Janice Johnson v. JP Morgan Chase Bank , 570 F. App'x 404 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-41015      Document: 00512652890        Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/04/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 13-41015                             June 4, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    JANICE JOHNSON,                                                                  Clerk
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, Successor By Merger to Chase Home Finance,
    L.L.C.,
    Defendant – Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:12-CV-285
    Before DAVIS, ELROD, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Appellant Janice Johnson filed suit against JP Morgan Chase Bank (JP
    Morgan) alleging breach of contract and violations of Texas Debt Collection Act
    (TDCA) in connection with JP Morgan’s attempt to foreclose on Johnson’s
    home. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JP Morgan,
    and Johnson appealed. We AFFIRM.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-41015     Document: 00512652890   Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/04/2014
    No. 13-41015
    I.
    Johnson obtained a loan to purchase the property located at 5617 Norris
    Drive, The Colony, Texas 75056 (Property) on November 21, 2001, from Crest
    Mortgage Company (Crest). The mortgage note was secured by a deed of trust
    and was assigned to Washington Mutual (WaMu). The note and deed of trust
    expressly provided that acceleration and foreclosure on Johnson’s loan were
    subject to any limitations created by Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
    regulations.
    In 2002, Johnson was laid off from work and fell behind on her mortgage
    payments. She ultimately filed for bankruptcy in 2003. In April 2006, Johnson
    sent WaMu a payment, which WaMu rejected as insufficient to reinstate the
    loan. WaMu then began foreclosure proceedings against the Property. In
    response, Johnson filed a lawsuit against WaMu in state court. The suit was
    stayed when WaMu went into receivership.
    On March 7, 2012, MERS, as nominee for Crest, assigned “all rights
    accrued and to accrue under the loan agreement” to JP Morgan. Under the
    terms of the purchase and assumption agreement between JP Morgan and the
    FDIC, JP Morgan explicitly did not assume liability for any borrower claims
    arising from WaMu’s “lending or loan purchase activities.” On April 4, 2012,
    JP Morgan sent Johnson notice that it would post the Property for a foreclosure
    sale on May 1, 2012.
    Johnson then filed suit in this case, and JP Morgan removed to federal
    court. Johnson asserted that JP Morgan never sent her a notice of its intent
    to accelerate, or gave her an opportunity to cure any alleged default. On
    January 11, 2013, JP Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment. The
    magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that summary judgment
    be granted, which was adopted by the district court. Johnson filed a motion to
    reconsider, which was denied, and then appealed.
    2
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    No. 13-41015
    II.
    Johnson argues JP Morgan breached the loan contract by failing to
    conduct a face-to-face meeting with her and failing to inform her of her
    assistance options before proceeding with foreclosure. Johnson argues that JP
    Morgan was required to take these actions because HUD regulation 24 C.F.R.
    § 203.604(b) was incorporated into the loan contract. 1 See Hernandez v. Home
    Sav. Assoc. of Dall., 
    606 F.2d 596
    , 601 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that HUD
    regulations incorporated into mortgage documents become part of the
    contract). However, the district court correctly determined that § 203.604(b)
    is inapplicable to JP Morgan because Johnson was already more than three
    months in default when JP Morgan acquired the loan.
    Section 203.604(b) provides: “The mortgagee must have a face-to-face
    interview with the mortgagor, or make a reasonable effort to arrange such a
    meeting, before three full monthly installments due on the mortgage are
    unpaid.” 
    Id. The plain
    language of the regulation requires the face-to-face
    meeting before three installments are unpaid. Johnson admits that she was
    already more than three months behind when the loan was assigned to JP
    Morgan. As a result, the timing of this particular obligation had already
    passed when JP Morgan received the loan, and thus the obligation did not
    1  In the proceedings below, Johnson also alleged that JP Morgan violated HUD
    regulation § 203.606. In response, the district court concluded that this “violation was raised
    for the first time in the objections and should not be considered by the court.”
    Johnson has waived her § 203.606 claim by failing to brief it on appeal. See Adams v.
    Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 
    364 F.3d 646
    , 653 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Even
    if she had not waived this claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding
    this claim as it was not specifically raised in Johnson’s complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 698–99 (2009); De Franceschi v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 477 F. App’x 200,
    204 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished but persuasive) (citing Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.
    State Univ., 
    429 F.3d 108
    , 113 (5th Cir. 2005)).
    3
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    No. 13-41015
    apply to JP Morgan. 2 Because JP Morgan did not assume any of WaMu’s
    liabilities, JP Morgan cannot be held responsible for WaMu’s alleged failure to
    comply with § 203.604(b). Johnson’s breach of contract claim thus fails.
    III.
    Johnson next argues that JP Morgan violated § 392.301(a)(8), which
    prohibits a debt collector from “threatening to take an action prohibited by
    law.” Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 392.301(a)(8). Johnson asserts that JP Morgan
    did so by violating the HUD regulations, and seeks to recover for her loss of
    creditworthiness and the stigma of foreclosure; mental anguish and acute
    psychological trauma; and the value of the time lost attempting to correct JP
    Morgan’s errors.
    The magistrate judge determined that the economic loss rule precluded
    Johnson’s TDCA claim because it was based exclusively on JP Morgan’s alleged
    violations of the note and deed of trust. The magistrate judge further noted
    that Texas courts do not ordinarily permit the recovery of mental anguish
    damages arising from the breach of contractual duties, and found that Johnson
    failed to “create a fact issue that she incurred the sort of severe mental harm
    that would entitle her to mental anguish damages.” The district court adopted
    the magistrate judge’s recommendation and granted summary judgment in
    favor of JP Morgan on this claim, holding that the economic loss rule barred
    Johnson’s claims, and that Johnson “cannot offer any evidence that [JP
    Morgan] threatened any action prohibited by law.” The district court also
    2 Without explanation or argument, Johnson also cites 24 C.F.R. § 203.605, which
    requires the mortgagor to perform loss mitigation “[b]efore four full monthly installments
    due on the mortgage have become unpaid.” Even assuming arguendo that Johnson has not
    waived this argument by failing to adequately brief it on appeal, this regulation is similarly
    inapplicable here because Johnson was more than four months behind in her payments at
    the time that JP Morgan acquired her loan.
    4
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    No. 13-41015
    agreed with the magistrate judge that Johnson had not created a fact issue
    regarding her alleged mental anguish damages.
    Johnson argues that the economic loss rule did not bar her claim for
    mental anguish damages.      We need not address the question of whether
    Johnson’s claim for mental anguish damages is barred because Johnson has
    failed to create a fact issue demonstrating that JP Morgan has violated or
    threatened to violate any HUD regulation at issue in this case. See Thompson
    v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 
    993 F.2d 1166
    , 1167–68 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
    summary judgment may be affirmed on any grounds supported by the record).
    As we stated above, JP Morgan did not violate § 203.604(b) of the HUD
    regulations because this provision did not apply to JP Morgan. In her briefing
    before this court, Johnson has not demonstrated how JP Morgan has violated
    any other HUD regulation or otherwise “threaten[ed] to take an action
    prohibited by law.” Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-41015

Citation Numbers: 570 F. App'x 404

Judges: Costa, Davis, Elrod, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/4/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023