United States v. Darius Springer , 667 F. App'x 493 ( 2016 )

Case: 15-11026 Document: 00513600911 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-11026
Summary Calendar
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
July 20, 2016
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
DARIUS LASHUN SPRINGER,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:14-CR-170-1
Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Defendant-Appellant Darius Lashun Springer was indicted for
possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone. The district court denied his
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that Springer voluntarily
consented to the search of his duffel bag. Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Springer pleaded guilty to the indictment and was sentenced below the
advisory guidelines range to 36 months of imprisonment and two years of
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 15-11026 Document: 00513600911 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-11026
supervised release. Per the agreement, Springer reserved his right to appeal
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, Springer
argues that the district court clearly erred in denying his motion because his
consent was the result of police coercion.
“The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from
a totality of the circumstances” and is reviewed for clear error. United States
v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We analyze the following six factors to determine whether
consent to a search was voluntarily given:
(1) the voluntariness of the defendant’s custodial status; (2) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of
the defendant’s cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant’s
awareness of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant’s
education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant’s belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found.
Id. at 436 & n.21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). No single
factor is dispositive. Id. at 436. “Where the judge bases a finding of consent
on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard
is particularly strong since the judge had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that
Springer voluntarily consented to the search of his bag because there was no
evidence of police coercion and Springer was given two opportunities to refuse
consent. A weighing of the pertinent factors supports the district court’s
determination that Springer voluntarily consented to the search of his duffel
bag. See Solis, 299 F.3d at 436 & n.21; United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d
117, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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