Ghedi v. Mayorkas ( 2021 )

Case: 20-10995 Document: 00516068148 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/25/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 25, 2021
No. 20-10995 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Abdulaziz Ghedi,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; David Pekoske, in his official capacity as Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration; Troy Miller, Acting
Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Merrick Garland,
U.S. Attorney General; Christopher Wray, in his official capacity as
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; Charles Kable, IV, in his
official capacity as Director of the Terrorist Screening Center,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:19-CV-1919
Before Stewart, Costa, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
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Abdulaziz Ghedi is an international businessman who regularly jets
across the globe. Frequent travelers, however, are not always trusted
travelers. In recent years, Ghedi has had repeated run-ins with one of
America’s most beloved institutions: modern airport security. Ghedi
complains that ever since he refused to be an informant for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation a decade ago, he has been placed on a watchlist,
leading to “extreme burdens and hardship while traveling.” Unsurprisingly,
the Government refuses to confirm or deny anything. Ghedi says these
intrusive security annoyances have harmed him both professionally and
reputationally. The law, however, is not on his side. Modern air travel is
chock-full of irritations and indignities that leave many passengers not just
bothered but humiliated. But Ghedi has not pleaded plausible claims, nor
sued the right people. While Ghedi’s hassles are certainly atypical, they do
not dispense with our jurisdictional limits or with ordinary pleading
standards. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Ghedi’s
complaint.
I
A
Understanding Ghedi’s claims starts with understanding 21st century
airport security, a byzantine structure featuring an alphabet soup of federal
agencies. One such agency is DHS—the Department of Homeland Security.
According to its website, one of its “top priorities is to resolutely protect
Americans from terrorism and other homeland security threats.” 1 That
includes “secur[ing] the nation’s air . . . borders to prevent illegal activity
while facilitating lawful travel and trade.” 2 DHS leaves the day-to-day of
1
Mission, DHS (July 3, 2019), https://www.dhs.gov/mission.
2
Id.
2
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airport security to specialized federal agencies, including the TSA
(Transportation Security Administration), which generally screens
passengers, 3 and CBP (Customs and Border Protection), which specifically
screens international passengers. 4
Still, it would be easier for DHS, TSA, and CBP to guard our
airports if they knew who to look out for in the first place. To that end, the
FBI administers a special anti-terrorism program called the TSC, or
Terrorist Screening Center. According to the FBI’s website, the TSC is “a
multi-agency center” that that manages “the watchlist.” 5 What is the
watchlist? The FBI describes it as a “database” containing the “identities of
those who are known or reasonably suspected of being involved in terrorist
activities.” 6 The TSC then provides those identities to “front-line screening
agencies,” like TSA, to aid in “positively identifying known or suspected
terrorists who are attempting to . . . enter the country, [or] board an
aircraft . . . .” 7
The Government admits, though, that within the watchlist are at least
two sub-lists—the No Fly List and the Selectee List. Inclusion on either
comes with consequences. The No Fly List is exactly what it sounds like: a
3
49 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1).
4
6 U.S.C. § 211(c).
5
Terrorist Screening Center, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-
structure/national-security-branch/tsc; see also 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (providing statutory
authority for the watchlist).
6
Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 5; 49 C.F.R. § 1560.105(b) (implementing
the watchlist).
7
Terrorist Screening Center, supra note 5; 49 U.S.C. § 114(h) (providing for sharing
the watchlist with front-line agencies).
3
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list of individuals that the TSA prohibits from flying. 8 In contrast, someone
on the Selectee List may still fly. The TSA, however, will subject the
individual to “enhanced screening” before boarding. 9 According to the
Government, enhanced screening differs from standard screening in two
ways. First, it takes more time for the passenger. The TSA will search the
passenger’s person multiple times and in multiple ways instead of using a
single search. Second, the screening itself is more intrusive. TSA will search
the passenger’s property for trace amounts of explosives, physically search
luggage, power electronics on and off, and examine the passenger’s footwear.
Still, merely undergoing enhanced screening does not mean that the
TSC has placed a passenger on the Selectee List. According to the
Government, any passenger with an “SSSS” printed on his boarding pass
must undergo enhanced screening. And those passengers might have an
SSSS printed on their boarding passes due to inclusion on the Selectee List,
“random selection,” or “reasons unrelated to any status.” Passengers not
on the Selectee List can even end up with an SSSS designation on multiple,
consecutive flights. The Government neither confirms nor denies who is
included on either list since that would reveal information of “considerable
value” to terrorists.
