Hicks v. Garner ( 1995 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-50109
CLEVLAND HICKS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JACK M. GARNER, ETC.
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
November 3, 1995
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges:
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-Appellant Clevland Hicks, Jr., a prisoner proceeding
pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), filed this civil rights suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants-Appellees Texas prison
officials, alleging that the prison's grooming regulations
interfered with the free exercise of his religion in violation of
both the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA).1 The district court dismissed his complaint as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The sole issue before us is whether the
district court abused its discretion in holding both of these
claims frivolous. As we agree that Hicks' First Amendment claim
was frivolous, we affirm in part; however, as we disagree that his
RFRA claim was frivolous, we reverse and remand in part.
I
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Hicks, who is currently incarcerated in the Administrative
Segregation (AS) Section of the Alfred D. Hughes Unit, a maximum
security prison within the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-
Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), professes the Rastafari religion.
Based on the Biblical vow of the Nazarite, Rastafari practices
include, inter alia, never cutting or combing one's hair, instead
allowing it to grow in dreadlocks.2 Diametrically opposed to that
tenet of the Rastafari religion is the aspect of the TDCJ-ID
grooming regulations that prohibits long hair and beards.
Hicks filed this suit alleging that the prison's grooming
regulations interfered with the free exercise of his religion, in
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
2
Numbers 6:6-1. Verse five of that vow reads:
All the days of the vow of his separation there shall no
razor come upon his head: until the days be fulfilled, in
the which he separateth himself unto the Lord, he shall
be holy, and shall let the locks of the hair of his head
grow.
See Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir. 1992).
2
violation of the First Amendment and the RFRA. Hicks concedes, in
his complaint, that as a general proposition his religious
practices facially conflict with penological interests, such as
prison security and ready ease of inmate identification. He
contends that an exception should be made in his case, however,
arguing that his confinement in AS and his segregation from the
general prison population so significantly reduce the importance of
these penological interests that they serve no valid purpose.
Adding that he has no desire to return to the general prison
population, Hicks concludes that, in his unique confinement
situation, forcing him to comply with the grooming regulations both
interferes with his religious beliefs and serves no actual
penological interests.
In essence, Hicks asserts that because he is in special
confinement, the penological interests of safety and identification
do not apply to him, and that without these penological interests,
the grooming requirements fail to pass muster under either the
Constitution or the RFRA. By way of relief, he seeks an injunction
that would prohibit prison officials from enforcing the grooming
regulations against him and would permit him to keep a "large
flexible plastic comb" in his cell for grooming.
This matter was referred to a magistrate judge who recommended
that the complaint be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1915(d). Hicks filed objections, requiring the district court to
review his complaint de novo. After considering the record, the
magistrate judge's recommendations, and the objections raised by
3
Hicks, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's
recommendations, dismissing Hicks' complaint as frivolous and
revoking his IFP status.3 Hicks timely appealed.
II
ANALYSIS
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
An IFP petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) may be dismissed if
the district court is "satisfied that the action is frivolous or
malicious." We review a district court's section 1915(d) dismissal
under the abuse-of-discretion standard.4
B. THE DEFINITION OF FRIVOLOUS
Prior to the Supreme Court teachings in Neitzke v. Williams5
and Denton v. Hernandez,6 we held in Cay v. Estelle7 that "[a]n IFP
proceeding may be dismissed if (1) the claim's realistic chance of
ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in
law or fact; or (3) it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim." Thereafter, however, we
determined that Neitzke invalidated Cay's third prong8 and that
3
We reinstated Hicks' IFP status for the purposes of this
appeal.
4
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118
L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992); Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 745-46 (5th
Cir. 1995).
5
490 U.S. 319, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989).
6
504 U.S. 25, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992).
7
789 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1986).
8
Pugh v. Parish of St. Tammany, 875 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1989)
(citing Neitzke for proposition that complaint which fails to state
4
Denton, invalidated its first prong.9 There is no question,
however, regarding the continued validity of Cay's second prong.10
In both Neitzke and Denton, the Court held that a complaint "is
frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact."11
A court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the
facts are "clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations
that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and 'delusional."12 As Hicks'
factual assertions obviously do not fall within this category, we
must review Hicks' legal arguments to determine whether they have
"an arguable basis in law."13 We initially examine his First
Amendment claim and then his RFRA claim.
C. FIRST AMENDMENT
The rule is well established that inmates retain their First
Amendment right to exercise religion;14 however, this right is
subject to reasonable restrictions and limitations necessitated by
claim for purposes of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is not automatically
frivolous within meaning of section 1915(d)).
9
Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115 (5th Cir. 1993).
10
Id. at 115 n.6.
11
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831-32; Denton, 504
U.S. at 28, 112 S.Ct. at 1733; see also, Booker, 2 F.3d at 115-16.
12
Denton, 504 U.S. at 33-34, 112 S.Ct. at 1733.
13
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 109 S.Ct. at 1831-32; Denton, 504
U.S. at 28, 112 S.Ct. at 1733; see also, Booker, 2 F.3d at 115-16.
