
hide in the compartment located in the center console of the
minivan.2 In his sworn deposition on August 3, 2004, Ponce-Mata
gave a similar account to what he had earlier told the border
patrol agents, but he added that he was not endangered by being
transported in the minivan’s console area. He testified that he
was not locked in the compartment, had enough air to breathe, and
was able to feel the vehicle’s air conditioning system.
On July 28, 2004, Rodriguez-Mesa was charged in a one-count
indictment with transporting an illegal alien in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii). The indictment also
contained an additional section entitled “Aggravating Factor.”
This section alleged that Rodriguez-Mesa “intentionally or
recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
2
Rodriguez-Mesa refuted this statement at his
rearraignment hearing, instead asserting that Ponce-Mata was
already inside of the compartment when he picked up the minivan.
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injury to another person” in violation of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5).
Without a written plea agreement, Rodriguez-Mesa pleaded guilty
to the alien transporting charge, but he refused to plead guilty
to the aggravating factor alleged in the indictment.3
3
At his rearraignment hearing, the following exchange
occurred between Rodriguez-Mesa and the district court in
discussing his guilty plea:
THE COURT: [W]hat is your plea to Count 1,
guilty or not guilty?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Guilty, he’ll say, except for the
aggravating factor.
THE COURT: I’m not asking you to plead,
[Defense Counsel]. Is this guilty
or not guilty, Mr. Mesa?
RODRIGUEZ-MESA: Guilty, except for the aggravating
factor, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you
are in fact guilty?
RODRIGUEZ-MESA: Of the smuggling, yes, ma’am. Not
of the aggravating factor.
THE COURT: Pardon?
RODRIGUEZ-MESA: I’m pleading guilty to the smuggling
of the illegal alien, but I don’t
feel that I’m guilty about the
aggravating factor.
THE COURT: Why is that?
RODRIGUEZ-MESA: He could have gotten up any time he
wanted to. He wasn’t in danger. He
was--he could breathe. He had--he
was actually sleeping. He had like
a–-
THE COURT: Did he have a seat belt down there?
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In the Presentence Report (“PSR”), the probation officer
made the following sentencing recommendations: The base offense
level was 12, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(a)(2); six points were added
because during the commission of the offense, Rodriguez-Mesa
“recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily
injury to another person by concealing an illegal alien in the
console area of the transport vehicle,” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5);
and three points were subtracted for acceptance of
responsibility, U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Based on these adjustments,
the probation officer recommended a total offense level of 15.
With Rodriguez-Mesa’s criminal history category of I, the
recommendation resulted in a guideline imprisonment range of
eighteen to twenty-four months.
Rodriguez-Mesa filed written objections to the PSR,
disputing the six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5)
on two grounds. First, he contended that, under Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the enhancement violated his
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because the judge used
facts not admitted by him or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Second, he argued that the enhancement for reckless
endangerment was not supported by the facts. He alleged, as
support, that Ponce-Mata’s sworn deposition showed that Ponce-
RODRIGUEZ-MESA: No, ma’am.
2 Rawle at 21-22.
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Mata was not in any danger, had enough air to breathe, and could
have opened the lid to the compartment at any time.
In an addendum to the PSR, the probation officer maintained
that the increase was applicable, stating that
[i]n respect to the Blakely objection, objections which
deal with the constitutionality of a case will be
addressed by the Court at sentencing. As per the
reckless endangerment adjustment [pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5)], the defendant was transporting an illegal
alien in a compartment built into the center console area
of the transport vehicle. Had an accident occurred, the
illegal alien would not be in a position to free himself.
The district court overruled Rodriguez-Mesa’s objections to
the PSR at sentencing. In rejecting Rodriguez-Mesa’s Blakely
objection, the district court stated that it had to “go with the
law of the Circuit”4 and concluded that Rodriguez-Mesa was not
entitled to a jury trial on the adjustment for reckless
endangerment but that it would “make a finding, if any, by beyond
a reasonable doubt.” After considering Ponce-Mata’s sworn
deposition and photographs of the compartment and Ponce-Mata in
the compartment,5 the district court also rejected Rodriguez-
Mesa’s objection to the reckless endangerment enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5). Specifically, the district court found
4
See United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464, 465 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that “Blakely does not extend to the federal
Guidelines”), vacated, 543 U.S. 1101 (2005).
5
Rodriguez-Mesa does not dispute the accuracy of the
photographs that the government submitted as evidence.
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that the console was not designed for passenger use,6 the console
looked like it was the same size as from the factory, and Ponce-
Mata’s “head and upper body were stuffed in the console, and his
feet were twisted around underneath the glove compartment.”7 The
district court concluded that the reckless endangerment
enhancement should apply, “find[ing] beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Rodriguez-Mesa created a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury by transporting an illegal alien in that fashion.”
