United States v. Sylvester ( 1998 )

REVISED - JUNE 29, 1998
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 96-60796
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
MARK SYLVESTER, LEON BROWN, and WILLIE EARL CULLEY,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
_________________________
June 11, 1998
Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Mark Sylvester, Leon Brown, and Willie Culley appeal their
convictions and, in Brown’s case, the sentence, for assorted drug-
related crimes. We remand for a hearing on their jury tampering
claim and reject the remainder of their challenges.
I.
A.
Culley ran an automotive shop in Jackson, Mississippi.
Following a lengthy investigation, the government concluded that he
also presided over a cocaine distribution network that bought the
drug in Houston and sold it in Jackson. Brown, the government
charged, was one of Culley's couriers who often accompanied Culley
on his trips to Houston to purchase cocaine. Sylvester worked at
Culley Automotive and allegedly supplemented his income by dealing
cocaine on the side.
B.
The three appellants and eleven others were charged in a
thirty-eight-count indictment with sundry drug-related offenses.1
Count 1 charged all three with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute, conspiracy to distribute, and conspiracy to use a
communications facility (the telephone) in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.2 Count 2
charged Culley with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise
under 21 U.S.C. § 848. Counts 3 through 38 alleged specific dates
and times that the appellants used a telephone to facilitate the
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
1
The eleven other defendants were never tried. Some entered into plea
bargain agreements with the government; the charges against the others were
dismissed.
2
The special verdict form asked the jury to find whether each defendant
conspired to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and/or crack, conspired
to distribute cocaine and/or crack, and conspired to use a communications
facility in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.
2
Culley, Brown and Sylvester were tried together. The
government's evidence fell into two main categories. First was the
testimony of six fact witnesses, some of whom were plea-bargaining
co-conspirators. Second was a series of taped phone conversations
intercepted from the phone at Culley Automotive and from Culley's
personal cellular phone; in all, the government taped nearly two
hundred calls over a month-long period. During the recorded
conversations, the appellants never used the words “cocaine” or
“crack,” but spoke, the government claimed, in code. The
appellants did not testify, and only Culley chose to call
witnesses.
The jury found Culley guilty of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and to use a communications facility in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime (count 1); of participating in a continuing
criminal enterprise (count 2); and of seventeen of the remaining
thirty-six counts for using the phone in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The jury found Brown guilty of conspiracy to
distribute crack cocaine (count 1) and Sylvester guilty of two uses
of the phone in furtherance of the conspiracy.
II.
Five issues are before us. First, all three appellants claim
that the district court erred in issuing supplemental instructions
to the jury during deliberations. Second, Culley and Brown argue
that a witness's remark constituted an impermissible comment on
their failure to testify. Third, Culley and Brown contend that
3
their convictions were not supported by the evidence. Fourth,
Brown claims that the district court erred in sentencing him. And
fifth, Culley and Brown argue that the district court erred in
meeting ex parte with individual jurors to discuss possible jury
tampering.
A.
The appellants claim that the district court erred in issuing
supplemental instructions to the jury. They lodge two specific
complaints: that the court should have, but did not, notify and
consult with them in advance; and that the content of the
instructions was faulty. “When evaluating the adequacy of
supplemental jury instructions, we ask whether the court's answer
was reasonably responsive to the jury's question and whether the
original and supplemental instructions as a whole allowed the jury
to understand the issue presented to it.” United States v.
Stevens, 38 F.3d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1994).
The supplemental instructions were issued after the district
court received a note from the jury, which began deliberating at
4:45 p.m. At 7:23 p.m., it sent the following note: “We cannot
agree SS Some members will never vote guilty because there is no
physical evidence and the word cocaine is never used in the
conversations.” The court called the jury back to the courtroom
but did not notify either side that he had received the note, nor
did he warn them that he would be issuing supplemental
instructions. He re-read portions of the prior charges concerning
4
the elements of each offense and the definitions of key terms, then
added this supplemental instruction:
Now, none of the charges, neither Count 1, nor Count 2,
nor Count 3 requires the Government to provide physical
evidence, although it may be helpful to you in weighing
the Government's case. If you are satisfied by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged conversations,
that the alleged conduct of the defendants amount to a
conspiracy, that is, an unlawful agreement as charged in
Count 1, thenSSor excuse meSSor if you are persuaded by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged
conversations, the alleged conduct of the defendants
amount to the violation of the use of a communication
facility as charged in Counts 3 through 38, or if you are
persuaded by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
alleged communications and alleged conduct of Defendant
Culley of Count 2 persuades you by reasonable doubt that
he violated Count 2, then if you are so persuaded by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the
conversations and conduct, then the Government has proved
its case. And then you will find the defendants guilty.
