Joseph Young v. City of Houston , 471 F. App'x 389 ( 2012 )


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  •      Case: 11-20637     Document: 00511896401         Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/22/2012
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 22, 2012
    No. 11-20637                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar                             Clerk
    JOSEPH YOUNG
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    CITY OF HOUSTON; HARRIS COUNTY
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:11-CV-897
    Before KING, JOLLY, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    The plaintiff, Joseph Young (“Young”), alleged civil rights violations and
    brought action against the City of Houston (“Houston”) and Harris County
    (collectively the “Defendants”). Houston and Harris County moved to dismiss
    on the grounds that service was improper and Young failed to state a claim upon
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 11-20637    Document: 00511896401      Page: 2    Date Filed: 06/22/2012
    No. 11-20637
    which relief could be granted. The district court granted the Defendants’
    motions to dismiss on said grounds and Young appealed. We AFFIRM.
    On March 7, 2011, Young filed this civil rights suit pro se against Houston
    and Harris County. In Young’s complaint, which he entitled, “Writ of Habeas
    Corpus,” he complained that the Defendants violated his civil rights. Young,
    however, failed to cite any specific civil rights laws that the Defendants allegedly
    violated.
    I.
    A. Standard of Review
    “We review dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.”            Oscar Renda
    Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, Tex., 
    463 F.3d 378
    , 381 (5th Cir. 2006)
    (citing Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 
    394 F.3d 285
    , 288 (5th Cir.
    2004)). “‘In doing so, we accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations in
    the complaint.’” 
    Id. (citing Herrmann Holdings
    Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 
    302 F.3d 552
    , 557 (5th Cir. 2002)). “The dismissal should be upheld only if it appears
    beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim
    which entitles them to relief.” 
    Id. (quotations and citations
    omitted). “The
    motion may be granted ‘only if it appears that no relief could be granted under
    any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.’” Morin v.
    Caire, 
    77 F.3d 116
    , 120 (5th Cir. 1996). “We review a dismissal for failure to
    effect [ ] proper service of process for an abuse of discretion.” Lindsey v. U.S.
    R.R. Retirement Bd., 
    101 F.3d 444
    , 445 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Peters v. United
    States, 
    9 F.3d 344
    , 345 (5th Cir. 1993)) (per curiam).
    B. Discussion
    Federal courts afford liberal construction of pro se briefs. See Mapes v.
    Bishop, 
    541 F.3d 582
    , 584 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). On appeal, Young recites
    various assertions from his complaint. With respect to Harris County, Young
    merely makes conclusory statements that the district court dismissed his case
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    “on [the] basis of political interference.” Young has neither discussed how the
    district court erred in its ruling nor did he provide any reasons, record citations,
    or legal authority in support of his claim. Young’s briefing fails to meet the
    requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 28(9)(A) and thus his arguments are waived.
    See S.E.C. v. Recile, 
    10 F.3d 1093
    , 1096-97 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing that,
    although the courts construe briefs liberally in determining issues for review,
    issues that are not raised or that are not briefed in accordance with Fed. R. App.
    P. 28 are waived).
    Young also fails to properly brief service issues against Houston on appeal,
    thus those arguments are waived. Alternatively, we find no abuse of discretion
    by the district court. It is undisputed that Houston is a government entity. And,
    state governmental organizations must be served by either “(A) delivering a copy
    of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer; or (B) serving
    a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law for serving a
    summons or like process on such a defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2). Texas law
    holds that, “[in] a suit against an incorporated city..., citation may be served on
    the mayor, clerk, secretary, or treasurer.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.024
    (Vernon 2008). Young failed to comply with Federal Civil Procedure Rules and
    Texas law.
    II.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.
    3