Myers v. Dallas County Justic ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 99-10039
    Conference Calendar
    JOHNNY GLENDELL MYERS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DALLAS COUNTY JUSTICE COURT, Precinct 3,
    Court 2; MARTHA E. RITTER, Judge,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:98-CV-2961-K
    --------------------
    February 16, 2000
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Johnny Glendell Myers, proceeding pro se and in forma
    pauperis (IFP), appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     suit as frivolous.   Myers sued Judge Martha Ritter,
    a state court judge, and the Dallas County Justice Court for a
    default judgment entered against Myers in 1995 in a tort suit.
    The district court concluded that Myers’ § 1983 suit, filed in
    1998, was time-barred and that the state judge was protected by
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 99-10039
    -2-
    absolute immunity.   On appeal, Myers challenges only the time-bar
    issue, and he argues that he did not timely receive notice of the
    default judgment.
    Myers has waived the judicial-immunity issue by not briefing
    it.   See Yohey v. Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993);
    see also Mitchell v. McBryde, 
    944 F.2d 229
    , 230 (5th Cir. 1991)
    (judges are absolutely immune for their judicial acts).
    Furthermore, the district court did not have jurisdiction to
    review Myers’ § 1983 challenges to the state trial court’s orders
    in the state tort suit.   See Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas, 
    18 F.3d 315
    , 317 (5th Cir. 1994)).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion for
    dismissing Myers’ § 1983 suit as frivolous.      See Denton v.
    Hernandez, 
    504 U.S. 25
    , 31-34 (1992).      Furthermore, Myers’ appeal
    lacks arguable merit and is thus frivolous.      See Howard v. King,
    
    707 F.2d 215
    , 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983).      The appeal is therefore
    DISMISSED.   5TH CIR. R. 42.2.   The dismissal of this appeal as
    frivolous and the dismissal of his district court suit as
    frivolous count as two strikes for purposes of 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).   We caution Myers that once he accumulates three
    strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in any civil action
    or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any
    facility unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical
    injury.   See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (g).
    DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS, SANCTION WARNING ISSUED.