If you are not persuaded, then you will find the
defendants not guilty.
Finally, the Government's evidence need not show that any
defendant ever used the word cocaine if you are satisfied
by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
engaged in coded conversations using substitute words for
cocaine instead of the expressed word itself. Your
inquiry lies further than determining only what the
defendants said. You must determine what they meant by
using the words they did.
Now, remember, as the triers of the facts, you, the jury,
are tasked with determining the facts here. Whether the
Government has proved any of the defendants guilty by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. You may now retire and
continue your deliberations. All rise.
The jury returned its mixed verdict at 12:15 a.m. Although
defense attorneys were present when the court issued the
supplemental instructions, they argue that the court should have
notified themSSand allowed them inputSSbefore speaking to the jury.
1.
5
The appellants argue that the supplemental instruction
constituted an Allen charge. We note at the outset that if the
instruction was in fact an Allen charge, the court was under no
duty to notify counsel of its intention to issue it; ensuring
defense counsel's presence when the charge is read is enough. In
United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504, 510 (5th Cir. 1979), we held
that “a trial judge is not required to notify defense counsel of
his plan to use [an Allen charge]. If a defendant's attorney is
present when the instructions are actually read to the jury and is
afforded the opportunity to object, that is sufficient.”
Emphasizing the first three words of the jury's noteSS”we
cannot agree”SSthe appellants claim that the judge's response to
this supposed deadlock was error because it did not include the
content required of Allen charges, namely an instruction that each
juror should adhere to his own honest opinion. Allen charges are
creatures of nuance that we have approved under limited
circumstances. In United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 854 (5th
Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Lyons, 731
F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc), we observed that “[t]his court
has tolerated Allen charges so long as the charge makes plain to
the jury that each member of the jury has a duty conscientiously to
adhere to his own honest opinion and so long as the charge avoids
creating the impression that there is anything improper,
questionable, or contrary to good conscience for a juror to cause
a mistrial.”
While we agree with the appellants that the supplemental
6
instruction was deficient as an Allen charge, we do not agree that
it was an Allen charge. Although the jury's note opened with “[w]e
cannot agree,” the instruction focused on the legal issues raised
in the second half of the note rather than on the possible
deadlock. Allen charges concern the jury's duty to make good faith
efforts to reach a verdict; while the note could have been answered
by an Allen charge, the court instead responded through a
supplemental instruction aimed at dispelling the legal confusion
implicit in the jury's message. In sum, the jury's note invited
two possible responses: an Allen charge or a clarifying
instruction on the law. The court chose the latter.
2.
Our refusal to characterize the supplemental instruction as an
Allen charge does not sink the appellants' argument. In fact, it
strengthens their claim in one important respect: Whereas we have
been unwilling to require notification of defense counsel before an
Allen charge is issued, we are less forgiving with regard to the
court's answering legal questions submitted by a deliberating jury.
The court's duty to consult with counsel upon receiving
questions from the jury was recognized in Gomila v. United States,
146 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1944), in which the court answered the
jury's questions without sharing them with, or consulting with,
defense attorneys. We held that “[d]efendants were entitled to be
apprised of the nature of these questions and were entitled to an
opportunity to be heard in connection therewith.” Id. at 373.
7
The Supreme Court bolstered this conclusion in Rogers v.
United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975), in which the trial judge
received and answered a legal question from the jury without
notifying counsel. The Court concluded that this was error,
relying on FED. R. CRIM. P. 43, which guarantees defendants the right
to be present at every stage of the trial. The Court interpreted
this right as including not only the right to be physically
present, but also the right to be notified:
Cases interpreting the Rule make it clear, if our
decisions prior to the promulgation of the Rule left any
doubt, that the jury's message should have been answered
in open court and that petitioner's counsel should have
been given an opportunity to be heard before the trial
judge responded.
Id. at 39.
We relied, as well, on Rogers in United States v. McDuffie,
542 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1976), in which the court did not disclose
the jury's question to counsel before answering it. Labeling the
procedure “well established,” we explained that “[w]hen a
communication is received from the jury, counsel should be informed
of its substance and afforded an opportunity to be heard before a
supplemental charge is given.” Id. at 241. The purpose of this
procedure is to enable counsel to make informed decisions
concerning whether to object or propose additional instructions.