Passengers that undergo enhanced screening for unexplained reasons
do have at least one remedy, though. Congress has required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to provide passengers “delayed or prohibited from
boarding a commercial aircraft” by TSA a “timely and fair process” to
8
49 C.F.R. § 1560.105(b)(1); Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2017).
9
§ 1560.105(b)(2); Beydoun, 871 F.3d at 462–63; Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019, 1023
(10th Cir. 2019).
4
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challenge why. 10 Congress directly required the TSA to do that too. 11 The
response is the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, or DHS TRIP. Anyone
“who believe[s] they have been improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited
from boarding an aircraft” because of the Selectee List may seek redress. 12
The “TSA, in coordination with the TSC and other appropriate Federal
law enforcement or intelligence agencies, if necessary, will review [the
aggrieved passenger’s] documentation and information[,] . . . correct any
erroneous information, and provide the individual with a timely written
response.” 13
B
Ghedi is president of an American company that operates globally. He
is also first-generation American. And like many naturalized American
citizens, Ghedi, born in Somalia, has not forgotten his roots. His company is
a major importer of chickens, eggs, and meat into Somalia. Ghedi personally
invests in Somalia’s hotel industry. And Ghedi commits significant amounts
of his time, talent, and treasure towards helping everyday Somalis. For
instance, Ghedi founded the Qalam Scholarship Fund, which pays for
Somalis to attend universities in Kenya, Uganda, and Egypt. He also founded
the Somali Resource Center, which provides critical services to Somali
refugees. 14
10
49 U.S.C. § 44926(a).
11
§ 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I).
12
49 C.F.R. § 1560.201.
13
§ 1560.205(d).
14
As we discuss more fully below, Ghedi is appealing the district court’s dismissal
of his complaint. Therefore, we accept his version of the facts, including the details about
his travel, as true. See Di Angelo Publ’ns, Inc. v. Kelley, 9 F.4th 256, 260 (5th Cir. 2021)
5
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Ghedi’s extensive professional and personal connections with
Somalia require him to fly internationally on a regular basis. They seem to
have caught the FBI’s attention as well. According to Ghedi, an FBI special
agent approached him in 2012. The special agent asked Ghedi to serve as an
informant. Ghedi declined, but offered to inform “the relevant
authorities . . . of any wrongdoing of which he [became] aware, without the
need to be on the FBI’s payroll.”
Ghedi claims that he “began experiencing extreme burdens and
hardship while traveling” shortly after declining the FBI’s request. For
example, since 2012 he has experienced:
• an inability to print a boarding pass at home, requiring him
to interact with ticketing agents “for an average of at least
one hour, when government officials often appear and
question” him;
• an SSSS designation on his boarding passes;
• TSA searches of his belongings, “with the searches usually
lasting at least an hour”;
• TSA pat downs when departing the U.S. and CBP pat
downs when returning to the U.S.;
• encounters with federal officers when boarding and
deboarding planes;
(“Where, as here, ‘the district court rules on jurisdiction without resolving factual
disputes . . . we consider the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true . . . .’” (quoting
Laufer v. Mann Hosp., L.L.C., 996 F.3d 269, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation
omitted))); Johnson v. BOKF Nat’l Ass’n, __ F.4th __, __ (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining that
in reviewing the district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) we “accept[] all well-pleaded facts as true, view[ing] them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor”).
6
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• questioning and searches by CBP officers “for an average
of two to three hours” after returning from international
travel;
• CBP confiscation of his laptop and cellphone “for up to
three weeks”;
• being taken off an airplane two times after boarding; and
• being detained for seven hours by DHS and CBP officials
in Buffalo, New York in May 2012 and being detained in
Dubai for two hours in March 2019.
Ghedi also claims that those traveling with him, including his children, are
subject to additional searches and pat downs and receive the SSSS
designation on their boarding passes. Ghedi states that due to these
difficulties, he has “often miss[ed] his scheduled flights.”
These travel difficulties, according to Ghedi, occur because he is on
the Selectee List. And Ghedi claims that his placement on the Selectee List
“is due, in part, to him declining the FBI’s request to serve as an informant.”
