Taylor v. Peerless Industries, Inc. , 211 F. App'x 248 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F I L E D
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ November 8, 2006
No. 05-21088 Charles R. Fulbruge III
Summary Calendar Clerk
_____________________
DARRELL B. TAYLOR
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
PEERLESS INDUSTRIES, INC.
Defendant-Appellee
----------------------
Appeal from the
United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
4:04-CV-2964
----------------------
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM*:
This appeal implicates a terminated employment relationship
between an employee, Plaintiff-Appellant Darrell B. Taylor
(“Taylor”), and his employer, Defendant-Appellee Peerless
Industries, Inc. (“Peerless”). From October 18, 2001 to May 2,
2003, Taylor worked as a district sales representative in the
southern district of Peerless’s professional sales department’s
area of coverage. On May 2nd, however, Peerless terminated
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
Taylor’s employment for his alleged ineffectiveness in the field.
Taylor, a black male, sued Peerless, charging that it
discriminated against him on the basis of his race in violation
of both United States Code, title 42, section 1981 and title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Slightly over a year into the
lawsuit, Peerless filed a motion for summary judgement,
contending that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
It argued that Taylor could not establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination, and that even if he could, Peerless would
still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on its
proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Taylor’s
termination —— his professional ineffectiveness.
After a hearing on the motion, the district court granted
summary judgment to Peerless, concluding that Taylor could not
establish that Peerless’s articulated, legitimate reason for
termination was pretextual under the burden-shifting oscillation
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.1 Taylor timely
filed a notice of appeal.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standard employed by the district court.2 Summary judgment
1
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2
Abarca v. Metro. Transit Auth., 404 F.3d 938, 940 (5th
Cir. 2005).
2
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3
In reaching its decision, the district court applied the
McDonnell Douglas methodology to Taylor’s claims. This
constituted an error of law. Since the Supreme Court handed down
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,4 we have applied a “modified”
McDonnell Douglas process in title VII cases.5
Like the original McDonnell Douglas methodology, the
modified procedure allows the use of circumstantial evidence of
discrimination when there is no direct evidence: The plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination; the
defendant then must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and, if the
defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must then offer
sufficient evidence that the defendant’s reason is not true, but
is instead a pretext for discrimination. The modified McDonnell
3
Dallas Fire Fighters Ass’n v. City of Dallas, 150 F.3d
438, 440 (5th Cir. 1998).
4
539 U.S. 90 (2003).
5
Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 341 (5th
Cir. 2005); see also Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d
305, 310-12 (5th Cir. 2004). Additionally, title VII and § 1981
claims require the same proof to establish liability when used as
parallel causes of action. Bunch v. Bullard, 795 F.2d 384, 387
n.1 (5th Cir. 1986). Thus, the modified McDonnell Douglas test
is equally applicable to Taylor’s § 1981 claim.
3
Douglas minuet comes into play in the so-called mixed motive
cases, those in which the defendant’s proffered reason, even if
true, is but one of two or more reasons for its employment
decision, another “motivating factor” being the plaintiff’s
protected classification.6 Under the modified McDonnell Douglas
process, the defendant-employer must demonstrate that it would
have made the same adverse employment decision even in the
absence of the employee’s showing of a discriminatory animus.7
If the employer cannot bear this burden, the plaintiff-employee
prevails.8
By applying the original McDonnell Douglas test, rather than
the modified version, the district court failed to consider
whether race was a motivating factor in Peerless’s decision, even
if it were not the sole factor. Based on the applicable law and
our extensive review of the parties’ briefs and the record on
appeal, we conclude that the district court failed properly to
analyze Taylor’s claim as a mixed motive case under the required
modified McDonnell Douglas process. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s summary judgment and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with Costa, our precedent, and
6
Keelan, 407 F.3d at 341.
7
Id.
8
Id.
4
this opinion.
Our decision today should not be construed as precluding the
district court’s reaching the same result under the modified
McDonnell Douglas procedure that it reached under the original
McDonnell Douglas methodology. We do not intend to send such a
signal.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
5