Nethery v. Collins ( 1993 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 92-1742
STEPHEN RAY NETHERY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JAMES A. COLLINS, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(June 11, 1993)
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
POLITZ, Chief Judge:
Stephen Ray Nethery was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death by the Texas state court. With all direct
appeals and collateral state reviews exhausted he seeks federal
habeas relief. The district court denied his application and
refused to grant a certificate of probable cause for appeal. We
granted CPC. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.
Background
On the evening of February 22, 1981, Nethery met a woman in a
Dallas bar. They consumed several strong drinks and he persuaded
her to leave the bar with him to go to a secluded spot to smoke
marihuana. They drove to an area near a lake in a high crime area
and parked. It was well after midnight. Nethery made sexual
advances which his companion initially resisted. A pistol fell out
of his pocket. He caused her to disrobe. He did likewise and they
engaged in sexual relations over an extended period. A police car
on patrol spotted them and pulled up alongside. Two officers
exited their vehicle; Officer Phillip Brown approached the Nethery
auto and shined his flashlight inside. Officer John McCarthy stood
by the police auto. As Officer Brown illuminated the interior of
Nethery's car the woman was attempting to put on her clothes;
Nethery was naked. Officer Brown told them that they could be
arrested and instructed them to leave the area.
At this point Brown turned to return to the police cruiser.
As he did, Nethery exited his car, rested his arm on the top of his
vehicle, said "I'm sorry," and fired three quick shots. He hit
Officer McCarthy. Officer Brown returned fire and Nethery ran
toward the lake. Brown pursued and chased Nethery into the lake
where Nethery finally surrendered. Upon returning to the parked
vehicles, Brown found his patrol partner on the ground, calling for
help on his mobile radio. Officer McCarthy was rushed to the
hospital but subsequently died of the gunshot wound to the back of
his head.
Nethery was indicted and tried for capital murder in Dallas
County. Pursuant to Texas procedure,1 the jury first determined
his guilt and then considered three statutorily mandated special
issues.2 In response to these questions, the jury found (1) that
Nethery's conduct was deliberate and undertaken with the reasonable
expectation of McCarthy's death; (2) that there was a probability
that Nethery would commit further criminal acts that would
constitute a threat to society; and (3) that Nethery's conduct was
unreasonable in response to any provocation by Officer McCarthy.
Based on these answers, Nethery was sentenced to death by lethal
injection.3
Nethery's appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
direct and automatic. That court found no reversible error in any
of his 55 points of error.4 The Supreme Court denied his petition
for certiorari, rendering his conviction final, in early 1986.5
Nethery next turned to the writ of habeas corpus. The same
judge who had presided over his trial denied his first state
application and resentenced him to death. Nethery maintains that
at this point the judge disclosed his close personal relationship
with Officer McCarthy. Nethery appealed the denial to the Texas
1
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071.
2
The jury was also instructed that it could consider evidence
of temporary insanity caused by intoxication.
3
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 37.071.
4
Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en
banc), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110 (1986).
5
Nethery v. Texas, 474 U.S. 1110, 106 S. Ct. 897 (1986).
3
Court of Criminal Appeals, adding a claim of judicial bias. That
court again denied relief.
Nethery thereafter filed his first application for a federal
writ, which was dismissed for failure to exhaust a claim. He did
nothing until his execution was rescheduled, at which point he
returned to the state district court again seeking habeas relief.
This time a different judge was assigned to the case. The court
found no factual or legal basis for relief. The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed.
Nethery then filed the instant application for federal habeas.
The district court assigned the matter to a magistrate judge who
held an evidentiary hearing. The magistrate judge found no
credible evidence supporting Nethery's claim of judicial bias and
recommended that the application be denied. The district court
adopted the recommendation and denied an application for CPC. We
granted CPC.
Analysis
I. JUDICIAL BIAS
Nethery claims that his trial was tainted by the presiding
judge's failure to disclose a close personal friendship with the
deceased officer. He contends that the relationship did not become
apparent until the judge went into "an emotional tirade" during a
resentencing hearing on Nethery's application for state habeas
relief. The record of that hearing indicates that the judge
sentenced Nethery to die on McCarthy's birthday and then
immediately called a short recess. After returning, the judge
4
directed the clerk to send a copy of the death warrant to Nethery
so he could "study it" before he died. Nethery claims the judge
also professed a close friendship to the victim, although the
record is silent in this respect. The state contends that the
judge simply was appalled by the senseless killing.