Ghedi states that he initiated DHS TRIP inquiries on two
occasions—first in 2012 and then again in 2019. As to his 2012 inquiry, Ghedi
says only that this “inquiry did not resolve his travel issues or remove him”
from the Selectee List. As to his 2019 inquiry, Ghedi says he received a
“standard response letter” stating that DHS could neither confirm nor deny
whether Ghedi was on any watchlist. The letter also said that DHS had
corrected its records where “necessary, including, as appropriate, notations
that may assist in avoiding [future] incidents of misidentification.”
Ghedi filed a lawsuit against various federal officers in their official
capacities—the Acting Secretary of DHS, the Administrator of TSA, the
Commissioner of CBP, the Attorney General, and the Directors of the FBI
and Terrorist Screening Center. He brought five different claims: (1) Fourth
Amendment violations by DHS, TSA, and CBP due to the pat-down
7
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searches and prolonged detentions; (2) Fourth Amendment violations by
DHS, TSA, and CBP for searches of his cellphones; (3) Fifth Amendment
due process violations by all Defendants for the lack of adequate procedures
to challenge placement on the Selectee List; (4) Administrative Procedure
Act violations by all Defendants for the lack of adequate process to challenge
his placement on the Selectee List and the searches and seizures of his person
and effects; and (5) APA violations by the Attorney General, the FBI, and
the TSC for placing Ghedi on the Selectee List in retaliation for his refusal
to become an FBI informant. Ghedi sought declaratory relief concerning the
alleged Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations as well as the APA
violations. He also sought injunctive relief that would “order DHS TRIP to
revise its policies” and reexamine his previous inquiry. Ghedi further asked
the district court to enjoin Defendants from conducting searches of his
person or property without probable cause.
Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The
district court granted their motion in a short order. The order first dismissed
several of Ghedi’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 49
U.S.C. § 46110, which provides appellate courts with exclusive jurisdiction
over challenges to TSA orders. 15 According to the district court, § 46110
prohibited its consideration of Ghedi’s challenges to the inadequate DHS
TRIP procedures, violations of his Fourth Amendment rights, and
placement on the watchlist. The district court then concluded that Ghedi
could not bring claims based on facts outside of a six-year statute of
limitations. The district court also found that “Plaintiff has failed to
15
49 U.S.C. § 46110.
8
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sufficiently allege a present injury or imminent threat of future injury” and
thus lacked standing to bring any of his claims.
The district court alternatively found that Ghedi failed to state a claim
for all five counts in the complaint. First, the court dismissed the procedural
due process claim because: “(1) Plaintiff has failed to plead a deprivation of
the right to travel; (2) Plaintiff has failed to plead a protected interest in his
reputation and a ‘plus’ factor; and (3) the redress process is constitutionally
adequate.” Next, the district court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claims
because Ghedi failed to state a claim that any of the searches or seizures were
unreasonable. Finally, the district court dismissed the two APA claims. The
first APA claim, according to the district court, “is coextensive with [the]
procedural due process and Fourth Amendment claims.” And the second,
concerning the alleged retaliation, is “based on mere speculation and devoid
of any facts supporting an inference that Plaintiff was placed on the [Selectee
List] ‘at least in part’ from declining” to serve as an FBI informant.
Ghedi timely appealed.
II
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a
claim under Rule 12(b)(6). 16 The plaintiff’s “complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” 17 A claim is facially plausible when its factual matter
allows us to draw a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
16
Boudreaux v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 3 F.4th 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation
omitted).
17
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).
9
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misconduct alleged.” 18 A merely “speculative” inference is not enough, and
we ignore the complaint’s legal conclusions in determining facial
plausibility. 19 At end, determining facial plausibility is a “context-specific
task” that requires us to draw on our “judicial experience and common
sense.” 20
Likewise, we review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). The party seeking to invoke
subject-matter jurisdiction has the burden to establish it. 21 “Dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . is proper only when the claim is
so . . . ‘completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal
controversy.’” 22 A claim fails that test when the plaintiff does not “plausibly
allege all jurisdictional allegations.” 23 In other words, the same plausibility
standard that applies in the Rule 12(b)(6) context also applies to Rule
12(b)(1). 24
18
Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
19
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
20
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679.
21
Boudreaux, 3 F.4th at 753 (citation omitted).
22
Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2021) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)).
23
Id. at 749.
24
See id. (holding that plausibility applies equally to reviewing both the merits and
jurisdictional allegations in a complaint); see also Davis v. United States, 597 F.3d 646, (5th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion should be granted only ‘if it appears
certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of facts that establish subject-matter
jurisdiction.’” (quoting Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2009))).