Granting counsel the opportunity to object only after the
supplemental instruction has been delivered is too little, too
late. Id.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred by
failing to notify counsel before issuing the supplemental
8
instruction. Upon receiving the note from the jury, the court
should have notified counsel of the message, shared its contents,
and granted each side the opportunity to be heard.
3.
We must now determine whether this failure to notify
constitutes reversible or merely harmless error. In McDuffie, we
said that failure to notify was harmless when “the supplemental
charge was distinctly responsive to the question and correctly
stated the law.” 542 F.2d at 241. Similarly, in United States v.
Breedlove, 576 F.2d 57, 60 (5th Cir. 1978), we deemed such a
mistake harmless, concluding that while “[w]e by no means approve
this unjustified jury-court communication,” when “the Judge's
answer to the jury's inquiry was distinctly responsive to the
question, it clearly stated the law, and no prejudice is shown, the
error is harmless.”
Here, the appellants do not claim that the court failed to
respond to the jury's question or misstated the law. Instead, they
argue that prejudice arose from the failure to re-read other
portions of the initial instructions that were more favorable to
the defense. Because the court did not “balance” the supplemental
instructions in this way, the appellants claim, their theory of the
case was torpedoed and the jury coerced into returning a guilty
verdict.
We do not agree that the appellants were prejudiced by the
supplemental instruction. The court simply answeredSSby all
9
accounts, accuratelySSthe question presented by the jury's note:
whether the government was required to introduce physical evidence
or show that the defendants used the word “cocaine.” The
appellants do not cite any authority suggesting a duty to diluteSSa
duty to temper instructions defense counsel deems unfavorable by
issuing supplemental instructions to questions that were not even
raised.
Moreover, the court explained that the supplemental
instructions were just thatSSsupplementalSSand should be considered
in tandem with the original instructions. The court instructed as
follows: “You should consider what I just read to you along with
what I read to you earlier. This is essentially part of the
earlier group of instructions. And you should apply all of them
during your deliberations.” The court thus made sufficiently plain
that the initial instructions remained valid; it was not obliged,
as the appellants suggest, to repeat them to the jury. Finally, we
note that the jury did not return a verdict until 12:15 a.m.SSover
four hours later. This lag further undercuts the appellants' claim
that the jury was coerced by the supplemental instructions.
In sum, the appellants have not shown prejudice or coercion or
that the instructions misstated the law or were unresponsive to the
jury's note. Accordingly, any error was harmless.3
B.
3
In so deciding, we reiterate, however, that the proper course is to
ensure all counsel’s participation in the proceedings.
10
Culley and Brown argue that a witness's remark constituted an
impermissible comment on their election not to testify. They aver
that their motion for a mistrial on this basis was improperly
denied. The denial of mistrial is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Thomas, 120 F.3d 564, 573-74 (5th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 721 (1998).
Jessie Stewart was a government witness who had been
implicated in the drug conspiracy and had struck a plea bargain
under which she agreed to testify against the appellants. During
cross-examination by Culley's attorney, the following exchange
occurred:
Q: But you wouldn't disagree with me that anybody
faced with as many charges [as] you have would get
in here and try to work out something the best they
could which you've obviously done and then get in
here and testify to something that would help them;
isn't that true?
A: Under the advise [sic] of my lawyer my telling the
truth would help me more than me sitting on that
row over there and not telling the truth.
Culley and Brown claim that Stewart's remark was aimed at them and
prejudiced the jury by castigating their failure to take the stand.
As an initial matter, it is far from evident how the jury
could interpret the remark as referring to the appellants' choice
not to testify, given that the remark occurred during the
government's case-in-chiefSSwell before the appellants had the
opportunity to take the stand. But even assuming that the comment
stuck in the jury's collective craw until the appellants' failure
to testify became apparent, we do not see how this remark warrants
a mistrial.
11
The Fifth Amendment prohibits a witness from commenting on a
defendant's failure to testify in a criminal trial. Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). We have set a high threshold for
reversible error, however. “Comment on a defendant's silence is
reason for reversal only if the speaker's manifest intention is to
focus on that silence or the remark was such that a juror would
naturally and necessarily take it as a comment on the defendant's
failure to testify.” United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59, 64 (5th
Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981). Moreover, the comment must have a “clear
effect” on the jury before reversal is warranted. United States v.
Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 232 (5th Cir. 1990).
Here, neither prong of Garcia is fulfilled. Stewart did not
demonstrate a “manifest intention” to “focus on the silence” of the
appellants. To the contrary, as the court concluded, her remark
was meant to defend her integrity in the face of questions
suggesting that she was fabricating her testimony. Even if we
agreed that her opaque remark could be construed as referring to
the appellants' failure to take the stand, there is no evidence
that her intention was to focus on their silence, nor would a juror
“naturally and necessarily” interpret her statement that way.
In short, we do not agree that this enigmatic
exchangeSSoccurring before the jury knew the appellants would not
testifySShad the “clear effect” of prejudicing the jury. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial.
C.
12
Culley and Brown claim the evidence was insufficient to
support their convictions. When reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether a rational
trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 766 (5th Cir. 1991). In so
doing, we view all evidence, including any inferences that may be
drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the government. Id.
1.
Culley was convicted of conspiracy under count 1, with a
special finding that he conspired to distribute powder cocaine and
conspired to use a communications facility in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime; he also was convicted of engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”) under count 2. Pursuant to
Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996), the government
agreed to dismissal of the count 1 conviction at sentencing.
Culley challenges the CCE conviction by arguing that he was
convicted of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine powder, whereas
Brown was convicted of a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine.
Therefore, Culley says, this could not have been the same
conspiracy, and in the absence of a co-conspirator, his conviction
must be reversed.
Even if we accept Culley's dubious distinction, his conviction
is valid under United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 878
(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), holding that an inconsistent verdict is
not a bar to conviction even where all other co-conspirators are
13
acquitted. Accordingly, Brown's acquittal on charges of conspiring
to distribute cocaine powder does not automatically vacate Culley's
conviction on the same charge.
The indictment named a group of conspirators (not all of whom
were indicted), and the evidence supported the existence of a
conspiracy. The government introduced eyewitness testimony in
addition to the hours of taped conversations between Culley and his
dealers, runners, and assorted henchmen. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the government, the evidence established Culley's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if he is deemed not to have
conspired with Brown, the evidence supported a finding that he
conspired with other individuals named in the indictment.
2.
Brown challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. He says
that the main witness linking him to the crack-dealing conspiracy
was one Edward Bennett, whom Brown attacks as not credible because
he is a convicted felon and drug addict. Brown adds that even if
we find Bennett's testimony credible, it failed to establish the
existence of a conspiracy.
Bennett's credibilitySSlike that of any witnessSSis properly
a question for the jury. The real issue is whether his testimony,
coupled with any other evidence, sufficed to support Brown's
conviction when viewed in the light most favorable to the
government.
14
The evidence was sufficient. Bennett testified that he cooked
powder cocaine into crack for Brown; Sylvester Jobe testified that
he bought crack from Brown. Such testimony, viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, supports a jury finding that
Brown conspired to distribute crack cocaine.
D.
Brown challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court
relied on two erroneous factual findings in applying the sentencing
guidelines. Specifically, he claims that the court wrongly
concluded he was a manager or supervisor of the drug conspiracy and
wrongly found him responsible for 1.48 kilograms of crack cocaine.
We review factual findings for clear error, and the application of
the guidelines de novo. United States v. Claiborne, 132 F.3d 253,
254 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3758 (U.S. May 26, 1998)
(No. 97-8827).
Brown received a three-point increase in his offense level
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) because the district court
concluded that he was a manager or supervisor. The court relied on
Bennett's testimony that he cooked crack for Brown; the court also
noted the testimony of “Handy” Moore, who testified to Brown's role
in the distribution scheme.
Brown attempts to discount this evidence by pointing out that
Bennett, although he admitted cooking crack for Brown, never
directly said that Brown “managed” him; in this sense, Brown was
merely a bystander or at worst a sous-chef, but not a manager or
15
supervisor. This claim fails for the same reason as Brown's
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: Given Bennett's
testimony that he cooked crack at Brown's request, coupled with
“Handy” Moore's testimony about Brown's role, the conclusion that
Brown was a manager or supervisor cannot be deemed clearly
erroneous.