The accused in any criminal trial is guaranteed the right to
an impartial tribunal.6 To secure relief on this basis, Nethery
had to establish that the judge was influenced by interests apart
from the administration of justice and that this bias or prejudice
resulted in rulings based on other than facts developed at trial.7
Nethery's conclusion of bias is premised on the judge's
alleged friendship with Officer McCarthy. The state habeas court
received conflicting affidavits from the trial judge and Nancy
Berry, Nethery's friend and spiritual advisor, regarding the
judge's statements at the resentencing hearing. Berry claimed to
have heard the judge profess a friendship with the victim; the
judge denied this and maintained that he was not personally
acquainted with the victim. The record of the resentencing hearing
is silent with respect to the judge's supposed reference to a
friendship with the victim, corroborating the judge's version of
events. The state habeas court found as a matter of fact that the
judge was not a personal friend of the victim. Because it did not
follow on the heels of a full and fair hearing, this finding is not
6
Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327, 1329 (5th Cir.),
modified, 796 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1986).
7
United States v. Reeves, 782 F.2d 1323, 1325 (5th Cir. 1986).
5
entitled to the statutory presumption of correctness.8
Berry testified in the evidentiary hearing conducted a` quo,
stating, as she had in her affidavit, that she heard the trial
judge profess a friendship with the decedent during the
resentencing hearing. The magistrate judge, citing her selective
recall of events, chose to discredit her testimony and concluded
that the "most petitioner has shown is that the trial judge was
offended and upset by the brutal and senseless nature of
petitioner's crime." The magistrate judge found the record of the
hearing and the state trial judge's affidavit more credible. Rule
52(a)'s command of deference to findings of fact, particularly
when, as here, those findings are premised on credibility
assessments, compels our rejection of this assignment of error.9
8
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The state habeas court did not
conduct an evidentiary hearing before discounting Berry's version
of events; rather, it adopted in whole the state's proposed
findings of fact two days after Nethery filed his petition.
Findings based solely on a paper record are not necessarily
entitled to a presumption of correctness. Ellis v. Collins, 956
F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1992). "[I]t is necessary to examine in each
case whether a paper hearing is appropriate to the resolution of
the factual dispute underlying the petitioner's claim." May v.
Collins, 955 F.2d 299, 312 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1925 (1992). Notably, and for obvious reasons, unlike the
petitioners in Ellis and May, Nethery's petition was not considered
by the same judge who had presided over his trial; thus, there was
never a meaningful opportunity for the court to assess the
credibility of the conflicting affiants. Also significant is that
Nethery's version of events was not so facially insubstantial as to
render a hearing a mere gratuitous formality. To the contrary, the
record of the hearing and an independent news report both
documented that the judge became emotional during the hearing and
sentenced Nethery to die on what would have been Officer McCarthy's
birthday.
9
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985).
6
II. GRAND JURY COMPOSITION
It is well established that the criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to a grand jury indictment before trial in
state criminal proceedings.10 A deficient indictment will, however,
provide a basis for federal habeas relief if the defect is so
significant that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction under
state law.11
Under Texas law, a grand jury is composed of twelve grand
jurors.12 Once the grand jury is impaneled, nine grand jurors
constitute a quorum for doing business.13 A review of pertinent
10
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Hamilton v.
McCotter, 772 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1985).
11
Branch v. Estelle, 631 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1980).
12
Tex. Const. art. V, § 13; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 19.40.
13
"Grand and petit juries in the District Courts shall be
composed of twelve men; but nine members of a grand jury shall be
a quorum to transact business." Tex. Const. art. V, § 13.
It became apparent during arguments in the course of the
hearing below that Nethery sought to argue that Texas law not only
requires the impaneling of twelve grand jurors but that twelve
grand jurors must be present to deliberate in every case. The
state court did not address this contention.
The district court, citing Drake v. State, 7 S.W. 868 (Tex.
App. 1888) and noting the state's waiver of the exhaustion
requirement, determined that Texas law imposed no such requirement.
Based on our review of the plain language of the Texas Constitution
and its Code of Criminal Procedure, as well as Texas case law, we
agree. Hodges v. State, 604 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
(holding nine grand jurors constitute a quorum for returning
indictments); see also In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575 (1891) (no
jurisdictional defect where sufficient number of grand jurors voted
to indict notwithstanding fact that an insufficient number were
impaneled); 38 AM. JUR. 2D Grand Jury § 16 (1968) ("Unless the
statute is mandatory as to the number of grand jurors acting, the
excusing or absence of some of the panel will not affect an
indictment if enough remain to constitute the number necessary to
concur.").
