United States v. Martin Sanchez-Alaniz , 517 F. App'x 277 ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 12-40292       Document: 00512186909         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/26/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 26, 2013
    No. 12-40292
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    MARTIN SANCHEZ-ALANIZ, also known as Martin Sanchez-Alanis,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:11-CR-961-1
    Before BENAVIDES, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Following a jury trial, Martin Sanchez-Alaniz was convicted of illegal
    reentry into the United States, and he received a within-guidelines sentence of
    108 months in prison and a three-year term of supervised release. In this
    appeal, he first argues that his Confrontation Clause rights were infringed by
    the introduction of the I-205 and I-294 forms in his A-file and that the remaining
    evidence is insufficient to uphold his conviction. He acknowledges our prior
    caselaw holding that admission of items such as I-205 and I-294 forms does not
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 12-40292
    implicate the Confrontation Clause, see United States v. Becerra-Valadez, 448
    F. App’x. 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2011), but argues that this jurisprudence was
    undermined by Michigan v. Bryant, 
    131 S. Ct. 1143
     (2011), and Bullcoming v.
    New Mexico, 
    131 S. Ct. 2705
     (2011).
    We conduct a de novo review of the issue whether the admission of
    evidence violated the Confrontation Clause, and any Confrontation Clause
    violations that are discovered are reviewed for harmless error. United States v.
    Morgan, 
    505 F.3d 332
    , 338 (5th Cir. 2007).          The improper admission of
    cumulative evidence is harmless error. United States v. El-Mezain, 
    664 F.3d 467
    , 526 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 525
     (2012).
    The items challenged in this appeal are not witness statements, they do
    not pertain to testing, and they were not created for evidentiary purposes.
    Rather, these “official court document[s]” were created in the course of
    immigration proceedings, and, for Confrontation Clause purposes, “[i]t is of no
    moment that an incidental or secondary use of those documents . . . actually
    furthered a prosecution.” Becerra-Valadezk, 448 F. App’x at 462. Consequently,
    the instant case is materially distinguishable from Bryant and Bullcoming.
    Additionally, even if Sanchez-Alaniz had shown a Confrontation Clause
    violation, then he still would not receive relief. This is because evidence other
    than the disputed items showed that Sanchez-Alaniz is a Mexican citizen who
    had previously been deported from this country and who reentered it and
    remained in it without authorization. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a); United States v.
    Flores-Peraza, 
    58 F.3d 164
    , 166 (5th Cir. 1995). Sanchez-Alaniz admitted to all
    elements of the offense during his testimony and in sworn statements. In light
    of this evidence, any error that occurred in admitting the disputed items is
    harmless. See El-Mezain, 664 F.3d at 526. This same evidence also suffices to
    permit a reasonable juror to conclude “that the evidence established [Sanchez-
    Alaniz]’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jaramillo, 
    42 F.3d 2
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    No. 12-40292
    920, 922-23 (5th Cir. 1995). Sanchez-Alaniz’s Confrontation Clause argument
    and his related challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence are unavailing.
    Sanchez-Alaniz also challenges his sentence.          As   he concedes, his
    empirical data argument is foreclosed by precedent. See United States v. Duarte,
    
    569 F.3d 528
    , 529-31 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 
    564 F.3d 357
    , 360, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2009). Insofar as he argues that the district court
    abused its discretion by denying his request for a continuance so that he could
    obtain medical records, our review of the record reveals no such error because
    the district court credited counsel’s assertions concerning Sanchez-Alaniz’s
    medical condition, and there is no indication that the proceedings would have
    ended differently if the continuance had been granted. Consequently, Sanchez-
    Alaniz has not established “that the denial resulted in specific and compelling
    or serious prejudice.” United States v. Barnett, 
    197 F.3d 138
    , 144 (5th Cir. 1999)
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Finally, Sanchez-Alaniz’s contention that his sentence was substantively
    unreasonable because the district court failed to properly account for his
    migraine headaches and cultural assimilation lacks merit. A review of the
    district court’s lengthy remarks at sentencing show that it considered these
    factors but did not believe that they should be weighted the same way that
    Sanchez-Alaniz thought they should. This same review reveals nothing to show
    that the sentence imposed “represents a clear error of judgment in balancing
    sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 
    589 F.3d 173
    , 186 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Sanchez-Alaniz’s arguments on this issue amount to no more than a
    disagreement with the propriety of the sentence, which is insufficient to show
    error. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 
    531 F.3d 337
    , 339 (5th Cir.
    2008).
    AFFIRMED.
    3