Brown asserts that the court erred in finding him responsible
for 1.48 kilograms of crack cocaine. The court calculated this
figure by including a one-kilogram purchase of what Brown and his
friends believed was cocaine. (Unhappily, it turned out to be
wax.) Brown complains that the court wrongly measured the wax as
cocaine base instead of cocaine powder, resulting in a more severe
sentence. He says that because Culley usually bought cocaine in
powder form, the court erred in concluding that the appellants
thought they were purchasing cocaine in base form.
The court premised its finding on testimony that Brown
believed he was buying cocaine in base form. Even Brown, in his
brief, concedes that the precise nature of the anticipated purchase
was ambiguous. In light of Brown's history as established at
trialSShe sold crack cocaine and had it cooked for himSSthe district
court's conclusion, bolstered by testimony illuminating Brown's
intent, cannot be characterized as clearly erroneous.
E.
The appellants' most persuasive contention is that the
district court erred by conducting ex parte voir dire with
16
individual jurors during its investigation of jury tampering. We
review for abuse of discretion a district court's handling of
complaints of outside influence on the jury. United States v.
Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 794 (5th Cir. 1996).
1.
There were three separate instances of potential jury
tampering. The first involved juror Glen Mallett, who received a
call at home around 9:00 p.m. from an unknown man who said, “I've
got to talk to you about tomorrow.” Mallett said he could not
discuss the trial and hung up.
Caller ID revealed that the call was placed from a pay phone
less than a mile away. Fearful for his safety, Mallett and his
wife left his house and spent the night at the home of his mother-
in-law. He later learned that a second call was placed to his home
that night at 2:30 a.m. from the same number.
The second instance of potential tampering involved juror
Rodney Caston, an employee of United Parcel Service (“UPS”).
Caston received a call at home from a man identifying himself as
“Ervin,” who told Caston that he knew who he was and that he worked
for UPS. Ervin tried unsuccessfully to get Caston to discuss the
case. Later that night, Caston received another call from a man
claiming to be a relative of Ervin's.
At 9:30 that night, a stranger bearing a mysterious package
appeared at Caston's home. Caston was away; the visitor asked Mrs.
Caston to deliver the package to her husband, but she refused to do
17
so, and the man left. Caston told the district court that he
believed the man worked at Culley Automotive.4
After hearing Caston's storySSand learning that he had
repeated the tale to other jurorsSSthe district judge met ex parte
with each member of the jury and questioned them about what they
had heard and whether they could remain impartial. Two other
jurors mentioned that they had heard about the Caston incident.
During the meeting with juror Maria Thompson, she raised a third
instance of potential tampering, reporting that a concession stand
vendor at the courthouse had implored juror Mallett to “take it
easy on the brothers.”
Neither defense counsel nor the government was present during
these meetings or had been notified of the alleged tampering or the
voir dire. After finishing his questioning, the judge determined
that the improper contacts had not resulted in prejudice and
allowed all jurors to continue to serve. The judge then notified
the parties, summarizing the tampering incidents and explaining
that he had conducted voir dire in chambers. He told defense
counsel that he would make available transcripts of the voir dire
after the trial.
The defendants' motion for a mistrial was denied, and they
were not permitted to submit supplemental questions to the jurors.
The judge explained that “these are matters which solely concern
the Court.”
4
The saga of the Ervins resulted in a federal conviction for jury
tampering.
18
2.
The Supreme Court explained the proper procedure for handling
investigations of jury tampering in Remmer v. United States, 347
U.S. 227 (1954). There, a juror was approached by a third party
offering a bribe in exchange for a favorable verdict. The juror
declined the offer, met ex parte with the trial judge, and was
later interviewed by the F.B.I. The judge concluded that the juror
was unbiased, and the defendant was convicted. The Court vacated
the conviction, holding that a trial court should not take final
action ex parte, but “should determine the circumstances, the
impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was
prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to
participate.” Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added).
We have consistently required the inclusion of all parties in
jury tampering hearings. For example, in United States v. Webster,
750 F.2d 307, 338 (5th Cir. 1984), we noted that when the
possibility of outside influence on the jury arises, “[t]he failure
to hold a hearing in such a situation constitutes an abuse of
discretion and is reversible error.” Accord United States v.
Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 1996). Remmer and its
applications in this Circuit thus require a district judge, when
confronted with credible allegations of jury tampering, to notify
counsel for both sides and hold a hearing with all parties
participating.5
5
We do not mean to suggest that a district court is obligated to conduct
a full-blown evidentiary hearing every time an allegation of jury tampering is
(continued...)
