Withrow v. Roell , 77 F. App'x 284 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                          United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FIFTH CIRCUIT                     October 10, 2003
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    No.    00-40627                       Clerk
    JON MICHAEL WITHROW,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JOSEPH C. ROELL; JERRY BALLARD; PETRA GARIBAY; J. REAGAN, M.D.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (C-97-CV-256)
    ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
    Before JOLLY, JONES, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In 2002, we held in this pro se appeal that, without the
    express written consent of the parties, a magistrate judge does not
    have jurisdiction to try a civil action.        Withrow v. Roell, 
    288 F.3d 199
    , 204 (5th Cir. 2002); see 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    (c).     The Supreme
    Court reversed and remanded, holding such consent can be implied
    through the parties’ conduct.       Roell v. Withrow, 
    123 S. Ct. 1696
    ,
    1703 (2003).      Accordingly, before us is the merits-issue not
    considered in our previous decision: whether the evidence at trial
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    was sufficient to support the jury’s finding Defendants’ care of
    Plaintiff did not violate the Eighth Amendment.        AFFIRMED.
    I.
    This 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action by Jon Michael Withrow, Texas
    prisoner # 675379, claimed Defendants — members of the prison
    medical staff where he was incarcerated — violated his Eighth
    Amendment rights.   Withrow claimed:     Defendants were deliberately
    indifferent to his medical needs after he suffered a broken leg;
    and, as a result, he was forced to undergo a complicated surgery
    that left him permanently disabled.
    Withrow’s claims against Ballard were dismissed pre-trial.
    The jury found for the remaining defendants (Defendants).
    II.
    A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be raised
    by a FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law at
    the conclusion of all the evidence.       E.g., Lincoln v. Case, 
    340 F.3d 283
    , 290 (5th Cir. 2003); Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Serv.,
    
    247 F.3d 229
    , 238 (5th Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. Wallace v.
    Flintco, Inc., 
    143 F.3d 955
    , 960 (5th Cir. 1998).       Withrow did not
    do so.    Accordingly, “[i]f any evidence exists that supports the
    verdict, it will be upheld”.       Lincoln, 
    340 F.3d at
    290 (citing
    Flowers, 
    247 F.3d at 238
    ).
    Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
    against   cruel   and   unusual   punishment   when   they   demonstrate
    2
    deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs,
    constituting an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.               Wilson
    v. Seiter, 
    501 U.S. 294
    , 297 (1991).           A prison official acts with
    deliberate indifference if he “knows of and disregards an excessive
    risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of
    facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
    risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference”.
    Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 837 (1994).             Unsuccessful medical
    treatment,   acts   of   negligence       or   medical    malpractice,    or   a
    prisoner’s disagreement with prison officials regarding medical
    treatment do not constitute an unconstitutional denial of medical
    care.   Varnado v. Lynaugh, 
    920 F.2d 320
    , 321 (5th Cir. 1991);
    Norton v. Dimazana, 
    122 F.3d 286
    , 292 (5th Cir. 1997).
    Withrow’s claim is based substantially on his assertion that
    Garibay, a nurse at the prison, mis-diagnosed him as not having a
    broken ankle, which led to delay in his receiving treatment.
    Garibay testified, however, that she had not diagnosed Withrow
    because she was not qualified to do so.                  Therefore, evidence
    supports the verdict that Garibay was not deliberately indifferent.
    Withrow also contends that the treatment by prison physician
    Dr. Reagan was deliberately indifferent because Dr. Reagan refused
    to send Withrow to a hospital before having his leg X-rayed,
    despite knowing that no X-ray technician was available.              Withrow
    testified, however, that an X-ray technician was located two hours
    3
    later.     Therefore, evidence supports the verdict that Dr. Reagan
    was not deliberately indifferent.
    Next, Withrow claims that prison physician Dr. Roell delayed
    sending Withrow to the hospital because of cost concerns.                        Dr.
    Roell testified, however:          he had to wait for clearance from the
    hospital because it had no orthopedic beds open at the time of
    Withrow’s    injury;   and   any    delay    in    treatment   was     because    of
    Withrow’s stable medical condition and the treatment that already
    had been rendered by the prison medical staff. Therefore, evidence
    supports    the   verdict    that     Dr.    Roell    was   not      deliberately
    indifferent.
    Finally,     Withrow    contends       that    his   level   of    care     was
    constitutionally deficient.         The verdict is supported by evidence
    of sufficient care provided him by the prison medical staff,
    including X-rays, Tylenol, treatment with a splint, immobilization,
    ice, and elevation.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
    AFFIRMED.
    4