14
Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1992)(per curiam),
cert. denied sub nom., Harrison v. McKaskle, __ U.S. __, 113 S. Ct.
668, 121 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1992).
5
penological goals.15 Equally clear in this circuit is the
proposition that prison grooming regulations, including
specifically the requirement that a prisoner cut his hair and
beard, are rationally related to the achievement of valid
penological goals, such as security and inmate identification.16
Hicks does nothing to distinguish his case from the long line of
cases that establish this precedent. Regardless of whether Hicks
is in the general prison population or in AS, the penological goals
behind the grooming requirements remain. Thus, Hicks has failed to
identify "an arguable basis in law" for his free exercise claim; it
is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.17 Accordingly,
we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Hicks' First Amendment claim.
D. THE RFRA
On the other hand, we conclude that the district court did
abuse its discretion by dismissing Hicks' claim under the RFRA.
Passed by Congress in 1993, the RFRA states in pertinent part:
§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially
burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability, except as
provided in subsection (b).
15
Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 817, 822-23, 94 S. Ct.
2800, 2804, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974)).
16
See Powell, 959 F.2d at 25 (holding that the TDJC's
prohibition on long hair and beards is rationally related to
legitimate state objectives); Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of
Corrections, 961 F.2d 77 (1992)(hair-grooming regulations that
required short hair was reasonably related to legitimate
penological concerns of identification and security).
17
See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1832.
6
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates
that application of the burden to the person--
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental
interest. The purpose of the RFRA is "to
restore the compelling interest test ... in
all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened.18
Given this broad statement of purpose, we join every other circuit
that has addressed this issue in concluding that the RFRA clearly
applies to prisoners' claims.19 Thus the issue whether the prison
violated Hicks' religious rights under RFRA must be analyzed using
the "substantial burden" test rather than the less stringent
"reasonable opportunity" test previously employed.20
We cannot see how the district court could have validly
concluded that Hicks' claim under the RFRA lacks "an arguable basis
in law." Not passed until late in 1993, RFRA remains relatively
18
42 U.S.C. s 2000bb(b)(1).
19
Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 948 (9th Cir. 1995)(per
curiam); Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69 (8th Cir. 1994); Werner
v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 115 S. Ct. 2625, __ L.Ed.2d __. These holdings are based on the
fact that Congress debated and rejected an amendment that would
have excluded prisons from the RFRA. See S.Rep. No. 111, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ V(d) and XI (1993); H.R.Rep. No. 88, 103rd
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
20
Under the latter test, an inmate who adheres to a minority
religion must be given a "reasonable opportunity of pursuing his
faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who
adhere to the conventional religious precepts." Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972).
Nevertheless, the religious needs of the inmate must be balanced
against the reasonable penological goals of the prison. O'Lone v.
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404, 96
L. Ed. 2d 282 (1987).
7
new law; its statutory contours are vague and its legal limits,
contours, and standards have yet to be defined.21 More importantly,
we have yet to address the RFRA or any of its discrete standards.
21
For example, "[t]he threshold inquiry under RFRA is whether
the statute [or conduct] in question substantially burdens a
person's religious practice. If there is no substantial burden,
RFRA does not apply." Morris v. Midway Southern Baptist Church,
183 B.R. 239, 251 (D.Kan. 1995). A "substantial burden" has been
defined in several different ways:
The religious adherent . . . has the obligation to prove
that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent's
practice of his or her religion . . . by preventing him
or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious
experience which the faith mandates. This interference
must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be
substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief
that is central to religious doctrine. Bryant v. Gomez,
46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir.1995); see also, Morris, 183
B.R. at 251;
To exceed the "substantial burden" threshold, government
regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain
conduct or expression that manifests some central tenet
of a prisoner's individual beliefs, . . .; must
meaningfully curtail a prisoner's ability to express
adherence to his or her faith; or must deny a prisoner
reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities
that are fundamental to a prisoner's religion. Werner,
49 F.3d at 1480 (citations omitted);
To be a "substantial burden", the government must either
compel a person do something in contravention of their
religious beliefs or require them to refrain from doing
something required by their religious beliefs. Morris,
183 B.R. at 251;
A "substantial burden" has been defined as follows:
"where the state conditions receipt of an important
benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or
where it denies such a benefit because of conduct
mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. Woods
v. Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756, 762 (D.S.C. 1995) (citations
omitted).
8
Although either a motion for summary judgment or the further
development of case law in this circuit may ultimately defeat
Hicks' RFRA claim, we hold that, at this early stage in the
development of RFRA, Hicks' has a "fightin' chance" to make some of
that the law. Accordingly, the district court abused its
discretion when it summarily dismissed Hicks' RFRA claim as
frivolous. We therefore vacate the district court's ruling on
Hicks' RFRA claim and remand it for further adjudication consistent
with this opinion. To facilitate future appellate review, the
district court should on remand explain its analysis in some
detail.
III
CONCLUSIONS
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's
dismissal of Hicks' First Amendment claim, but vacate and remand
his claim under RFRA for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED and REMANDED in part.
9