10
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III
We turn first to Ghedi’s constitutional claims, that Defendants
violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. For the reasons explained below,
we cannot reach the merits of his Fourth Amendment claims. Similarly, his
Fifth Amendment claims fail on plausibility grounds.
A
Ghedi brings two Fourth Amendment claims. The first alleges that the
heads of the DHS, TSA, and CBP violated his Fourth Amendment rights
through “prolonged detentions,” and “numerous invasive, warrantless pat-
down searches” lacking probable cause. The second alleges that the heads of
the DHS, TSA, and CBP also violated his Fourth Amendment rights
through their agents conducting “warrantless searches of his cell phones
without probable cause.” The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” 25 Outside the border context, a warrantless search of
a cellphone—whether supported by probable cause or not—is generally
unreasonable. 26 The district court dismissed these claims.
As a reminder, Ghedi had the burden to plausibly allege a federal
controversy. If he did not, then the district court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to decide his claims. This limitation comes from Article III’s
requirement that federal courts decide only “Cases” and “Controversies.” 27
A Case or Controversy exists only when the plaintiff has “standing to sue.” 28
25
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
26
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
27
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
28
Deutsch v. Annis Enters., Inc., 882 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
11
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And standing to sue exists only when the plaintiff plausibly alleges three
elements—(1) an “injury in fact,” (2) that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant,” and (3) that is “likely . . . redress[able]
by a favorable decision.” 29 We disagree with the district court that Ghedi
failed to allege a plausible injury in fact. But we affirm because Ghedi has
failed to plausibly allege that his injury is fairly traceable to these Defendants.
(1)
Not just any injury will suffice to establish standing. Ghedi is
requesting prospective relief, declaratory and injunctive, which means that
he must “show that ‘there is a real and immediate threat of repeated
injury.’” 30 “Merely having suffered an injury in the past is not enough.” 31
Defendants say that Ghedi’s claim to standing fails here since he has not
alleged any concrete travel plans. We disagree.
Defendants cite the Supreme Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife. 32 In that case, conservationists sued to stop foreign, federally backed
construction projects in a bid to protect endangered wildlife. 33 The
conservationists alleged they had traveled to the construction site areas
before to observe wildlife; that they intended to go back at some point; but
that they had “no current plans” to travel. 34 Those facts did not establish an
imminent future injury, said the Court. The previous travel “prove[d]
29
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
30
Deutsch, 882 F.3d at 173 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102
(1983)).
31
Id.32
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
33
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
34
Id. at 563–64.
12
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nothing,” and mere “‘some day’ intentions—without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will
be”—could not support an imminent future injury. 35
Comparing Lujan to this case, though, is an apples-to-oranges
comparison. The Lujan conservationists neither alleged a professional need
for habitual travel nor that they were injured each time they flew. Instead,
they alleged that they traveled for pleasure (to view wildlife) and that their
injury would occur only once they arrived at their destination (the wildlife’s
habitat). Ghedi, on the other hand, alleges both a professional need for
habitual travel and that his injuries are tied to the act of flying, not his
destination. He serves as president of a company operating internationally,
owns international investments, and leads international charitable endeavors.
He also alleges that he “frequently endures severe difficulties” whenever he
flies, and that these difficulties have persisted the “last eight years.” On
these facts we can reasonably infer that his next flight, and thus injury, is both
real and immediate. Therefore, he has plausibly alleged an injury in fact under
Article III. 36
35
Id. at 564.
36
The Defendants also cite to our en banc decision in Frame v. City of Arlington for
the proposition that Ghedi’s has failed to allege sufficiently concrete future travel plans.
657 F.3d 215, 235 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). But our decision in Frame only bolsters our
analysis. We certainly recognized Lujan for the proposition that “[m]ere ‘some day’
intentions . . . ‘without any description of concrete plans[]’ do[] not support standing.”
657 F.3d at 235 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564). But we also explained that “‘imminence’
is an ‘elastic concept’” that turns on a “sufficiently high degree of likelihood” of future
injury. Id. It is not so rigid that a plaintiff must “engage in futile gestures” to maintain
standing. Id. at 236. Requiring Ghedi to amend his complaint with each new plane ticket
would be a futile gesture, indeed.
