Lynn Funk v. Rick Thaler, Director ( 2010 )


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  •            IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 13, 2010
    No. 09-41290 c/w 09-41293
    Summary Calendar                          Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    LYNN LEWIS FUNK,
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    RICK THALER, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
    CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
    Respondent-Appellee
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:09-CV-510 USDC
    No. 4:09-CV-543
    Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Lynn Lewis Funk, Texas prisoner # 1275560, moves this court for a
    certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the dismissals of his § 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     applications as time barred. Funk sought to challenge his conviction in
    Cause No. F-2004-0307-C of two counts of indecency with a child and two counts
    of sexual assault and his conviction in Cause No. F-2004-0308-C of three counts
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    No. 09-41290 c/w 09-41293
    of indecency with a child. He has also filed motions for leave to proceed in forma
    pauperis (IFP) on appeal, to use the original record IFP, and to expedite
    consideration of his motion for a COA.
    Funk argues that the limitations period should be statutorily tolled from
    the date his conviction became final until September 2008, thereby making his
    § 2254 applications timely. He also argues that his applications should be
    deemed timely based upon equitable tolling and actual innocence.               The
    remainder of his brief is dedicated to arguments on the merits of his
    constitutional claims and arguments regarding procedural errors in the state
    habeas proceedings.
    To obtain a COA, Funk must make a substantial showing of the denial of
    a constitutional right. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
    537 U.S. 322
    , 336 (2003). When the district court’s denial of federal habeas relief is based
    on procedural grounds, as here, “a COA should issue when the prisoner shows,
    at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states
    a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason
    would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
    ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000).
    Funk has not made the required showing on his equitable tolling and
    actual innocence claims. Accordingly, a COA is denied on these issues. See
    Slack, 
    529 U.S. at 484
    .
    In Egerton v. Cockrell, 
    334 F.3d 433
    , 436-39 (5th Cir. 2003), this court
    considered whether denial of access to legal materials can constitute a
    state-created impediment pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (b)(2)(B). Egerton was
    denied access to a copy of § 2244(d)(1) for over two years because he was first
    housed in a unit that did not have library privileges and then was transferred
    to a unit that had inadequate library facilities. Id. at 435. This court concluded
    that the State’s failure to provide “materials necessary to prisoners to challenge
    their convictions or confinement, in this case a copy of the very statute that is
    2
    No. 09-41290 c/w 09-41293
    being used to render Egerton’s petition time-barred, constitutes an ‘impediment’
    for purposes of invoking § 2244(d)(1)(B).” Id. at 438-39. Whether a prisoner has
    demonstrated the existence of a state-created impediment is highly fact
    dependent. See id. at 438.
    In verified objections to the magistrate judges’s reports, Funk detailed his
    numerous housing assignments and asserted that, as a result of the
    inadequacies in the various prison libraries where he was housed, he was
    prevented from accessing the AEDPA until September 2008. The district courts
    overruled Funk’s objections without making factual findings regarding the
    existence of a state-created impediment. Without factual findings regarding the
    materials available to Funk for challenging his conviction, this court cannot
    conclusively determine that Funk was not prevented from filing his § 2254
    applications by the existence of a state-created impediment. See Thames v.
    Wilson, 179 F. App’x 241, 242-43 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Fuller v. Johnson, 
    114 F.3d 491
    , 495 (5th Cir. 1997).
    In light of the foregoing, Funk has made a showing that the correctness of
    the district court’s procedural ruling concerning the existence of a state-created
    impediment is debatable. See Slack, 
    529 U.S. at 484
    . Because the procedural
    ruling is debatable, a COA should be granted if reasonable jurists could debate
    whether the district court pleadings, the record, and the COA motion contain a
    valid constitutional claim, or if those materials are unclear or incomplete.
    Houser v. Dretke, 
    395 F.3d 560
    , 562 (5th Cir. 2004).
    The district courts dismissed Funk’s § 2254 applications as time barred
    sua sponte, prior to service on the State, and without the benefit of a complete
    state court record. We express no opinion on the validity of Funk’s ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims; the record is incomplete. Accordingly a COA is
    granted solely on the issue whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to
    a state-created impediment. The case is vacated and remanded for the district
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    No. 09-41290 c/w 09-41293
    courts to make findings whether a state-created impediment prevented Funk
    from timely filing his § 2254 applications. See Houser, 
    395 F.3d at 562
    .
    Funk’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is granted. His motions
    to use the original record IFP, and for expedited consideration of his motion for
    a COA are denied.
    COA GRANTED in part; COA DENIED in part; IFP GRANTED;
    VACATED and REMANDED; REMAINING MOTIONS DENIED.
    4