Johnson v. TX Bd of Cr Justice ( 2008 )


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  •        IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    December 2, 2008
    No. 07-20396
    Summary Calendar              Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    ALAN WADE JOHNSON
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    TEXAS BOARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Sued in its Official Capacity; BRAD
    LIVINGSTON, Executive director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Sued
    in His Individual and Official Capacity; DOUGLAS DRETKE, Division Director,
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Sued
    in His Individual Capacity; RICK THALER, Region I Director, Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Sued in His
    Individual Capacity; THOMAS J PRASIFKA, Senior, Warden, Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, John M
    Wynne Unit, Sued in His Individual and Official Capacity; NATHANIEL
    QUARTERMAN, Division Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
    Correctional Institutions Division, Sued in His Official Capacity; ROBERT
    TREON, Region I Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
    Institutions Division, Sued in His Official Capacity
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:05-CV-3705
    No. 07-20396
    Before KING, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Alan Wade Johnson, Texas prisoner # 660513, appeals the district court’s
    grant of the defendants’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the
    dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. Johnson’s complaint arises from the
    enforcement of prison policies restricting telephone usage and the amount of
    property inmates may store in their cells. Johnson argues that the defendants
    violated his constitutional rights by limiting telephone privileges to one five-
    minute collect call every 90 days and by limiting storage space for legal and
    religious property.
    Johnson disavows any claim for compensatory damages; in any event, he
    could not recover such damages because he has not alleged a physical injury.
    See Geiger v. Jowers, 
    404 F.3d 371
    , 374-75 (5th Cir. 2005). Johnson also fails to
    allege facts which would support a claim for punitive damages because his
    allegations do not show that the defendants’ actions, which implemented prison
    policies, were motivated by evil intent or that the defendants acted with reckless
    indifference to Johnson’s constitutional rights. Smith v. Wade, 
    461 U.S. 30
    , 56
    (1983).
    Johnson asserts that he did not sue the defendants in their official
    capacity, and thus the district court need not have ruled that any such claims
    were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus, we need not address
    that determination by the district court. Johnson has abandoned any claim
    arising under international law because he has failed to adequately brief the
    issue. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 
    813 F.2d 744
    , 748
    (5th Cir. 1987).
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
    should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    2
    No. 07-20396
    In district court, Johnson challenged the restrictions on telephone use
    embodied in Administrative Directive 03.90. We note that Johnson’s arguments
    concerning telephone usage are likely moot in light of the provisions of TEX.
    GOV’T CODE § 495.025, enacted in May 2007 and due to be implemented soon.
    In any event, Johnson’s constitutional challenges to the provisions of
    Administrative Directive 03.20, as well as his constitutional challenges to the
    restrictions on storage space for legal and religious property, embodied in
    Administrative Directive 03.72, fail because the prison policies are reasonably
    related to legitimate penological interests. See Turner v. Safley, 
    482 U.S. 78
    , 89
    (1987).
    To the extent that Johnson argues that the restriction of storage space
    denies him access to the courts, his contention is without merit because he does
    not show that his position as a litigant was or will be prejudiced. See Lewis v.
    Casey, 
    518 U.S. 343
    , 350-53 (1996). Johnson’s retaliation claim fails because he
    has not presented any direct evidence of retaliatory motivation, nor has he
    alleged a chronology of events from which retaliatory motivation may be
    plausibly inferred. See Woods v. Smith, 
    60 F.3d 1161
    , 1166 (5th Cir. 1995).
    Rather, he alleges that the defendants enforced prison policy. This argument
    does not support a claim for retaliation.
    Johnson’s separate storage space claim based on the Religious Land Use
    and Institutionalized Persons Act is without merit because he has not
    demonstrated that the storage policy has substantially burdened his religious
    exercise. See Adkins v. Kaspar, 
    393 F.3d 559
    , 570-71 (5th Cir. 2004).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson’s request
    for class certification. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
    339 F.3d 294
    , 301
    (5th Cir. 2003); Floyd v. Bowen, 
    833 F.2d 529
    , 534 (5th Cir. 1987).
    Johnson asks that we reinstate his state law claims. Because the district
    court dismissed all of Johnson’s federal claims, the dismissal of any remaining
    state law claims was not an abuse of discretion. See Bass v. Parkwood Hosp.,
    3
    No. 07-20396
    
    180 F.3d 234
    , 246 (5th Cir. 1999). We recognize that the dismissal of any such
    state claims was without prejudice to their assertion in the appropriate state
    court. See 
    id. Accordingly, the
    judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    4