7
statements in Texas decisions, mostly in dicta and mostly from the
late 1800s and early part of this century, suggests that a
conviction after indictment by a grand jury impaneled with more or
less than 12 members is void.14 Assuming, per arguendo, that these
cases reflect the current state of Texas law, and that proof of the
impanelment of less than 12 grand jurors would constitute grounds
for reversal on collateral attack, Nethery has failed to establish
that controlling fact herein.
Nethery claims to have learned from a fellow inmate, who was
indicted by the same grand jury, that the grand jury was not
lawfully formed. During the course of the evidentiary hearing in
this case, Nethery introduced the transcript of a hearing in his
fellow inmate's case in which the foreman of the grand jury noted
in passing that only nine grand jurors deliberated throughout the
grand jury's tour of duty. The state objected to the introduction
of this transcript because the issue in the previous case was
whether the indictment had been forged; thus, there never had been
an opportunity to develop fully the testimony from the foreman with
respect to the number of grand jurors. The foreman did not testify
in the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate judge.
Assuming, per arguendo, that the foreman's testimony in an
unrelated proceeding was properly admitted under a hearsay
exception, and that this testimony can fairly be read to establish
the presence of only nine grand jurors during deliberation of both
14
E.g., Wilson v. State, 36 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1931)
(dicta).
8
cases, the same result obtains. Texas law clearly provides for
indictment by a quorum of nine grand jurors; the foreman's
testimony, even if accepted as reliable, would, in fairness,
establish only that this number was present when the Nethery
indictment was handed up. Hugh Lucas, an Assistant District
Attorney, testified that he supervised the operations of the grand
jury on the day Nethery was indicted, that twelve grand jurors were
impaneled, and that he personally witnessed at least nine of them
assemble to hear Nethery's case. This testimony never has been
contradicted and is corroborated by court documents listing the
names of the 12 impaneled grand jurors. This assignment of error
is without merit.
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Nethery charges that certain statements made by the
prosecution during closing arguments improperly pointed to his
failure to testify. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the
following statement by Nethery's lawyer to have invited reply:
The prosecutor, when they were questioning you, told you
it's not up to the state to prove motive. That's right.
Nothing in the court's charge says they have to prove it.
But I'll say this: If you have lack of motive, you're
certainly entitled to consider that. According to Brown,
he'd finished. He was--both of them [had] finished.
Turning to go back to their car. And you've got a man
who knows that he's facing two police officers with guns
and [he] gets out of the car and deliberately shoots and
kills a policeman. Where's the logic? What reason is
there?
In its closing the state responded:
Motive? Mr. Goodwin wants a motive. Mr. Goodwin wants
a reason. You told us, each and every one of you told us
on voir dire that we could not, in many cases, bring you
a motive or a reason and you agreed from that witness
9
stand that you would not force the State to show you a
motive. And I'm sure it was explained to you that we
can't show you a motive or a reason because many times it
is known only to the defendant. It's in that head
(pointing to defendant). We can't cut that head open.
The trial court sustained a defense objection to the statement and
instructed the jury to disregard it but refused to declare a
mistrial. The state argues that (1) even if the statement could be
interpreted as a comment on Nethery's silence, it was invited; (2)
to the extent the reply exceeded the invitation, if at all, the
error was either cured by the instruction; or (3) was harmless.
While we hesitate to endorse the prosecution's remarks as an
appropriate and measured response to those of defense counsel, we
note that any unfair prejudice was, at most, slight.
Defense counsel had opined that the state's failure to prove
a motive for Nethery's conduct suggested a lack of criminal
responsibility. The state was entitled to make an appropriate
response. To the extent the prosecution may have responded
excessively, we must view the error in light of the court's
curative instruction and consider whether the residual impact had
any "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict."15
15
In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court
considered whether the prosecution's reference to the defendants'
failure to testify at trial, in violation of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, required reversal of their
convictions. The Court rejected a proposed blanket rule which
would have required reversal in all cases of constitutional error,
preferring instead a rule requiring reversal whenever the error is
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Since Chapman, the Court has drawn a distinction between
constitutional violations "of the trial type" and "structural
defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy
10
To say at this point that the jury drew the adverse inference
Nethery feared would be speculative at best. Nonetheless, even
assuming the statement caused each juror to consider Nethery's
failure to take the stand in his own defense and to draw an adverse
inference from it, we are not prepared to say that this assumed
error was harmful to the extent required under the controlling
standard. Nor are we prepared to say that this assumed error was
not corrected by the court's curative instruction.16 Rather, we
hold that any error associated with the prosecution's reply was
cured at trial and, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt,
had no substantial and injurious effect or influence in the
determination of Nethery's guilt or proper sentence.
