Jackson v. Amite City ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-30099
No. 98-30390
Summary Calendar
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OLIVER JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AMITE CITY, a political subdivision of the State
of Louisiana; BUDDY BEL, Individually and in his
official capacity of Aldermen; SAMUEL C. HYDE,
Individually and in his official capacity of Aldermen;
H. LEE SCHILLING, JR., Individually and in his
official capacity of Aldermen, City of Amite;
PARKER C. GABRIEL, Individually and in his official
capacity of Chief of Police, City of Amite;
MICHAEL FOSTER, Individually and in his
capacity of Captain, Amite Police Department;
CHRIS GALMON, Individually and in his official
capacity of Police Officers, Amite Police Department;
JASON JOHNSON, Individually and in his official
capacity of Police Officers, Amite Police Department;
KENNER HARRELL, Individually and in his official
capacity of Police Officers, Amite Police Department,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 97-CV-14-D
January 28, 1999
Before KING, Chief Judge, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
Appellant Oliver Jackson appeals a summary judgment and an
attorney’s fees award, both of which are adverse to him. We AFFIRM.
I.
Jackson was employed as a police officer with Amite City,
Louisiana. In June 1996, Jamie Hawthorne, Jackson’s “step-cousin”,
took an automobile to be repaired; the vehicle was registered to
Jackson but used by Jackson’s daughter. Jackson issued an “All
Points Bulletin” for Hawthorne when he failed to return with the
car. Later that night, Jackson was notified that Hawthorne had
been located.
When Jackson arrived, Hawthorne was seated in a patrol car.
Three police officers and two civilians present at the scene gave
written statements that, when Jackson arrived, he took Hawthorne
from the car, slapped him several times, and then kicked him into
Jackson’s patrol car. Hawthorne subsequently stated to police
officers that Jackson had hit and kicked him. (Later, after making
these accusations against Jackson on more than one occasion,
Hawthorne recanted.)
Based on this information, Police Chief Gabriel suspended
Jackson and informed him that he (Gabriel) would recommend
Jackson’s termination at the next Board of Aldermen meeting. At
the open meeting, the Aldermen voted to terminate Jackson.
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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Subsequently, Jackson filed this action, claiming that his
termination violated his First Amendment rights and his rights
under Louisiana law, and that Officers and Aldermen had engaged in
a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights because he had
spoken out on matters of public concern. In a comprehensive
opinion, the district court granted summary judgment to Appellees,
holding: (1) Jackson had not presented evidence to show a nexus
between his claimed protected speech and his termination; (2)
Jackson did not produce sufficient evidence to support his state
law claims; (3) there could be no civil conspiracy because there
was no evidence that Jackson’s rights were violated; and (4)
Jackson failed to present evidence to support his claim against the
City.
After judgment was entered in their favor, Appellees moved
successfully for attorney’s fees and costs. The district court
awarded $29,412.18 ($27,812 in fees and $1,600.18 in costs; the
latter are not challenged on appeal).
II.
A.
Jackson does not challenge the summary judgment with respect
to his state law claims. Accordingly, those claims are deemed
abandoned. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(4); e.g., Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City
of Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1045 (5th Cir. 1998); In re T-H New
Orleans Limited Partnership, 116 F.3d 790, 796 (5th Cir. 1997).
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A summary judgment is reviewed de novo. E.g., Burns v. Harris
County Bail Bond Board, 139 F.3d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1998).
“Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence
illustrate that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a
matter of law.” Id; FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
As in district court, Jackson fails to point to evidence
linking his claimed protected speech to his termination. Needless
to say, mere general allegations are insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. See Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 807 (5th
Cir. 1990); Alizadeh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 113
(5th Cir. 1986); In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust
Litigation, 672 F.2d 436, 443 (5th Cir. 1982). Having reviewed the
briefs and the record, there is no support for Jackson’s claims of
a violation of his civil rights or of a conspiracy to violate them.
Restated, there is no material fact issue and Appellees are
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, summary
judgment was proper.
B.
Jackson also challenges the award of attorney’s fees.
Appellees’ motion to strike the appeal from this order is DENIED.
See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson and Co.,486 U.S. 196 (1988).
Pursuant to a well-reasoned opinion, fees were awarded
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). We review the decision to award
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such fees for abuse of discretion; the factual findings, for clear
error. E.g, Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1996).
1.
Jackson first bases error on the claim that his action was
well-founded and not frivolous. As discussed supra in part II. A.,
and pursuant to our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980).
2.
Jackson also maintains that the district court did not
adequately examine the well-known fee-setting factors from Johnson
v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974), in determining the fee amount. He asserts also that the
awarded fee was too high.
The district court, albeit in brief fashion, explained
adequately its reasons for the award, including that it had applied
the Johnson factors. Again, we find no abuse of discretion.
Jackson falls far short of even beginning to show otherwise.
III.
Accordingly, for the reasons above stated, the summary
judgment and the order awarding Appellees’ attorney’s fees and
costs against Jackson are
AFFIRMED.
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