19
The government deploys two arguments, neither of which is
persuasive, in hopes of justifying the ex parte nature of the
hearings. First, it contends that the court was not required to
notify or include the defense under Webster. There, we held that
the judge did not err when he excluded counsel from a hearing to
investigate juror misconduct.
The government's argument is suspect, because the Webster
court explicitly distinguished between juror misconduct cases and
jury tampering cases, remarking that “[w]e are not convinced that
the premature expression of an opinion about the merits of a case
[i.e., juror misconduct] rises to the level of . . . jury
tampering.” 750 F.2d at 338-39. Accordingly, the court concluded,
an ex parte hearing may be appropriate in juror misconduct cases,
but not in jury tampering cases. The court thus maintained the
very distinction the government argues it erased, concludingSSin
language that directly contradicts the government's
positionSS”Counsel should be present at any hearing held to assess
outside influence on the jury.” Id. at 338.
Next, the government contends that the court “conducted the
necessary inquiry with such skill that it deflected all possible
prejudice from the defendants.” The government does not cite any
caselaw for this novel proposition. Having reviewed the
(...continued)
raised. As we said in United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974, 980 (5th Cir.
1978), “the court must balance the probable harm resulting from the emphasis [a
hearing] would place upon the misconduct and the disruption involved in
conducting a hearing against the likely extent and gravity of the prejudice
generated by the misconduct.” Here we think it indisputable that the outside
contacts with the jurors were of a serious enough magnitude to warrant a hearing.
20
transcripts of the voir dire, we agree that the court conducted a
thorough investigation of the tampering incidents. Even the most
diligent ex parte inquiry is insufficient, however, under Remmer,
which requires that counsel for both sides have the opportunity to
examine jurors. The government has cited no authority suggesting
that we should read Remmer any differently.6
3.
We do not, however, agree with appellants' claim that the
government is automatically required to prove the absence of
prejudice. The Remmer Court held that any outside influence on
the jury was presumptively prejudicial; the burden fell on the
government to rebut this presumption.7 Yet, in recent years the
6
The government adds that defense counsel could not have been invited to
a hearing, because their clients were suspects in the tampering, and the court's
investigation would have been impeded by alerting the lawyers. Again, the
government cites no authority.
Although we are troubled by the possibility that, if the contacts were in
fact instigated by the appellants, they are profiting from their own wrongdoing,
this argument is expressly foreclosed by our caselaw. See United States v.
Forrest, 620 F.2d 446, 458 (5th Cir. 1980) (“It makes no difference in this case
that it was [the defendant] himself who initiated the contact that may have
poisoned the jury. We reject the suggestion that [the defendant] may not be
heard here to complain of the results of his own misconduct.”). This rule, while
called into question as applied to civil cases, remains valid in the criminal
context. Cf. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1147 (5th Cir. 1988),
vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 914 (1989) (“Even if we were not convinced
that the district court correctly found an absence of jury prejudice here, we
would not permit the perpetrator of jury tampering, in a civil proceeding, to
reap the rewards of his misdeed by enjoying a new trial.”). In any event, in the
instant case, the government does not allege that the contacts were initiated by
any of the appellants.
7
See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about
the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed
presumptively prejudicial . . . . The presumption is not
conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to
(continued...)
21
Supreme CourtSSand at least two of our sister circuitsSShave backed
away from this position, indicating that the presumption of
prejudice and the assignment of the burden of proof are not
triggered automatically but are imposed at the discretion of the
district court.
The first modification of Remmer occurred in Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982). There, both the district court and
the court of appeals concluded that a habeas petitioner was
entitled to a new trial based on the alleged partiality of a juror
who had applied for a job in the prosecutor's office. Although the
trial court had conducted a hearing and determined that the juror
was not prejudiced, the federal courts concluded that the trial
court should have conclusively presumed prejudice, given the facts.
455 U.S. at 214. The Supreme Court, citing Remmer as authority,
reversed, holding that due process requires only that the trial
court hold a hearing to determine the existence of prejudice. It
concluded: “This Court has long held that the remedy for
allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant
has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” 455 U.S. at 215
(emphasis added). This language is difficult to reconcile with a
presumption of prejudice warranting rebuttal by the government.8
(...continued)
establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such
contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.
