Webster v. Kijakazi ( 2021 )


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  • Case: 20-60856     Document: 00516109588         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/29/2021
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 20-60856                           November 29, 2021
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    Arthur Webster,
    Plaintiff—Appellant,
    versus
    Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social
    Security,
    Defendant—Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 3:19-CV-97
    Before Elrod, Southwick, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
    Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:
    The district court affirmed the decision of the Social Security
    Commissioner to deny disability benefits to Arthur Webster. On appeal,
    Webster argues that the Administrative Law Judge erred in assessing his
    Residual Function Capacity and failed to develop the record by declining to
    order a Consultative Exam. Webster also argues that the Administrative Law
    Judge failed to analyze his impairments under the proper listing and failed to
    consider whether he could maintain employment, assuming he could find any
    at all. We AFFIRM.
    Case: 20-60856     Document: 00516109588          Page: 2    Date Filed: 11/29/2021
    No. 20-60856
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Arthur Webster is a former truck driver, combat rifle crew member in
    the U.S. Army, mechanic, and production assembler. He has a high school
    education and some college. Webster served in Iraq where he witnessed
    several traumatic events, including the death of a friend and the
    endangerment of Iraqi children. He suffered from posttraumatic stress
    disorder (“PTSD”) following these events and was admitted into a PTSD
    Residential Rehabilitation Treatment Program for over a month in 2016. He
    also complains of numerous physical impairments including knee, foot, and
    back pain.
    On March 19, 2019, Webster applied for Title II Social Security
    disability insurance benefits, alleging physical and mental impairments that
    began in March of 2016. Webster was 43 years old at the time of the alleged
    onset of his disability and 46 years old at the time of his hearing. Webster’s
    application for benefits was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
    Thereafter, Webster requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
    (“ALJ”).      Though he found that Webster suffered from various
    impairments, the ALJ denied benefits on the grounds that none of the
    impairments met or exceeded the severity of the listing requirements under
    the applicable regulations. Additionally, the ALJ found that Webster could
    perform relevant past work as an assembler or perform various light effort,
    limited contact jobs suggested by a vocational expert.
    Webster timely appealed the denial to the district court. The parties
    consented to a hearing before a magistrate judge, and that judge affirmed the
    ALJ’s decision. Webster timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    This court reviews a Commissioner’s denial of social security
    disability benefits “only to ascertain whether (1) the final decision is
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    supported by substantial evidence and (2) whether the Commissioner used
    the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence.” Keel v. Saul, 
    986 F.3d 551
    , 555 (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Substantial
    evidence is merely enough that a reasonable mind could arrive at the same
    decision; though the evidence “must be more than a scintilla[,] it need not
    be a preponderance.” Taylor v. Astrue, 
    706 F.3d 600
    , 602 (5th Cir. 2012)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner’s
    analysis proceeds along five steps. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    (a)(4). The
    Commissioner considers (1) whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial
    gainful activity,” (2) the severity and duration of the claimant’s impairments,
    (3) whether the claimant’s impairment “meets or equals” one of the listings
    in the relevant regulations, (4) whether the claimant can still do his “past
    relevant work,” and (5) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from
    doing any relevant work. 
    Id.
     The claimant bears the burden on the first four
    steps. See Keel, 986 F.3d at 555. If the claimant advances that far, the burden
    shifts to the Commissioner to “prove the claimant’s employability.” Id.
    On appeal, Webster argues that the ALJ erred for several reasons
    relating loosely to Steps 3 through 5 of the sequential evaluation process.
    These arguments can be reduced to three categories: (1) disputes about the
    validity of the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”); (2) arguments that a
    Consultative Exam should have been ordered; and (3) arguments raised for
    the first time on appeal regarding the listing impairments and Webster’s
    ability to maintain work. We consider the arguments in that order.
    I.     The RFC was supported by substantial evidence.
    First, Webster argues that the ALJ’s RFC was not supported by
    substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to incorporate allegedly more
    restrictive portions of a state agency report prepared by Dr. Angela Herzgog
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    and failed to accord proper weight to Webster’s examiner, Dr. Charles Small.
    Webster argues further that the allegedly faulty RFC corrupted the ALJ’s
    hypothetical questioning of the vocational expert.
    An “ALJ is responsible for determining an applicant’s residual
    functional capacity.” Ripley v. Chater, 
    67 F.3d 552
    , 557 (5th Cir. 1995). In
    doing so, an ALJ examines the medical evidence in the record, including the
    testimony of physicians and the claimant’s medical records. See 
    id.
     An ALJ
    usually cannot reject a medical opinion without some explanation. See
    Kneeland v. Berryhill, 
    850 F.3d 749
    , 760 (5th Cir. 2017).
    Notably, though, ALJs are no longer required to give controlling
    weight to a treating physician’s opinion, as was mandated by federal
    regulations and our caselaw in the past. Compare 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
    (2016), with 
    20 C.F.R. § 404
    .1520c; see also 
    82 Fed. Reg. 5853
     (Jan. 18, 2017)
    (commenting that the rule change would enable courts to focus on “the
    content of the evidence [rather] than on the source.”). For claims filed after
    March 27, 2017, an ALJ instead considers a list of factors in determining what
    weight, if any, to give a medical opinion. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404
    .1520c. The most
    important factors in determining the persuasiveness of a medical source are
    whether the source’s medical opinion is based on “objective medical
    evidence and supporting explanations” and the “consistency” of the
    source’s opinion with the evidence from other medical and nonmedical
    sources in the claim. 
