Doe v. Brg City Indep Sch Dist ( 2021 )

Case: 20-40596 Document: 00516062601 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/20/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 20, 2021
No. 20-40596 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Jane Doe, individually and as next friends of "Son Doe", minor son;
John Doe, individually and as next friend of "Son Doe", minor son,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Bridge City Independent School District,
Defendant—Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:20-CV-113
Before Dennis, Higginson, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiffs (collectively the “Does”) appeal the district court’s denial
of leave to amend their pleadings. Because we find no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s holding that allowing the Does leave to amend would have
been futile due to contrary controlling precedent, we AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 20-40596 Document: 00516062601 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/20/2021
No. 20-40596
I.
This dispute stems from an alleged assault in a school locker-room
upon “Son” Doe, a middle school student in the Bridge City Independent
School District (“Bridge City”), by another student. The Does sued Bridge
City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the district was liable for Son Doe’s
injuries. The district court granted Bridge City’s motion to dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the Does had failed to adequately
plead municipal liability to hold Bridge City responsible for the intentional
tortious actions of the alleged third-party attacker. The Does had not
responded to the motion to dismiss. Although the Does had also not moved
to amend their pleadings, the district court proactively denied them that
opportunity on the grounds of futility.
Over a month later, the Does filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that
the district court’s dismissal of their claims was “premature” because they
had intended to file an amended complaint in lieu of filing a response to
Bridge City’s motion to dismiss. Because the Does did not identify any
federal rule under which they were moving for reconsideration, the district
court analyzed the motion as either a Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to alter
or amend the judgment or a Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from a
judgment or order, and denied the motion under either analysis. 1 The Does
now appeal to this court.
II.
At the outset, the Does argue that this court should construe their
petition as an appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and thus should review
1
The Does do not challenge the district court’s Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) analysis,
nor do they contend on appeal that the district court should have analyzed the motion for
reconsideration under any alternate framework.
2
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No. 20-40596
the district court’s holding de novo. Bridge City avers that the proper
standard of review is abuse of discretion, arguing that the Does have waived
any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of their claims by failing to brief
those arguments on appeal. We agree. The Does briefed only two issues on
appeal; first, arguing that the district court erred in denying leave to amend,
and second, attempting to advance a constitutional argument on the merits
which was not presented to the district court. 2 Because the Does entirely fail
to address the district court’s reasons for dismissing their claims, they have
waived any challenge to the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order. Thus, we review
for abuse of discretion only the district court’s denial of leave to amend.
III.
Leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a), but a district court need not do so when amendment
would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The district court
denied the Does leave to amend, reasoning that amendment would be futile
because, inter alia, the Fifth Circuit does not recognize a DeShaney special
relationship between a school and its students that gives rise to an affirmative
duty to protect them from private violence. DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989); see Doe ex rel. Magee v.
Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
We agree. In DeShaney, the Supreme Court stated that “nothing in the
language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the
life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”
489 U.S. at 195. A special relationship giving rise to this duty exists only
2
Because this novel argument is raised for the first time on appeal, we decline to
consider its merits. See, e.g., NCDR, L.L.C. v. Mauze & Bagby, P.L.L.C., 745 F.3d 742, 752
(5th Cir. 2014).
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“when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against
his will[.]” Id. at 199–200. Previously we have found that this special
relationship exists “when the state incarcerates a prisoner,” “involuntarily
commits someone to an institution,” or places a child in foster care.
Covington, 675 F.3d at 856 (citations omitted). However, we have held
explicitly that “a public school does not have a special relationship with a
student that would require the school to protect the student from harm at the
hands of a private actor.” Id. Therefore, the school did not have a
constitutional duty to protect Son Doe. The fact that the alleged perpetrator
of the private violence in this case was another student does not change this
result. See Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (finding
no special relationship giving rise to a duty to protect student plaintiff from
sexual assault by another student); Doe v. Columbia-Brazoria Indep. Sch. Dist.
by & through Bd. of Trustees, 855 F.3d 681, 688 (5th Cir. 2017) (same).
Because we are bound by these precedents, we agree that any attempt by the
Does to amend their pleadings in order to survive Rule 12(b)(6) review would
have been futile.
*
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
4