IV. JURY SELECTION
During the course of jury selection the court excused for
cause prospective jurors William Keller and Debra Pippi and
declined defense invitations to excuse several other venire members
who indicated a preference for imposing death as a penalty for
murder. Nethery complains of both decisions.
In Wainwright v. Witt17 the Supreme Court approved the removal
of a prospective juror for cause where his views would "prevent or
analysis by harmless error standards." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. ---, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991). The Court recently has held that
"trial type error" will serve as a basis for habeas relief only if
it "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct.
353 (1993). Chapman error, as alleged here, is trial error.
16
Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
17
469 U.S. 412 (1985).
11
substantially impair" the performance of his duties in accordance
with his oath and the court's instructions. The Court recognized
that reliable assessment of the juror's ability to set aside
personal convictions depends on the juror's demeanor and
credibility. A juror's bias need not be proven with unmistakable
clarity. Accordingly, judgments made at trial about a juror's
ability to abide by the oath and the court's instructions,
notwithstanding moral convictions, are accorded a presumption of
correctness under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).18
Venire member Keller repeatedly insisted that the death
penalty was per se inappropriate and pointedly answered that he
would vote "no" to the special issues regardless of the
instructions or the evidence, in order to avoid its imposition.
Only on cross-examination did he testify that it was "possible"
that he could answer the special issues in the affirmative. On
redirect by the state, Keller reiterated that he would vote "no" to
prevent the imposition of the death penalty and held to that
position during the judge's final examination. Venire member Pippi
likewise expressed her disapproval of the death penalty and
testified that she would find it difficult to cast aside her
convictions in favor of the court's instructions. We conclude and
hold that the dismissal of Keller and Pippi did not violate the
standard announced in Witt.
Nethery exercised peremptory challenges to remove the venire
18
Duff-Smith v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
Witt), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1958 (1993).
12
members he identifies as having been properly subject to strikes
for cause. Even counting the strikes he used on these jurors,
Nethery did not exhaust his peremptory challenges.19 He was not
forced, therefore, to accept jurors he found objectionable, and the
court's refusal, erroneous or otherwise, to strike for cause those
prospective jurors he removed with peremptory challenges did not
cause harm of which Nethery may now complain.20
V. MITIGATING EVIDENCE AND SPECIAL ISSUES
In three distinct points of error, Nethery asserts that the
jury could not give effect to mitigating evidence of his
intoxication in responding to the statutorily mandated special
issues. He first claims that the special issues as they existed at
the time of his trial21 did not allow the jury to consider evidence
19
In Demouchette v. State, 731 S.W.2d 75, 83 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986), the court stated:
When the trial court errs in overruling a challenge for
cause against a venireman, the defendant is harmed only
if he uses a peremptory strike to remove the venireman
and therefore suffers a detriment from the loss of a
strike. Error is preserved only if the defendant
exhausts his peremptory challenges, is denied a request
for an additional peremptory challenge, identifies a
member of the jury as objectionable and claims that he
would have struck the juror with a peremptory challenge.
20
Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (finding no due process
or sixth amendment violation where capital murder defendant
exhausted his peremptory challenges removing a juror who should
have been excused for cause in the absence of a showing that any
juror who ultimately was seated was subject to removal for cause).
21
Texas has since revised the submission to require an
instruction informing the jury expressly to consider any mitigating
evidence in answering the three special issues. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. art. 37.071(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
At the time of trial the issues were:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused
13
of his intoxication or to incorporate their response into the
answers called for and, as a result, the court's refusal to provide
a separate instruction resulted in a violation of his eighth and
fourteenth amendment rights. He next claims that the special
issues failed to apprise the jury about how it should consider
evidence which was probative of his future dangerousness and which
also mitigated his culpability. Lastly, he argues that the special
issues and instructions allowed the jury to consider only evidence
of future dangerousness. We address these arguments collectively.