On December 15, 2004, the district court sentenced Rodriguez-Mesa
to nineteen months in prison and two years of supervised release.
Rodriguez-Mesa now appeals, arguing that: (1) the district
court erred in applying a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5); and (2) this court should vacate and remand for
resentencing because he raised a Blakely objection at the
district court and the government has failed to prove that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the Supreme Court in Booker excised and struck down
the statutory provisions that made the Sentencing Guidelines
6
See 3 Rawle at 11 (“Well, sticking his head through the
center console and wrapping his legs around the center console is
not a position, is not any way designed the way he was using this
for passenger use.”).
7
According to Ponce-Mata’s sworn deposition, he is five
feet, six inches, weighing 170-180 pounds.
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mandatory,8 “a district court is still required to calculate the
guideline range and consider it advisory.” United States v.
Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing
Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46, and United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d
511, 518-19 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005)).
After Booker, we continue to review the district court’s
interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo and its
factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Solis-
Garcia, 420 F.3d 511, 513-14 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 203 n.9 (5th Cir. 2005)
(noting that this court continues to review factual findings with
respect to the application of adjustments under the Guidelines
for clear error), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 268 (2005); United
States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding
that this court continues after Booker to review the district
court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines de
novo).9
8
Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 (severing and excising “the
provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence
within the applicable Guidelines range (in the absence of
circumstances that justify a departure)”) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(b)(1)).
9
There was some discussion at oral argument regarding
Solis-Garcia’s impact on our standard of review. In Solis-
Garcia, this court noted that the standard of review has not
changed since Booker. See Solis-Garcia, 420 F.3d at 513-14
(noting that this court continues to apply the same standard of
review to a sentence imposed under the Guidelines that we applied
prior to Booker, i.e., we review the district court’s
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and the district court’s
-8-
III. DISCUSSION
Section 2L1.1(b)(5) provides that a defendant’s base offense
level must be at least 18 “[i]f the offense involved
intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily injury to another person . . . .” U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5). The commentary to § 2L1.1(b)(5) explains that
[r]eckless conduct to which the adjustment from
subsection (b)(5) applies includes a wide variety of
conduct (e.g., transporting persons in the trunk or
engine compartment of a motor vehicle, carrying
substantially more passengers than the rated capacity of
a motor vehicle or vessel, or harboring persons in a
crowded, dangerous, or inhumane condition).
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5) cmt. n.6.10 Besides the latter part of
the commentary, which mentions harboring persons in a dangerous
condition, nothing in the commentary directly speaks to
transporting an alien in a compartment located inside of a
vehicle. See id. Although the factual scenario in this case is
not expressly included in this list of reckless conduct, this
factual determinations for clear error). Because there was no
factual dispute regarding the facts necessary to support the
enhancement in Solis-Garcia, see id. at 514, the only question
before the court was the application question--i.e., “[w]hether
Solis’s conduct in transporting the illegal aliens qualifies as
‘intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death
or serious bodily injury to another person’ as required for a
§ 2L1.1(b)(5) sentence enhancement”--which was, under our
standard of review, considered de novo. Id.
10
“[C]ommentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets
or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the
Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a
plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” Stinson v. United
States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
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court has not limited § 2L1.1(b)(5) to the examples mentioned in
the commentary. See United States v. Garcia-Guerrero, 313 F.3d
892, 896 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[t]he commentary
expressly states that the adjustment applies to ‘a wide variety
of conduct’”).
We have not found any published opinions that address the
particular circumstances created by Rodriguez-Mesa in
transporting an illegal alien in a compartment concealed between
the front passenger’s seats. Most of our decisions addressing
the application of § 2L1.1(b)(5) involve transporting aliens
unrestrained in the bed of a pickup truck or in an overcrowded
vehicle without seats or seatbelts. See, e.g., Angeles-Mendoza,
407 F.3d at 750-51 (concluding that the adjustment under
§ 2L1.1(b)(5) was appropriate where the “defendants smuggled
aliens in the back of their truck and modified the vehicle to
allow more smuggled aliens to fit in by removing the back
seats”); United States v. Cuyler, 298 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding that the defendant’s act of transporting four
aliens in the bed of a pickup truck recklessly created a
substantial risk of injury to the aliens); id. at 390-91 (citing
numerous circuit courts holding that § 2L1.1(b)(5) applies in
cases where the defendant smuggled aliens in an overcrowded van,
often without seats or seatbelts).
These cases are not particularly relevant here. Although
Ponce-Mata was not wearing a seatbelt, in view of the fact that
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he was transported in a compartment located between the front
passenger’s seats, it seems less likely that Ponce-Mata would
have been thrown from the vehicle in the event of an accident.
