Maurice Johnson v. Chip Box , 420 F. App'x 327 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-60740 Document: 00511422958 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/24/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 24, 2011
    No. 10-60740
    Summary Calendar                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    MAURICE ANTONIO JOHNSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    JAMES MURRAY, Investigator, Lamar County Sheriff’s Department; RICHARD
    COX, Investigator, Lamar County Sheriff’s Department,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 2:10-CV-92
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Maurice Antonio Johnson, Mississippi prisoner # 33122, appeals the
    district court’s 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal of his pro se 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     complaint as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
     (1994). Johnson
    argues that his parole was wrongfully revoked based upon Mississippi state
    criminal charges arising from allegations that he acted under false pretense in
    an attempt to secure items of value from a Walmart. He relies, inter alia, upon
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-60740 Document: 00511422958 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/24/2011
    No. 10-60740
    an order of nolle prosse issued by a Mississippi state court in connection with the
    criminal charges related to the Walmart incident to support his argument that
    the criminal charges were without factual foundation. He contends that the
    revocation of his parole based upon the Walmart incident and his continued
    incarceration violate his constitutional rights. Johnson has also filed a motion
    for leave to file an amended complaint.
    A district court shall dismiss a case at any time if the court determines
    that an action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This court employs the same de novo standard to review a
    § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal as is used to review a dismissal pursuant to Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Bradley v. Puckett, 
    157 F.3d 1022
    , 1025
    (5th Cir. 1998). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
    above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the
    complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007) (emphasis and quotation omitted). “To survive a motion to
    dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
    ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    ).             Also, “[t]o recover
    damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other
    harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
    sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
    has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
    invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
    question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck v.
    Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 486-87 (1994). The rule set forth in Heck applies to a
    challenge to the validity of confinement resulting from a parole-revocation
    hearing. McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 
    47 F.3d 158
    , 161 (5th Cir.
    1995).
    2
    Case: 10-60740 Document: 00511422958 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/24/2011
    No. 10-60740
    Johnson’s claim for damages based upon the revocation of his parole and
    his continued incarceration implicates the validity of the revocation hearing.
    Johnson does not explicitly argue that the parole revocation has been reversed,
    expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance
    of a writ of habeas corpus. See Heck, 
    512 U.S. at 486-87
    ; McGrew, 
    47 F.3d at 161
    .    The order of nolle prosse is not relevant to the validity of Johnson’s
    confinement resulting from the parole revocation hearing. Johnson’s reliance
    upon the order of nolle prosse therefore is not persuasive.
    Johnson’s appeal is without arguable merit and therefore is frivolous. See
    Howard v. King, 
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is
    frivolous, it is dismissed. See 5 TH C IR. R. 42.2. Johnson is cautioned that the
    dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike under § 1915(g), as does
    the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. See § 1915(g); Adepegba
    v. Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 387-88 (5th Cir. 1996). Johnson therefore has two
    strikes under § 1915(g) and he is cautioned that if he accumulates three strikes
    under § 1915(g), he will not be able to proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal
    filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he “is under
    imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See § 1915(g).
    IFP DENIED; APPEAL DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS; SANCTION
    WARNING ISSUED; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
    DENIED.
    3