13
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(2)
Even though we hold that Ghedi has plausibly alleged an injury in fact,
he still must satisfy standing’s second prong—that his injury is fairly
traceable to these Defendants. 37 Here Ghedi’s Fourth Amendment claims
falter. That is because Ghedi bases his Fourth Amendment claims on TSA
and CBP agents’ searching him and seizing his electronics. He argues these
searches and seizures are atypical actions, even for people on the Selectee
List. Yet instead of suing these agents directly, Ghedi has brought his Fourth
Amendment claims against the heads of DHS, TSA, and CBP. Ghedi does
not allege that any of these officials personally conducted or directed the
searches or seizures he has experienced. And his allegations that his
experiences are atypical cut against an inference that these agents are
following official policy. In sum, we cannot reasonably infer that the heads of
DHS, TSA, or CBP will immediately cause or ever have caused the kind of
Fourth Amendment violation Ghedi alleges. At most Ghedi’s allegations give
rise to a reasonable inference that “the independent action[s] of some third
party not before the court,” individual TSA or CBP agents, will cause him
future injury. 38 Such a connection cannot support traceability for standing. 39
Therefore, Ghedi has failed to plausibly plead that his injury in fact is fairly
traceable to the Defendants he has sued.
B
We turn next to Ghedi’s Fifth Amendment claims. Ghedi claims that
the DHS TRIP system violates his Due Process rights because it “provides
individuals like [himself] with no adequate redress avenue to contest the
37
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
38
Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–21 (1976)).
39
Id.14
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deprivation of their constitutionally protected liberty interests.” 40 The Due
Process clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” 41 But it “is not a general fairness
guarantee.” 42 As both its text and Ghedi’s invocation make plain, Ghedi
must start by plausibly pleading some deprivation. He fails to do so. 43
(1)
Ghedi first alleges that Defendants have deprived him of his right to
travel. His complaint alleges, in support, that he must get his boarding pass
at the airport, has experienced extra searches after returning from
international flights, has missed some flights, and has been removed twice
from an airplane after boarding. But Ghedi never alleges that he was
prevented from ultimately getting to his final destination. At most, these
allegations lead to a reasonable inference that the Government has
40
We note that Ghedi has plausibly pleaded standing to bring his claims under the
Fifth Amendment. Unlike his claims under the Fourth Amendment, which largely
challenge atypical intrusions attributable to the decisions of individual TSA agents,
Ghedi’s Fifth Amendment claims are directed an agency policy—the DHS TRIP system.
That ameliorates the traceability problem that we identified with Ghedi’s Fourth
Amendment claims. And because we could order these Defendants to make changes to the
DHS TRIP system if it violates Due Process, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976) (outlining the test for evaluating whether agency procedures meet procedural due
process minimums), that makes Ghedi’s Fifth Amendment claims “likely . . . redress[able]
by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
41
U.S. Const. amend. V.
42
Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 659 (7th Cir. 2019).
43
Because Ghedi has failed to plausibly plead a deprivation, we do not reach the
separate constitutional question: Whether the DHS TRIP procedures are constitutionally
adequate. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (answering constitutional questions “is legitimate only in the last resort, and
as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
individuals” (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345
(1892))).
15
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inconvenienced Ghedi. But they do not plausibly allege a deprivation of
Ghedi’s right to travel.
In short, Ghedi has no right to hassle-free travel. In the Supreme
Court’s view, international travel is a “freedom” subject to “reasonable
governmental regulation.” 44 And when it comes to reasonable governmental
regulation, our sister circuits have held that Government-caused
inconveniences during international travel do not deprive a traveler’s right
to travel. In the Sixth Circuit’s view, “incidental or negligible” delays of “ten
minutes” to “an entire day” do not “implicate the right to travel.” 45 The
Second and Tenth Circuits have held the same. 46 Ghedi has therefore failed
to plausibly allege that he has been deprived of his right to travel
internationally by the extra security measures he has experienced.
(2)
Ghedi’s allegation that Defendants have deprived him of his right to
freely practice his chosen profession also fails. While we have recognized that
right before, Ghedi must plead facts showing that Defendants “effectively
foreclosed” him from practicing his chosen profession to show a
deprivation. 47 Ghedi pleads only that the extra screenings make it “nearly
impossible to do” his business and humanitarian work “effectively.” But
these threadbare allegations do not give rise to a reasonable inference that the
44
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981).
45
Beydoun, 871 F.3d at 468.
46
See Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding
that delaying a traveler for “little over one day . . . was a minor restriction that did not result
in a denial of the right to travel”); Abdi, 942 F.3d at 1032 (rejecting that the Government
deprived a traveler’s due process rights because a “forty-eight-hour delay . . . reasonably
encumbered” him).