Cf. Solis-Garcia, 420 F.3d at 516 (noting that transporting
illegal aliens without requiring them to wear seatbelts is not by
itself enough for the § 2L1.1(b)(5) enhancement). In addition,
Ponce-Mata was positioned directly beside Rodriguez-Mesa and
could have communicated any discomfort he may have experienced or
in the case of an emergency. These factors distinguish this case
from many of the cases cited above and from the examples cited in
the commentary. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5) cmt. n.6; see also
Cuyler, 298 F.3d at 390-91.
The parties both point to Solis-Garcia--our most recent
published decision addressing the application of U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5)--as relevant and helpful in deciding whether the
district court in the present case erred. In Solis-Garcia, this
court held that “the act of transporting four aliens lying in the
cargo area of a minivan, with no aggravating factors, [does not]
constitute[] an inherently dangerous practice such as to create a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to those
aliens.” 420 F.3d at 516 (emphasis added). In support of its
holding, the court contrasted the facts in Solis-Garcia with
those in Cuyler, 298 F.3d at 388-89. The court noted that unlike
an individual riding in the bed of a pickup truck who is not
protected by the passenger compartment of the vehicle, see
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Cuyler, 298 F.3d at 391, “[a]n individual riding in the cargo
area of a minivan has access to oxygen, is not exposed to extreme
heat or cold, and can easily extricate himself from his position
on the floor of the van.” Solis-Garcia, 420 F.3d at 516. The
court also rejected the idea that § 2L1.1(b)(5) punishes
offenders simply for transporting illegal aliens without
requiring them to wear seatbelts. Id. (“The § 2L1.1(b)(5)
enhancement as written, one would think, does not extend so far
as to increase punishment for offenders simply for transporting
illegal aliens without requiring them to wear seatbelts.”).
Recognizing that the contours of § 2L1.1(b)(5) are dependent upon
carefully applying the guideline in a case-by-case analysis, the
court concluded that the defendant did not create a substantial
risk of death or serious bodily injury. Id.
Rodriguez-Mesa argues that the holding and reasoning of
Solis-Garcia apply with equal force to his case and militate
against the district court’s application of the reckless
endangerment enhancement. He contends that there is no
meaningful distinction between his case and Solis-Garcia because
Ponce-Mata had access to oxygen, was not exposed to extreme heat
or cold, and could easily extricate himself from his position on
the floor of the minivan. See id. In contrast, the government
claims that Solis-Garcia stands for the proposition that the
reckless endangerment enhancement does not apply to transporting
illegal aliens who are not wearing seatbelts without proof of
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additional aggravating factors. According to the government,
this case involves aggravating factors that were not present in
Solis-Garcia, thereby distinguishing it from the instant case.
We agree with the government that this case is
distinguishable from our recent opinion in Solis-Garcia. Here,
unlike Solis-Garcia, Ponce-Mata could not have easily extricated
himself from a position where “his head and upper body were
stuffed in the console, and his feet were twisted around
underneath the glove compartment.” Cf. id. (stating that an
individual riding in the cargo area of a minivan “can easily
extricate himself from his position on the floor of the van”).
That Ponce-Mata was required to maintain this contorted position
on the floor of the minivan (for at least an hour before the
checkpoint and potentially for another 250 miles from the
checkpoint to Houston), with the upper half of his body stuffed
into the console and his arms pinned to his sides, suggests
exposure to a “substantial risk of . . . serious bodily injury.”
See Cuyler, 298 F.3d at 390 (stating that the illegal aliens who
were unrestrained in the bed of the pickup truck “almost
certainly would have been injured in the event of an accident”).
Contrary to Rodriguez-Mesa’s assertions, the photographs indicate
that it would have been difficult to extricate Ponce-Mata,
regardless of whether the lid of the console opened easily,
because of Ponce-Mata’s crammed position in the compartment. Cf.
United States v. Dixon, 201 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]
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person hiding inside a locked trunk could not extricate himself,
while a person hiding in a hatchback area easily could extricate
himself by pushing up the lightweight, flimsy hatchback cover.”).
The presence of this additional aggravating factor--the
inability of Ponce-Mata to extricate himself--distinguishes this
case from Solis-Garcia and supports the district court’s
application of the reckless endangerment enhancement in this
case. Cf. Solis-Garcia, 420 F.3d at 516 (“In this case, it is
not asserted . . . that the aliens were subjected to any other
risks.”). Accordingly, based on our own “case-specific
analysis,” we conclude that the district court did not err in
applying § 2L1.1(b)(5) to this set of facts. See id. (“Defining
the contours of this enhancement is dependent upon carefully
applying the words of the guideline in a case-specific
analysis.”).
