Childress Ex Rel. Childress v. Tate County School District , 384 F. App'x 430 ( 2010 )


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  •      Case: 10-60167     Document: 00511165192          Page: 1    Date Filed: 07/07/2010
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 7, 2010
    No. 10-60167
    Summary Calendar                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    WILLIAM CODY CHILDRESS, a minor, by and through John Childress,
    Natural Father,
    Plaintiff - Appellant
    v.
    TATE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; GARY WALKER, TCSD
    Superintendent, in his official and individual capacities; COREY
    BLAYLOCK, Independence High School Principal, in his official and
    individual capacities,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 2:10-CV-24
    Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    This is an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying
    Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary
    injunction. We affirm the district court's order.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-60167       Document: 00511165192          Page: 2     Date Filed: 07/07/2010
    No. 10-60167
    We review a district court's denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of
    discretion.1 See Bluefield Water Ass'n v. City of Starkville, Miss., 
    577 F.3d 250
    ,
    253 (5th Cir. 2009). Legal determinations are reviewed de novo, and factual
    determinations are reviewed for clear error. See 
    id.
    A district court may grant a preliminary injunction if an applicant
    demonstrates (1) a substantial likelihood that he will prevail on the merits, (2)
    a substantial threat that he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not
    granted, (3) his threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party
    whom he seeks to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not
    disserve the public interest. Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    328 F.3d 192
    , 195-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).                  "We have cautioned
    repeatedly that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which
    should not be granted unless the party seeking it has clearly carried the burden
    of persuasion on all four requirements." 
    Id. at 196
     (citation and quotes omitted).
    Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in denying him a preliminary
    injunction because he has satisfied all four prongs of the above-cited test.
    However, the district court concluded, inter alia, that Plaintiff had failed to show
    a likelihood of success on the merits. Specifically, the district court held that
    Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Defendant's otherwise gender-neutral policy
    of corporal punishment violates Plaintiff's right to equal protection by its
    purportedly disparate impact on male students. Given the Supreme Court
    precedent on disparate impact and the burden of proof for showing
    discriminatory intent, we do not find the district court's holding an abuse of
    discretion. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
    442 U.S. 256
    , 274, 99
    1
    We review only the court's denial of a preliminary injunction. See 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1)
    (authorizing the courts of appeals to review appeals of orders granting or refusing to grant
    injunctions); In re Lieb, 
    915 F.2d 180
    , 183 (5th Cir. 1990) (appeals court lacks jurisdiction to
    review temporary restraining order pursuant to interlocutory appeal).
    2
    Case: 10-60167    Document: 00511165192     Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/07/2010
    No. 10-
    60167 S. Ct. 2282
    , 2293 (1979) ("purposeful discrimination," not just disparate impact,
    necessary for equal protection violation).
    Moreover, given the district court's acceptance of Plaintiff's alleged
    operative facts as true regarding the frequency and disparate nature of the
    alleged punishment, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of
    Plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing. See PCI Transp., Inc. v. Fort
    Worth & W. R.R. Co., 
    418 F.3d 535
    , 546 (5th Cir. 2005) (no evidentiary hearing
    necessary when material factual dispute is absent).
    Because we find no abuse of discretion regarding Plaintiff's likelihood of
    success on the merits, we need not review the district court's other grounds for
    denying the preliminary injunction. See Lake Charles Diesel, Inc., 
    328 F.3d at 196
    .
    AFFIRMED
    3