8
The court in United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1984), read
Phillips as abolishing Remmer's presumption of prejudice and shifting the burden
of proof from the government to the defendant. The court construed Remmer as
speaking only to the proper procedure a court should follow when confronted with
(continued...)
22
In Abell, we recognized that Phillips “cast a foreboding
shadow” on the Remmer presumption, but left the question
unresolved, noting only that “we have not yet explicitly determined
how Smith v. Phillips has affected Remmer.” Id. at 1146.9
Similarly, in Young v. Herring, 938 F.2d 543, 558 n.7 (5th Cir.
1991) (on remand), although not deciding the question, we observed
that Phillips “clarified” Remmer. We suggested that Remmer did not
establish a flat rule of presumptive prejudice, but was rather a
“characteriz[ation]” made “out of deference to the seriousness of
the conduct.” Id.
The Supreme Court once again called into doubt the Remmer
presumption in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). There,
the defendant claimed prejudice when the trial court permitted
alternate jurors to sit in on deliberations, but instructed them
not to participate. The Court summarized what it termed its
“intrusion jurisprudence,” quoted Phillips, and concluded:
There may be cases where an intrusion should be presumed
prejudicial, but a presumption of prejudice as opposed to
a specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry:
Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and
thereby its verdict?
Id. at 739 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).
At least one other court has understood Olano as reconfiguring
(...continued)
credible allegations of jury tampering. 737 F.2d at 532. Pennell was not
followed by all circuits, however. See, e.g., United States v. Littlefield,
752 F.2d 1429, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1985).
9
We also concluded that Webster, 750 F.2d at 336-39, did not resolve the
question because, among other things, it failed to take account of Phillips.
Abell, 858 F.2d at 1146.
23
Remmer. In United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 494-99
(D.C. Cir. 1996), the court rejected Remmer's automatic
presumption, concluding that the district court instead should
“inquire whether any particular intrusion showed enough of a
likelihood of prejudice to justify assigning the government a
burden of proving harmlessness.” Id. at 497 (internal quotations
omitted).10
We agree that the Remmer presumption of prejudice cannot
survive Phillips and Olano. Accordingly, the trial court must
first assess the severity of the suspected intrusion; only when the
court determines that prejudice is likely should the government be
required to prove its absence. This rule comports with our
longstanding recognition of the trial court's considerable
discretion in investigating and resolving charges of jury
tampering.11 As stated in Olano, 507 U.S. at 739, regardless of
whether the presumption arises, the court's “ultimate inquiry” must
be whether the intrusion will affect the jury's deliberations and
verdict.
4.
In sum, although we reject the Remmer presumption, we agree
10
Although we have addressed Remmer in several cases since Olano was
decided, see, e.g., Ramos, 71 F.3d at 1154, we have yet to determine whether the
presumption remains viable.
11
See, e.g., United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150, 1153-54 (5th Cir. 1995)
(“In granting a broad discretion to the trial judge, we acknowledge and underscore
the obvious, that the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate accurately the
potential impact of the complained-of outside influence.”).
24
with the appellants that the district court abused its discretion
in conducting the ex parte voir dire. Accordingly, we retain
jurisdiction and remand for the limited purpose of a hearing to
determining whether the jury was prejudiced by the outside
contacts.12 See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230; Forrest, 620 F.2d at 459.
Counsel for both sides shall be given the opportunity to examine
the jurors on the record, under oath. Subject to ultimate review
by this court, if the district court concludes that the contacts
did not result in prejudice, the convictions shall stand affirmed,
and if the court concludes that the contacts did result in
prejudice, the appellants are entitled to a new trial.
REMANDED.
12
We remand Sylvester's case as well, even though he failed to raise the
jury tampering issue in his brief. See United States v. Miles, 10 F.3d 1135,
1137 n.3 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494, 497 (5th
Cir. 1980)):
Ordinarily we would limit each defendant's appeal to the issues
raised in his brief. However, we have discretion to suspend the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure “for good cause shown,” FED. R.
APP. P. 2. Believing it anomalous to reverse some convictions and
not others when all defendants suffer from the same error, we
consider the arguments to be adopted. . . . This adoption does not
prejudice the government which had the opportunity to fully brief
all issues in response to the various contentions of the
defendants. . . . This notwithstanding, we caution counsel to state
specifically in the opening brief the issues raised on appeal; the
failure to do so will usually result in our not considering them.
(Internal quotations omitted.)
25