47
Martin v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 130 F.3d 1143, 1148 (5th Cir. 1997).
16
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Government has effectively foreclosed Ghedi from serving as president of his
company. And Ghedi points to no caselaw supporting that his liberty interest
in practicing his chosen profession extends to his charitable endeavors. Here
too, then, Ghedi has failed to plausibly allege a deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest.
(3)
Ghedi finally asserts that Defendants have deprived him of his liberty
interest in his reputation. We have noted before that “the infliction of a
stigma on a person’s reputation by a state official, without more, does not
infringe upon a protected liberty interest.” 48 More means that Ghedi must
plausibly allege both “stigma” and “an infringement of some other
interest.” 49 Ghedi has not plausibly pleaded either.
As we noted at the outset, Ghedi’s status on the Selectee List is a
Government secret. Simply put, secrets are not stigmas. The very harm that
a stigma inflicts comes from its public nature. 50 Ghedi pleaded no facts to
support that the Government has ever published his status—one way or the
other—on the Selectee List. His assertions that the Government has
attached the “stigmatizing label of ‘suspected terrorist’” and
“harm[ed] . . . his reputation” are legal conclusions, not factual allegations.
But even if that were not the case, our preceding analysis shows that Ghedi
failed to plausibly plead an infringement of some other interest. Ghedi has
48
Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710–11 (1976)).
49
Id.50
See Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2006) (requiring
stigmatizing charges be “made public”); see also Paul, 424 U.S. at 701–02 (focusing on the
effect of a stigma on a person’s public reputation, tying it to “governmental defamation”).
17
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No. 20-10995
therefore failed to plausibly plead that Defendants have deprived him of his
liberty interest in his reputation.
IV
Ghedi further asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his two
claims under the APA. We disagree. Neither claim is plausible.
A
The Fourth Count in Ghedi’s complaint alleges that “all” the
Defendants are violating the APA by “implementing policies or practices
that permit, or fail to prevent, Defendants’ arbitrary and capricious decision
making.” An agency certainly has no power to take actions that are
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 51 But the only policy Ghedi directly identifies is the DHS TRIP
process. And Ghedi’s complaints about the DHS TRIP process boil down
to one claim: that even after he used the DHS TRIP process, the
“warrantless and invasive searches” continued. That may be why the district
court found these allegations “coextensive with [Ghedi’s] due process and
Fourth Amendment claims.” Because we have already held that Ghedi failed
to plausibly plead standing under the Fourth Amendment or state a claim
under the Fifth, he has likewise failed to plausibly plead this claim.
51
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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No. 20-10995
B
The Fifth Count 52 in Ghedi’s complaint alleges that the Attorney
General, FBI Director, and TSC Director acted arbitrarily and capriciously
by placing him on the Selectee List. Again, we agree that federal agencies
cannot take arbitrary and capricious actions. 53 But “[t]he arbitrary and
capricious standard is ‘highly deferential,’ and we must afford the agency’s
decision ‘a presumption of regularity.’” 54 Ghedi’s core factual allegation is
that he was placed on the Selectee List for “declining to serve as an FBI
informant.” But he then further alleges that he was placed on the Selectee
List only “in part” because of his refusing the FBI, and that the Government
regularly requires at least reasonable suspicion for anyone it places on it. Even
if we could reasonably infer that Ghedi is, indeed, on the Selectee List,
Ghedi’s own admissions make it only speculative that he was placed on it in
retaliation. Therefore, Ghedi’s allegations do not permit a reasonable
inference that these Defendants violated typical review processes to retaliate
against him. 55
52
It is the fifth count only in order. Ghedi’s complaint, though, labeled it “Count
Six.”
53
§ 706(2)(A).
54
Hayward v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 536 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2008).
55
See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 (“But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—
but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2)).
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No. 20-10995
* * *
Controlling law yields just one conclusion: Ghedi has failed to
plausibly allege standing to bring his Fourth Amendment claims, or to
plausibly state his Fifth Amendment or APA claims. Therefore, we cannot
grant him relief and do not reach his remaining issues. 56
We AFFIRM the district court.
56
The district court also found that Ghedi’s claims were at least partially barred by
statute of limitations, and that it lacked jurisdiction to address Ghedi’s claims under 49
U.S.C. § 46110, which prevents district courts from reviewing certain TSA actions.
Because of our disposition, we need not reach either issue.
20