In Penry v. Lynaugh,22 the Supreme Court held that the Texas
special issues were inadequate to allow meaningful consideration of
the mitigating effect of Penry's mental retardation. The Court
based its conclusion on the direct inverse relation between the
evidence's mitigating and aggravating potential and the fact that
the special issues provided a means of expression only to the
aggravating character of this evidence in relation to the second
special issue--future dangerousness. Thus, the jury's ability to
consider the mitigating effect in response to one of the three
questions was not present and an additional instruction was
the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would
occur;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of
the defendant in killing the deceased was
unreasonable in response to the provocation, if
any, by the deceased.
22
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
14
necessary.
Nethery argues that the mitigating effect of his intoxication
likewise had relevance beyond the scope of any question asked in
Texas' sentencing scheme and that the absence of further
instruction prevented the jury from considering this evidence or
from expressing a favorable response. He also assails the Texas
scheme in its entirety because it allegedly fails to provide the
jury with reasonable means of considering mitigating evidence and
directs attention unfairly towards aggravating factors.
The Penry court expressly declined a sweeping invalidation of
the Texas scheme; such would have required announcing and applying
a "new rule."23 The Court thus did not invalidate the Texas scheme
in toto or mandate "special instructions whenever [the accused] can
offer mitigating evidence that has some arguable relevance beyond
the special issues."24 Rather, this court has construed the holding
in Penry to require additional jury instructions only where the
"major mitigating thrust of the evidence is beyond the scope of all
the special issues."25 We have held that the Texas special issues
are sufficiently broad in themselves to allow the jury to give
meaningful consideration to the accused's voluntary intoxication.26
23
Id.
24
Graham v. Collins, _____ U.S. _____, _____, 113 S. Ct. 892,
902 (1993).
25
Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1027 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
banc), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
26
Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 959 (1992); James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir.
1992).
15
Unlike the permanent disability suffered by Penry, Nethery's
intoxication was a transitory condition which could be given
mitigating effect in response to the first or second special
issues. Indeed, Nethery's trial counsel recognized as much and so
argued to the jury. Nethery's arguments are either foreclosed by
controlling precedent or propose a new rule which we may not apply
on collateral review.27
VI. FAILURE TO DEFINE TERMS USED IN THE SPECIAL ISSUES
Nethery claims that the meaning of the terms "deliberately,"
Unlike the dissent, we do not believe we have before us the
question whether the jury instruction as given, pursuant to
section 8.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, affirmatively
precluded the jury's consideration of Nethery's purported
intoxication. There was no prior submission to that effect in
either the state or federal courts. In fact, as the dissent notes,
the Texas courts found the objection Nethery actually presented to
be procedurally barred and also found that he was not so
intoxicated at the time of the offense as to warrant submission of
the temporary insanity instruction. Further, not only did Nethery
fail to preserve this point, he actually requested a definition of
insanity -- basing his later challenges on the denial thereof --
which would have created the precise prejudice the dissent fears.
The dissent argues that the Texas courts have twice excused
procedural defaults where the defendant sought to argue a Penry
claim because "Penry 'constituted a substantial change in the
law. . . .'" Selvage v. Collins, 816 S.W.2d 390, 392
(Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (citing Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350, 374
(Tex.Crim.App. 1991)). It is unclear how this reading will be
affected by the Supreme Court's subsequent and more restrictive
reading of Penry in Graham. More importantly, as the dissent
points out, the defaulted claim would be the total preclusion of a
jury's ability to consider mitigating evidence. That objection was
recognized, again, as the dissent points out, as early as 1976.
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). We conclude that the
claim has not been presented to us at all and, in any event, that
Texas courts would find it to be barred. Accordingly, we do not
address its merits.
27
Graham, _____ U.S. at _____, 113 S. Ct. at 903.
16
"probability," and "society" cannot be ascertained and thus
complains of their use in the special issues. We have determined
that these words have a common meaning and adequately permit the
jury to effectuate its collective judgment.28 Thus, consideration
of this point is foreclosed.29
VII. FAILURE TO INFORM THE JURY OF THE EFFECT OF NOT ANSWERING THE
SPECIAL ISSUES
The jury was informed, pursuant to Article 37.071 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, that it could return a negative answer
to any special issue if ten or more of them so voted. An
affirmative response to any question required unanimity. The jury
was not told of the consequence of its failure to muster fewer than
ten "no" votes or 12 "yes" votes. Nethery contends that the
failure to so advise the jury caused the jury's responses to fall
short of the heightened need for reliability required of a verdict
in a capital case.