Although we hold that the district court did not err in
applying the reckless endangerment enhancement of U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.1(b)(5), we must determine the effect that Booker has on
Rodriguez-Mesa’s sentence.11 Rodriguez-Mesa argues that his
sentence “runs afoul of Booker in two separate, though related,
ways.” First, he asserts that he received a sentence greater
11
Here, unlike the court in Villegas, we must reach the
Booker issue because we conclude that the district court did not
err in applying the Guidelines. Cf. Villegas, 404 F.3d at 364-65
& n.8 (addressing “antecedent error that the district court
committed by misapplying the Guidelines” and pretermitting review
of alleged Booker error).
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than that authorized by the facts admitted by him, in violation
of Booker’s Sixth Amendment holding. Second, he alleges “Fanfan
error” because the district court sentenced him under the
mandatory application of the Guidelines. Rodriguez-Mesa
correctly recognizes that there are two types of error addressed
in Booker. See United States v. Walters, 418 F.3d 461, 463 (5th
Cir. 2005) (“Booker error is found where the district court
applied the mandatory Guidelines and enhanced a defendant’s
sentence on the basis of facts neither admitted by him nor found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of the Sixth
Amendment[,]” whereas “‘Fanfan error’ is found where the district
court applied the mandatory Guidelines to enhance a defendant’s
sentence absent any Sixth Amendment Booker error.”); see also
Villegas, 404 F.3d at 364 (same). Regardless of whether
Rodriguez-Mesa’s error is characterized as a Booker or Fanfan
error, he preserved that error by raising a Blakely objection in
the district court. Compare United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d
165, 170 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that a Blakely objection in the
district court preserves Booker error and reviewing under the
harmless-error standard), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1444 (2006),
with United States v. Gonzalez-Ribera, 2006 WL 319270, at *1 (5th
Cir. Feb. 13, 2006) (unpublished) (stating that a Blakely
objection in the district court preserves Fanfan error and
reviewing for harmless error) (citing Walters, 418 F.3d at 463);
see also United States v. Rodriguez, 433 F.3d 411, 415-16 (4th
-15-
Cir. 2006) (concluding that the defendant properly preserved his
claim of Fanfan error (“statutory Booker error”) by raising a
timely Blakely objection at sentencing, and noting that the
court’s position that a Blakely objection preserves Fanfan error
for harmless-error review “is consistent with the unanimous view
of the nine courts of appeals to have considered the question[,]”
including the Fifth Circuit).
When there is preserved Booker or Fanfan error, as here,
“the only question is whether the government has met its burden
to show harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt in the
imposition of [the defendant’s] sentence.”12 Walters, 418 F.3d
at 464. Although at least one panel of this court has questioned
whether the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies
to a preserved Fanfan error,13 we are bound to follow Walters,
12
Although Rodriguez-Mesa argues that Booker error is
structural and therefore insusceptible to harmless-error
analysis, we have rejected this argument on numerous occasions.
See United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d 349, 362 n.23 (5th Cir.
2005) (rejecting the argument that Booker error is structural and
insusceptible to harmless-error analysis, and stating that
“[n]either Booker error nor Fanfan error is structural”), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 504 (2005) (citing United States v. Malveaux,
411 F.3d 558, 560 n.9 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
194 (2005), and United States v. Martinez-Lugo, 411 F.3d 597, 601
(5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 464 (2005)).
13
See United States v. Mendoza-Blanco, 440 F.3d 264, 265
n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (stating that although the panel must follow
the panel’s decision in Walters, “we note that the standard of
review it applied--requiring the Government to show that
preserved Fanfan error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt--
was not contested in the case and appears to be incorrect because
Fanfan error is nonconstitutional error” but deciding that “the
issue is irrelevant here because the Government cannot meet
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which applied the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard to
a preserved Fanfan challenge. See United States v. Ruiz, 180
F.3d 675, 676 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that “this panel may not
overrule or ignore a prior panel decision”). Based on the record
before us, we cannot say that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because the district court did not indicate what
it would have done absent the mandatory Guidelines. Therefore,
the government has not met its burden of proving that the Booker
or Fanfan error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, although we hold that the district court’s
application of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(5) was warranted here, we must
nevertheless vacate and remand for resentencing in accordance
with Booker. See United States v. Palomares-Alcantar, 406 F.3d
966, 968 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court’s
application of § 2L1.1(b)(5) was warranted, but remanding the
case for resentencing under an advisory Guidelines regime).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Rodriguez-Mesa’s
conviction, VACATE Rodriguez-Mesa’s sentence, and REMAND for
resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
either burden”). Similarly, the government cannot meet either
burden in the present case. See id.
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