State of Texas v. USA , 106 F.3d 661 ( 1997 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-40721.
STATE OF TEXAS, on its own behalf and on behalf of all Texans as
parens patriae; George W. Bush, Governor of the State of Texas;
La Joya Independent School District, on their own behalf and as
class representatives of all independent school districts of Texas;
Harris County Hospital District; Dallas County Hospital District;
Bexar County Hospital District, on their own behalf and as class
representatives of all Hospital Districts in Texas; Harris County;
Dallas County; Hidalgo County, on their own behalf and as class
representative of all counties in Texas; The City of Odessa, on
its own behalf and as class representative of all municipalities in
Texas, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES of America; Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General;
Doris Meissner, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service; Michael S. Williams, Director of Immigration and
Naturalization Service's Texas Regional Office; Ronald C.
Chandler, Immigration and Naturalization Service's District
Director of the Houston District; Robert A. Wallis, Immigration
and Naturalization Service's District Director of the Houston
District; Richard M. Casillas, Immigration and Naturalization
Service's District Director of the San Antonio District; Alice
Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget; Margaret M.
Richardson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,
Defendants-Appellees.
Feb. 28, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and BARKSDALE, Circuit
Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:
The State of Texas and its political subdivisions
(collectively, "the State")1 appeal a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
1
The suit was brought as a class action by the State of Texas
on behalf of all Texans; the Governor; one school district on
behalf of all Texas school districts; three hospital districts on
behalf of all Texas hospital districts; three counties on behalf
1
dismissal of their complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief which would require that the United States pay the
educational, medical, and criminal justice expenses allegedly
incurred as a result of the presence of undocumented or illegal
aliens in Texas. Concluding that the complaint raises questions of
policy rather than colorable claims of constitutional or statutory
violations, we affirm.
Background
The amended complaint alleges that hundreds of thousands of
undocumented immigrants live in Texas as the direct consequence of
federal immigration policy. The State alleges that federal
defendants have violated the Constitution and immigration laws by
failing to control illegal immigration and by failing to reimburse
Texas for its educational, medical, and criminal justice
expenditures on undocumented aliens. The State seeks an order
enjoining federal defendants from failing to pay for these alleged
financial consequences of federal immigration policy and requiring
prospective payment as well as restitution for the State's relevant
expenditures since 1988. These expenditures are estimated at $1.34
billion for 1993 alone.
The complaint alleges breach of duties imposed by the
naturalization clause of the Constitution, specifically the duty to
of all Texas counties; and the City of Odessa, seeking to
represent Texas municipalities. Defendants are the United States;
the Attorney General; the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Commissioner and four INS officials in Texas; the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service; and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget. The El Paso Independent School District was
denied intervention but was given amicus status.
2
control immigration and to pay for the consequences of federal
immigration policy. The complaint also alleges that defendants
have commandeered State resources in violation of the tenth
amendment and, further, that defendants' failure to pay
immigration-related expenditures denigrates Texas' republican form
of government, in violation of the Constitution's guaranty clause
and the Articles of Annexation for Annexing Texas to the United
States. Finally, the complaint alleges that the Attorney General's
failure to prevent illegal immigration violates the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
The district court dismissed this action on three grounds:
(1) the claims present nonjusticiable political questions; (2) the
plaintiffs lack standing; and (3) the complaint fails to state a
claim on which relief can be granted.2 The State timely appealed.
Analysis
A complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim unless it appears certain that no set of
facts can be proved entitling plaintiffs to relief.3 For purposes
of our de novo review of the order of dismissal we accept the
complaint's factual allegations as true, cautioning that
conclusionary allegations alone will not pass muster.4
2
For purposes of today's disposition we assume, without
deciding, that the plaintiffs have standing.
3
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957).
4
Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973 (5th Cir.1995).