Nethery muses that the jury's ignorance could lead to a
situation in which individual jurors felt compelled to reach a
consensus and, thus, one lone juror, assuming that he would have to
rally another nine "no" votes, would vote "yes" even though he felt
the appropriate answer was "no." This lone juror theory presumes
that the juror would disregard the court's instructions to exercise
independent judgment and vote according to the evidence as
28
James, 987 F.2d at 1120 (citing Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d
1091 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1030 (1985)).
29
See United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir.
1990) ("[P]rior panel opinions of this Court may not be disturbed
except on reconsideration en banc.").
17
presented and the law as explained by the court. Nethery contends
that the jury's ignorance about the effect of its verdict could
lead to a situation in which jurors feel compelled to reach a
consensus because Texas juries are instructed, pursuant to
Article 37.071, that they "shall" reach a verdict. We have
previously held that this type of claim -- which is based on the
principle announced by the Court in Mills v. Maryland30 -- proposes
a new rule under Teague v. Lane.31 Nethery's conviction became
final in 1986 -- two years before Mills was decided. We thus do
not reach the merits of his claim. Granting relief on this claim,
in contravention of the ordinary presumption that jurors follow the
trial court's instructions,32 would require our fashioning a new
rule of criminal procedure.33 This we decline to do.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the panel majority's affirmance of
the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus in
Nethery's case. My disagreement with the majority is limited to
30
486 U.S. 367 (1988).
31
489 U.S. 288 (1989); Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167
(5th Cir. 1992).
32
See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 933 (1993).
33
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
18
its disposition of Nethery's Eighth Amendment claim regarding his
mitigating evidence of voluntary intoxication at the time of the
crime.
I.
I initially note that I believe that the Supreme Court's
decision in Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), aff'g on other
grounds, 950 F.2d 1009, 1027 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), would
appear to require that the majority should, as a threshold matter,
address whether Nethery's Penry claim34 is barred under the
nonretroactivity doctrine first announced in Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). See Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 897
("Because this case is before us on Graham's petition for a writ of
federal habeas corpus, `we must determine, as a threshold matter,
whether granting [the habeas petitioner] the relief he seeks would
create a "new rule"' of constitutional law.") (citation omitted).35
The majority, however, cites a prior panel decision of this circuit
-- that was rendered after the Supreme Court's decision in Graham
-- which reached the merits of a Penry claim based on mitigating
evidence of intoxication without mentioning Teague. In effect,
that panel held that the Teague doctrine does not bar the court
from reaching the merits in such a case. See James v. Collins, 987
34
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
35
Even if Graham does not require us to raise the issue sua
sponte, see Williams v. Collins, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 10195, 989
F.2d 841, ___ n.9 (5th Cir. May 4, 1993), I observe that the State
in this case expressly invoked Teague with respect to Nethery's
Penry claim, which would appear to require the majority to address
the Teague issue. Cf. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
19
F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1993).36 Although I believe that the
panel decision in James mistakenly ignored the Supreme Court's
decision in Graham regarding the effect of Teague on Penry-type
claims, I agree with the majority that we appear to be bound by
James. See Burlington N. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance Way
Employees, 961 F.2d 86, 89 (5th Cir. 1992) (prior panel decision
binds subsequent panel unless intervening en banc or Supreme Court
decision).
II.
Nevertheless, even if this court were to apply Teague to
Nethery's case on a clean slate, I believe that Nethery's Eighth
Amendment rights were violated under Supreme Court authority firmly
in existence well before his conviction became final in 1986. See
Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1110 (1986). As I will explain below, I believe
cases such as Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (joint opinion of
Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978) (plurality), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982),
dictate the result in this case.
A. The instructions given to Nethery's sentencing jury
36
In rejecting the habeas petitioner's Penry-type claim based
on mitigating evidence of intoxication, James relied on authority
from this circuit that antedated the Supreme Court's decision in
Graham. See James, 987 F.2d at 1121 (citing Cordova v. Collins,
953 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1992)). I believe Cordova's implicit
holding that Teague is not a threshold issue to a Penry-type
challenge is no longer good law in view of the Supreme Court's
decision in Graham.
20
In contending that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated,
Nethery argues that the evidence of his intoxication at the time of
the crime could not be given adequate mitigating effect under the
three Texas "special issues" submitted to his capital sentencing
jury.37 The majority holds that a jury could adequately give
mitigating effect to evidence of intoxication if the jury was
submitted these three special issues. I do not quarrel with the
abstract holding that, in answering the "deliberateness" query, a
rational jury could adequately give mitigating effect to evidence
of intoxication at the time of the crime.
