United States v. Aguirre , 237 F. App'x 983 ( 2007 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
No. 06-51114 August 7, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
MARTHA BARRAZA AGUIRRE; AMELIA PEREZ DE ACOSTA
Defendants-Appellants
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 3:06-CR-517-PRM
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
In this consolidated appeal, co-defendants Martha Barraza-
Aguirre and Amelia Perez de Acosta challenge their two-count jury
convictions of conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine arguing that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that defendants knew the cocaine was in their vehicle. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 06-51114
1. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
determine whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found
that the evidence established the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Johnson, 381 F.3d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 2004). “All
reasonable inferences from the evidence must be construed in favor
of the jury verdict.” Id. The evidence need not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Jaramillo, 42
F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1995). The relevant inquiry is not whether
the trier of fact made the correct guilt or innocence determination,
but rather whether it made a rational decision to convict or acquit.
Id.
2. The question before us is whether the evidence was sufficient to
support the jury’s conclusion that Acosta and Barraza-Aguirre had
knowledge of the cocaine in the hidden compartments of their
vehicle. “A jury may ordinarily infer a defendant’s knowledge of the
presence of drugs from his control over the vehicle in which they are
found.” United States v. Villarreal, 324 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir.
2003). “If the contraband is hidden, however, we require
additional circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in nature or
demonstrates guilty knowledge.” Id.
3. Here, Acosta was the owner of the drug-bearing Durango. Acosta
and Barraza-Aguirre were in control of the vehicle at the time the
drugs were found at a border checkpoint. Additionally, the
Government provided significant circumstantial evidence that was
suspicious in nature including (1) Acosta’s extreme nervousness at
the checkpoint in spite of her legal status, including her attempt to
silence Barraza-Aguirre and to abandon the significant amount of
cash she carried after she was searched, see United States v. Diaz-
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No. 06-51114
Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 954 (“Nervous behavior at an inspection
station frequently constitutes persuasive evidence of guilty
knowledge.”); (2) Acosta’s inconsistent statements regarding her
relationship to Barraza-Aguirre and her residence, see id. at 954-55(“Inconsistent statements are inherently suspicious; a factfinder
could reasonably conclude that they mask an underlying
consciousness of guilt.”); (3) prayer books found in the vehicle
seeking good luck in and receipt of “a lot of money” from new
endeavors; (4) a key ring tool corresponding with the bolts on the
concealment panel; (5) Appellant’s claims that they were merely
traveling to Carlsbad for a five-day weekend when maps spread out
in the vehicle and notes in the console indicated circuitous travel
directions from El Paso to the Philadelphia-New Jersey area; (6) the
women carried large sums of cash, see United States v. Pennington,
20 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting in a hidden compartment
case that possession of large amounts of cash by a defendant may be
considered evidence of guilt); (7) two vehicles purchased by or for
Acosta in the presence of Barraza-Aguirre for cash under unusual
financing circumstances, with the papers sent to a false address and
the cars being driven for thousands of miles within a few months;
and (8) Acosta’s detailed expense records on these apparent business
trips, though both women claimed to be unemployed. Acosta’s and
Barraza-Aguirre’s explanations for these suspicious facts were
implausible. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d at 954-55 (recognizing that a
less-than-credible explanation for a defendant’s actions is part of the
overall circumstantial evidence from which possession and
knowledge may be inferred).
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No. 06-51114
4. Considering the Government’s evidence as a whole and the
inferences that could properly be drawn from it, we conclude that
the jury could reasonably have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellants knew illegal drugs were concealed in their vehicle.
AFFIRMED.
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