3
Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, and New York have
brought similar actions seeking federal reimbursement for expenses
allegedly incurred as a result of illegal immigration.5 All of
these actions were dismissed by the trial court for failure to
state a colorable claim or as presenting nonjusticiable political
questions. All were affirmed on appeal by our colleagues in the
Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
Naturalization Clause
The naturalization clause, article I, section 8, clause 4 of
the Constitution provides that Congress "shall have Power ... To
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." The clause is a
principal source of the broad authority of Congress over
immigration matters, a discretionary authority subject to limited
judicial review.6 Our colleagues in the Second and Third Circuits
have found similar naturalization clause claims seeking federal
reimbursement to be nonjusticiable and lacking in merit.7
A judicial action presents a nonjusticiable political
question not amenable to judicial resolution where there is "a
5
Arizona v. United States, 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir.1997);
California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir.1997); New
Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir.1996); Padavan v.
United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir.1996); Chiles v. United States,
69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116
S.Ct. 1674, 134 L.Ed.2d 777 (1996). Each of these cases omitted
some of the counts in the instant complaint or included other
claims not present here.
6
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 2977, 102 L.Ed.2d 563(1982); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50(1977).
7
New Jersey; Padavan.
4
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it...."8
Nonjusticiability based on commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department generally entails a finding that the
Constitution confers thereon final authority over the question at
issue, to the exclusion of the judiciary.9 A holding that a case
presents a nonjusticiable political question is "very different
from determining that specific congressional action does not
violate the Constitution. That determination is a decision on the
merits that reflects the exercise of judicial review, rather than
the abstention from judicial review that would be appropriate in
the case of a true political question."10 We are not aware of and
have difficulty conceiving of any judicially discoverable standards
for determining whether immigration control efforts by Congress are
constitutionally adequate.
Were we to assume, arguendo, the justiciability of this
claim, judicial review of congressional and executive action in the
immigration arena is limited. " "[O]ver no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over'
8
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7
L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
9
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 113 S.Ct. 732, 122
L.Ed.2d 1 (1993).
10
United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442,
458, 112 S.Ct. 1415, 1425, 118 L.Ed.2d 87 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
5
the admission of aliens."11 Courts must give special deference to
congressional and executive branch policy choices pertaining to
immigration.12
We conclude that the naturalization clause claims lack merit.
Neither the language, history, nor judicial interpretations of the
clause support the contention that it imposes a reimbursement duty
on the federal government.13 The State would find support for its
novel theory in a resolution by the House of Representatives
stating that inadequate immigration law enforcement has imposed on
state and local governments financial costs which the federal
government has an obligation to reimburse.14 A congressional
resolution cannot create a constitutional duty. The State also
contends that article I, section 8 of the Constitution implies the
authority to carry out all functions necessary to reach the
objective of Congress' powers, and that payment of
immigration-related expenses is a necessary function of the
naturalization power. Although the grant of broad powers to
Congress by the naturalization clause undoubtedly includes the
discretion to decide whether to appropriate funds to states for the
expenses at issue, we perceive no basis for reading into the clause
11
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792, 97 S.Ct. at 1478 (quoting Oceanic
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339, 29 S.Ct. 671,
676, 53 L.Ed. 1013 (1909)).
12
Fiallo.
13
New Jersey; Padavan.
14
H.R.Con.Res. 218, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 140 Cong.Rec. 1210
(1994).
6
an affirmative duty to do so.
Tenth Amendment Claim
The tenth amendment ensures that "[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Congress may not assume control over the legislative
processes of the states by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.15 The tenth amendment
promotes accountability to the electorate. "[W]here the Federal
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."16
The State contends that federal defendants have commandeered
its financial resources by forcing it to provide services to
undocumented aliens. According to the State, inadequate
enforcement of immigration laws presents the State with a Hobson's
choice: to pay medical and correctional expenses of undocumented
aliens or to place at risk the public health and safety.
We hold that in the absence of a federal statute or regulation
or executive branch directive specifically compelling states to
provide services to undocumented aliens, the federal government
15
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-61, 112 S.Ct.
2408, 2420, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-89, 101 S.Ct.
2352, 2366, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981)).
16
New York at 169, 112 S.Ct. at 2424.