My dissent is not based on the operation of the statutory
special issues in isolation in Nethery's case; instead, it is based
on another instruction that the trial court submitted along with
the special issues that, in effect, took all three of the special
issues out of operation with respect to Nethery's mitigating
37
At the time of his trial, Article 37.071 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure provided that the following three special
issues must be submitted to the jury at sentencing:
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with
the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased
or another would result;
(2) Whether there is a reasonable probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
(3) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing was unreasonable in response to the
provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. Art. 37.071(b) (Vernon's 1981). Nethery's jury
was given three special issues based in substance on these three
statutory special issues.
21
evidence of intoxication. Pursuant to a Texas statute38 applicable
to all criminal cases -- capital and non-capital -- the trial judge
instructed Nethery's jury that:
Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication may
be introduced by the actor in mitigation of penalty
attached to the offense for which he is being tried.
"Intoxication" means disturbance of mental and physical
capacity resulting from the introduction of any substance
into the body.
Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686, 711 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (quoting
from Nethery's jury instruction) (emphasis added).
A reasonable juror39 could read that instruction as providing
that Nethery's evidence of intoxication could not be considered at
all -- including under the special issues -- unless Nethery was so
intoxicated that he was rendered temporarily insane. Indeed, this
38
See TEX. PEN. CODE § 8.04. That provision provides in
pertinent part:
§ 8.04. Intoxication.
(a) Voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense
to the commission of a crime.
(b) Evidence of temporary insanity caused by intoxication
may be introduced by the actor in mitigation of the
penalty attached to the offense for which he is being
tried. . . .
Because of § 8.04, Texas criminal juries may not consider
evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication for any reason
during the guilt/innocence phase; a jury may only consider such
evidence during the sentencing phase, and then only if the
defendant's intoxication rose to the level of temporary insanity.
See Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 534 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).
39
The Supreme Court has held that, in analyzing capital
sentencing issues in the context of jury instructions, courts must
ask how a reasonable juror could have interpreted the submitted
instructions. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987)
("`The question is . . . what a reasonable juror could have
understood the charge as meaning.'") (citation omitted).
22
is precisely how the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals interprets §
8.04. See Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.
1988) ("[T]he [§ 8.04] instruction required the jury to find that
[the defendant's] intoxication at the time of the killings rendered
her temporarily insane before they could consider her drug use in
mitigation of punishment. The charge on its face instructed the
jury to consider the mitigating evidence only in this light,
thereby implying that it may not be considered for any other
purpose.") (emphasis added); see also Volanty v. Lynaugh, 874 F.2d
243, 244 (5th Cir. 1989). Of course, while intoxication that is so
severe that it rises to the level of temporary insanity is
quintessential mitigating evidence, so is intoxication that is not
so severe as to be tantamount to a state of insanity.40 See Bell
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 640 (1978) (companion case to Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)); see also Elliot v. State, 1993
Tex.Crim.App. LEXIS 84 at *39-40 (Tex.Crim.App., April 14, 1993)
40
Nethery's evidence of alcohol and drug use was substantial
enough to permit a reasonable juror to find that he was
intoxicated. While the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on direct
appeal specifically found that Nethery's evidence of intoxication
did not rise to the level of insanity, see Nethery v. State, 692
S.W.2d 686, 711-12 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985), the court did not find
that Nethery was not intoxicated. Id. at 712. A witness testified
at trial that Nethery drank a substantial amount of hard liquor and
smoked marijuana around the time of the crime. Nethery himself
stated that "he remembered drinking beer, whisky, and vodka, and he
remembered smoking some marijuana." Id. at 711. Nethery's bizarre
conduct -- stepping outside of his car totally nude and shooting
the police officer for no reason, see id. at 697 -- also supports
a finding of intoxication. Nethery met the evidentiary threshold
for Eighth Amendment purposes. See Sawyers v. Collins, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5596, 986 F.2d 1493 (5th Cir. March 23, 1993) (merits
of Penry-type claim not reached because defendant's evidence of
intoxication insubstantial). The question of Nethery's
intoxication was one within the province of the jury.
