Miller v. Riser , 84 F. App'x 417 ( 2003 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 23, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-30762
STEVEN WAYNE MILLER; ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
STEVEN WAYNE MILLER; PATRICIA DIANE
PRICHARD; BENJAMIN JAMES PRICHARD,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
THEODORE RISER, JR., Sheriff; ET AL.,
Defendants,
THEODORE RISER, JR., Sheriff; J. E. MORTON, individually
and in his official capacity; SHAWN GRIFFITH, individually
and in his official capacity,
Defendants - Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 00-CV-1505
--------------------
Before DAVIS, SMITH and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Deputies Shawn Griffith and J.E. Morton appeal from the
denial of their motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. Sheriff Theodore Riser, Jr., appeals from
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-30762
-2-
the order reinstating the state-law claims against him in a civil
action arising from an incident involving Steven Wayne Miller and
Patricia Diane Prichard.
The district court denied Griffith and Morton’s summary
judgment motion because it found that genuine issues of material
fact exist regarding the deputies’ entitlement to qualified
immunity on the plaintiffs’ false arrest, malicious prosecution,
and excessive force claims. Given that the district court based
its denial of summary judgment on the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact, our jurisdiction on appeal is limited to
considering the materiality of these factual disputes. Hatfield
v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 2002). As a consequence,
we must ask whether, assuming all of the plaintiffs’ allegations
are true, those facts are sufficient to establish that defendants
acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. Id.We conclude that the district court did not err by
concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed on
plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims. See Castellano v. Fragozo,
No. 00-50591, 2003 WL 22881590 (5th Cir. Dec. 5, 2003)(en banc);
Morris v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 754 (5th Cir.
2001)(probable cause for arrest); Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d
699, 703-04(5th Cir. 1999)(excessive force); Rankin v.
Klevenhagen, 5 F.3d 103, 108 (5th Cir. 1993)(qualified immunity).
Here the facts supporting the arrest were placed before a neutral
magistrate, and his finding of probable cause may have insulated
No. 02-30762
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the officers from liability. Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456
(5th Cir. 1994). But plaintiffs have introduced a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the magistrate’s probable cause
determination was “tainted by the malicious actions of the
government officials,” Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d 722, 728 (5th
Cir. 2002), making the district court’s denial of summary
judgment here appropriate.
Sheriff Riser contends that the district court erred by
reinstating the state-law claims against him. This claim does
not relate to the appeal from the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity, and therefore we do not have jurisdiction to
review this claim. Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223, 225 (5th
Cir. 2002).
The deputies and Sheriff Riser contend that the civil action
against them was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),
because it attacked the validity of the state court’s pretrial
probable cause determinations. This court has jurisdiction to
address Heck in an interlocutory appeal. Wells v. Bonner,
45 F.3d 90, 92, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1995).
Pursuant to Heck,
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,
the district court must consider whether a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff
can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has
already been invalidated.
No. 02-30762
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Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Because Miller and Prichard were not
convicted, the civil action was not barred by Heck.
As we recently held in Castellano, “‘malicious prosecution’
standing along is no violation of the U.S. Constitution and that
to proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such a claim must rest on the
denial of a right secured under federal not state law.” No. 00-
50591 2003 WL 22881590 at *1. Accordingly, we vacate the denial
of qualified immunity on this claim and consistent with
Castellano give the district court discretion on remand to allow
plaintiff an opportunity to amend to assert a state law malicious
prosecution claim.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART and REMANDED.