Wilson v. City of New Orleans ( 2002 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-30135
    Summary Calendar
    HENRY WILSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS DEPARTMENT OF
    HEALTH; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND PERMITS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    (No. 00-CV-3115-R)
    _________________________________________________________________
    October 15, 2002
    Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Henry Wilson appeals a summary judgment dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action against the City of New Orleans and two of its
    departments (collectively “the City”).      (He does not contest the
    dismissal of his state-law claims.)        Wilson contends the City
    denied him due process of law by failing to provide sufficient
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    notice of a hearing and adjudication concerning the demolition of
    his property in New Orleans.
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.          E.g., Amburgey
    v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 
    936 F.2d 805
    , 809 (5th Cir. 1991).
    Such judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the non-movant, “‘there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to [a]
    judgment as a matter of law.’”       
    Id.
     (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
    Wilson alleged no specific facts that, if accepted as true,
    would establish a municipal policy or custom to provide inadequate
    notice, as he must do to establish municipal liability under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .      See, e.g., Johnson v. Moore, 
    958 F.2d 92
    , 93-94
    (5th Cir. 1992).       Allegations of a policy or custom and its
    relationship to a constitutional violation cannot be conclusional
    but must contain specific facts.         See, e.g., Spiller v. City of
    Texas City, Police Dep’t, 
    130 F.3d 162
    , 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
    Fraire v. Arlington, 
    957 F.2d 1268
    , 1278 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
    
    506 U.S. 973
     (1992)).
    Nor did Wilson offer any summary-judgment evidence relevant to
    a policy or custom.        He contends that a single decision may
    constitute a policy or custom, but he does not explain how that
    principle    applies   here.    Instead,     he    asserts   that    “various
    witnesses”   will   establish   “a   clear   and    continuing      series   of
    practices” that violate constitutional due-process requirements.
    Needless to say, such conclusions do not avoid dismissal.                    See
    Spiller, 
    130 F.3d at 167
    .     Because Wilson fails to show a policy
    or custom, the judgment is AFFIRMED.         See Bickford v. Int’l
    Speedway Corp., 
    654 F.2d 1028
    , 1031 (5th Cir. 1981) (appellate
    court may affirm “on any grounds, regardless of whether those
    grounds were used by the district court”).
    AFFIRMED
    3