7
cannot be said to have commandeered state legislative processes in
violation of New York v. United States. We agree with our
colleagues in the Second, Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits that
state expenditures on medical and correctional services for
undocumented immigrants are not the result of federal coercion.17
The State's correctional expenses stem from its enforcement of its
own penal laws, not federal laws, and federal law requires states
to provide emergency medical care to undocumented aliens only if
the states voluntarily choose to receive federal funds from the
Medicaid program.18 The Supreme Court has recognized that the tenth
amendment permits Congress to attach conditions to the receipt by
the states of federal funds that have the effect of influencing
state legislative choices.19 "[T]o hold that motive or temptation
is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless
difficulties."20 This we will not do.
Finally, the State's public education expenditures for the
children of undocumented aliens are required by the equal
protection clause rather than by actions of the federal
defendants.21 A duty imposed on states by the Constitution can
hardly be said to violate the tenth amendment's reservation of
17
Padavan; New Jersey; California; Chiles.
18
California; Padavan.
19
New York; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107 S.Ct.
2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987).
20
Dole at 211, 97 S.Ct. at 2798 (quotation omitted).
21
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d
786 (1982).
8
unenumerated powers to the states.22 Accordingly, the State has not
alleged a cognizable claim of violation of the tenth amendment.23
Guaranty Clause Claims
The complaint alleges that federal immigration policy and
defendants' failure to pay for state expenditures related to
undocumented aliens infringes on the right of Texas voters to
determine the spending priorities of state government in violation
of the guaranty clause of the Constitution and the Articles of
Annexation for Annexing Texas to the United States. The guaranty
clause, article IV, section 4, provides that "[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government."
Although the Supreme Court has suggested that perhaps not all
claims under the guaranty clause present nonjusticiable political
questions, in the main the Court has found that such claims are not
judicially enforceable.24 In cases seeking federal reimbursement
for states' immigration-related expenses, the Second, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have held guaranty clause claims nonjusticiable.25
The State suggests no manageable standards by which a court could
decide the type and degree of immigration law enforcement that
would suffice to comply with its strictures. Whatever might be the
22
Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 107 S.Ct. 2802, 97
L.Ed.2d 187 (1987).
23
California; Padavan.
24
New York at 182-86, 112 S.Ct. at 2432-33.
25
Padavan; California; Chiles.
9
decision in other cases in other settings, we are persuaded that
the case now before us does not present a justiciable claim of
violation of the guaranty clause.
Further, were we to assume that the present complaint is
justiciable, it fails to allege a realistic risk of denying to
Texas its guaranteed republican form of government. The defendants
are not mandating the State to take any action with respect to
undocumented aliens. Any inaction by the federal government with
respect to immigration enforcement or payment of state expenditures
cannot realistically be said to pose a meaningful risk of altering
the Texas government's form or method of functioning. The Texas
electorate is not being deprived of the opportunity to hold state
and federal officials accountable at the polls for their respective
policy choices. We must conclude that the complaint fails to state
a violation of the guaranty clause or the Articles of Annexation.
Statutory Claim
Finally, the State alleges that the Attorney General has
breached a nondiscretionary duty to control immigration under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.26 The State candidly concedes,
however, that section 1103 places no substantive limits on the
Attorney General and commits enforcement of the INA to her
discretion.27
The State's allegation that defendants have failed to enforce
the immigration laws and refuse to pay the costs resulting
26
8 U.S.C. § 1103.
27
Chiles; see also California.
10
therefrom is not subject to judicial review. An agency's decision
not to take enforcement actions is unreviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act28 because a court has no workable
standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of
discretion.29 We reject out-of-hand the State's contention that the
federal defendants' alleged systemic failure to control immigration
is so extreme as to constitute a reviewable abdication of duty.
The State does not contend that federal defendants are doing
nothing to enforce the immigration laws or that they have
consciously decided to abdicate their enforcement responsibilities.
Real or perceived inadequate enforcement of immigration laws does
not constitute a reviewable abdication of duty.30
The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.
28
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
29
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d
714 (1985).
30
See Heckler.
11