    Id.
    The ALJ in these proceedings relied on the state agency’s 2018
    assessment, finding it “persuasive” because it was supported by the evidence
    and consistent with Webster’s other records. The state agency found that
    Webster had the capacity to maintain attention and concentration “for two
    hour periods . . . without excessive interruption from psychological
    symptoms” and could “interact adequately, on a limited basis, receive non-
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    confrontational supervision, and make mental adaptions to complete
    unskilled tasks in a work setting, especially those requiring minimal
    interaction with others.” Further, Webster “retain[ed] mental capacity to
    complete unskilled work tasks for which he remains physically capable.”
    Contrary to Webster’s contentions, the ALJ incorporated these
    findings into Webster’s RFC, which stated that Webster had the “residual
    functional capacity to perform light work as defined by 20 C.F.R.
    [§] 404.1567(b) except that he can engage in occasional climbing and
    balancing” and that he was “further limited to routine, repetitive tasks with
    occasional public contact.” Furthermore, the ALJ appropriately used the
    RFC when questioning the vocational expert, and Webster’s counsel had
    “the opportunity to correct deficiencies in the ALJ’s question by mentioning
    or suggesting to the vocational expert any purported defects in the
    hypothetical questions.” Bowling v. Shalala, 
    36 F.3d 431
    , 436 (5th Cir. 1994).
    Moreover, the RFC and the state agency report are reflected in the vocational
    expert’s proposed occupations, as he specifically identified potential
    employment that did not require “a great deal of interaction with the public
    or coworkers.”
    The ALJ also articulated his reasons for rejecting the testimony of Dr.
    Small. As is required by Section 404.1520c, the ALJ considered both the
    consistency and supportability of Dr. Small’s testimony in light of other
    medical opinions and evidence in the record, including Webster’s hospital
    and VA treatment records. Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Dr. Small’s
    testimony was only “supported” by his own findings and was inconsistent
    with Webster’s medical history and longitudinal psychiatric treatment
    records indicating improvement to the symptoms caused by Webster’s
    PTSD. Though the ALJ neither adopted the state agency report verbatim
    nor accepted the testimony of Dr. Small, it cannot be said that his decision
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    was not based on substantial evidence or that he improperly applied the
    relevant legal standards.
    II.     A Consultative Exam was not required.
    Webster also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to order a requested
    Consultative Exam (“CE”). Webster argues that the conflicting evidence
    introduced by Dr. Small necessitated a further development of the record
    with a government-funded CE.1
    An “ALJ has a duty to develop the facts fully and fairly relating to an
    applicant’s claim for disability benefits.” Ripley, 
    67 F.3d at 557
    . An ALJ’s
    failure to fulfill this duty is not reversible error unless the claimant is
    prejudiced. 
    Id.
     “A consultative examination is required to develop a ‘full
    and fair record’ only if ‘the record establishes that such an examination is
    necessary to enable the [ALJ] to make the disability decision.’” Hardman v.
    Colvin, 
    820 F.3d 142
    , 148 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Jones v. Bowen, 
    829 F.2d 524
    , 526 (5th Cir. 1987)).
    As in Hardman, the record here is “replete with medical documents
    that spanned years.” 
    Id.
     The ALJ reviewed Webster’s medical records from
    both the Veteran’s Administration (“VA”) and the hospital, the state agency
    consultation, the findings of Dr. Small, and testimony from Webster’s wife
    and mother. Nothing in the record suggests that the ALJ needed any more
    medical information to reach an informed decision about whether Webster
    was disabled. The ALJ’s decision was based upon substantial evidence in a
    sufficiently developed record, and he did not err in declining to order the CE.
    1
    Part of Webster’s argument for a CE relies on his belief that the ALJ erred in
    determining that the record showed no evidence of prescribed knee and back braces.
    Though the record does evidence the existence of the knee brace, the pages cited by Webster
    do not demonstrate that either the back or knee brace were prescribed.
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    III.   Webster’s remaining arguments were waived.
    Webster advances two final claims of error that he did not raise at the
    district court. First, he argues that the ALJ erred by not analyzing Listing
    Impairment 12.15 for Trauma and Stressor related disorders. Second, he
    argues that the ALJ erred by failing to determine whether Webster could hold
    whatever job he could find for a significant period of time.
    Our court adheres to the general rule that “arguments not raised
    before the district court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on
    appeal.” LeMaire v. Louisiana Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 
    480 F.3d 383
    , 387
    (5th Cir. 2007). An argument is not waived, though, “if the argument on the
    issue before the district court was sufficient to permit the district court to
    rule on it.” Horton v. Bank One, N.A., 
    387 F.3d 426
    , 435 (5th Cir. 2004)
    (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    Webster did not raise these arguments at the district court or present
    them in a manner sufficient for the district court to rule on them. Nor did he
    respond to the Commissioner’s arguments that they were waived.
    Consequently, we hold that Webster waived these arguments.
    AFFIRMED.
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