23
(Clinton, J., dissenting); Ex Parte Rogers, 819 S.W.2d 533, 537
(Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (Clinton, J., dissenting, joined by Baird &
Maloney, JJ.).41
Even as early as Jurek, in 1976, total preclusion of a capital
sentencing jury's ability to consider any species of
constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence was held to be an
Eighth Amendment violation. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 272
("[T]he constitutionality of the Texas procedures turns on whether
the [special issues] allow consideration of particularized
mitigating factors."); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. at 604;
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. at 110. Because Nethery's jury was
entirely precluded from considering the evidence of his non-insane
state of intoxication, I believe that the § 8.04 instruction given
by the trial judge in Nethery's case was a straight-forward
violation of this well-established Eighth Amendment principle.
41
In Tucker v. State, supra, the Court of Criminal Appeals
observed -- without deciding the constitutionality of a § 8.04
instruction submitted in conjunction with the special issues --
that such a jury charge entirely precluded jury consideration of a
non-insane state of intoxication as mitigating evidence. See
Tucker, 771 S.W.2d at 534. In a Texas case following Tucker, in
which a Penry-type challenge was made to capital sentencing
instructions that included both the § 8.04 charge and the three
statutory special issues, the Court of Criminal Appeals summarily
rejected the defendant's claim without any discussion or citation
of Tucker. See Ex Parte Rogers, 819 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.
1991). However, three dissenting judges argued that "this
instruction does not even purport to empower the jury to give
mitigating effect to evidence of voluntary intoxication that does
not rise to the level of temporary insanity. A juror who believed
a capital [defendant] was not so intoxicated as to be incapable of
appreciating the wrongfulness of his action [i.e., being
temporarily insane] might nevertheless find him less morally
culpable than would have been a sober man committing the same
crime." Id. at 537 (Clinton, J., dissenting, joined by Baird &
Maloney, JJ.).
24
B. Is this claim properly before this court?
Nethery has not specifically argued that the § 8.04
instruction was the source of the Eighth Amendment violation that
he claims occurred at his trial. Rather, he has simply argued that
mitigating evidence of his intoxication at the time of the crime
could not be given proper mitigating effect under the statutory
special issues submitted to his jury. The majority believes that
the issue of the constitutionality of the operation of § 8.04 in
Nethery's case is not properly before this court. I respectfully
disagree.
I believe that we must necessarily address this specific
question as a collateral issue to the larger Eighth Amendment claim
raised. See Ex Parte Rogers, 819 S.W.2d at 537 (Clinton, J.,
dissenting, joined by Baird & Maloney, JJ.). As the Supreme Court
held in Graham, cases such as Lockett and Eddings require that a
capital defendant's sentence be upheld so long as all relevant
mitigating evidence was placed within "the effective reach of the
sentencer." Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 902. In order for the majority
to hold that Nethery's evidence of intoxication was properly
considered as mitigating evidence under the instructions given to
his capital sentencing jury, it thus must agree that Nethery's
evidence of intoxication was not beyond the effective reach of his
jury under the special issues. In view of the § 8.04 instruction
given by Nethery's trial judge in addition to the statutory special
25
issues, I cannot agree with that conclusion.42
Furthermore, I believe that we may not avoid addressing the
effect of the § 8.04 instruction because, in considering a
challenge to jury instructions, a court must review the entire
charge in order to determine the effect of the alleged defect. See
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. at 543 (in a capital case, the Court
stated that "reading the charge as a whole, as we must . . ."); see
also United States v. Shaw, 894 F.2d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Washington, 819 F.2d 221, 226 (9th Cir. 1987)
(asking "whether as a whole [the jury instructions] were misleading
or inadequate"). Reviewing the entire sentencing charge in
Nethery's case in order to determine whether Nethery's evidence of
intoxication was in "the effective reach" of his jury, Graham, 113
S. Ct. at 902, I do not believe that we simply may ignore the §
8.04 component of the capital sentencing charge, notwithstanding
Nethery's failure precisely to raise that particular issue. For
these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
42
Although this precise claim was not made by Nethery during
habeas review in state court, Nethery did argue that the trial
court's instructions were unconstitutional because "the jury was
not instructed to consider the mitigating evidence [of Nethery's
intoxication] in answering the special issues." State Habeas Op.
at p. 6. The state habeas courts held that such a claim was
procedurally defaulted because no such instruction was sought by
Nethery at trial. Since the time of Nethery's denial of state
habeas relief, however, a unanimous Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has explicitly waived procedural defaults in Eighth Amendment
challenges to the Texas capital sentencing procedures in effect at
the time of Nethery's trial. See Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350
(Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Selvage v. Collins, 816 S.W.2d 390
(Tex.Crim.App. 1991).
26
27