United States v. Fields ( 2021 )

Case: 20-20491 Document: 00516125109 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/10/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 10, 2021
No. 20-20491
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Winfred Fields,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:18-CR-316-1
Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
A jury found Winfred Fields guilty of mail fraud, conspiracy to
commit mail fraud and wire fraud, and 13 counts of aiding and assisting in
preparation and presentation of false tax returns. He argues on appeal that
his attorney labored under several conflicts of interest, that the district court
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-20491
should have rejected his waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel, and that
counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him to accept the Government’s
plea offer.
I.
Winfred Fields was charged with 15 criminal counts related to a
scheme to obtain fraudulent income tax refunds for United States residents
and nonresident taxpayers. The superseding indictment alleged violations of
a treaty or convention between the United States and the United Kingdom
(UK) “establish[ing] the taxation rules for residents of one country
performing work and receiving pay in the other country to avoid double
taxation and the prevention of fiscal tax evasion.” The indictment alleged
that Fields filed approximately 200 tax returns or amended tax returns
seeking a refund by falsely claiming that the withheld earnings paid to the IRS
were exempt from taxation pursuant to the tax treaty with the UK.
Before trial, the Government filed a motion asking the district court
to inquire into possible conflicts of interest between Fields and one of his
defense attorneys, Dwight Jefferson. The motion asserted that in 2010
Jefferson represented Fields in applying for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) against a bank after Fields’s business account was frozen on suspicion
of fraud. The motion also asserted that, after the litigation with bank was
resolved, Fields began depositing tax refund checks into Jefferson’s attorney
trust accounts; Jefferson retained a fee and issued the proceeds to Fields.
The district court granted the Government’s motion and conducted
two Garcia hearings to ensure a valid waiver by the defendant of his
constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. See United States v. Garcia, 517
F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by Flanagan v. United
States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 & n.2 (1984). In the end, the district court found
that Fields had validly waived his right to conflict-free representation.
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The jury found Fields guilty of all 15 counts. He was sentenced within
the advisory guidelines range to a total 108 months of imprisonment followed
by three years of supervised release, and he was ordered to pay more than $3
million in restitution.
II.
Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant’s right to counsel requires
that counsel be free of a conflict of interest. United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d
768, 799 (5th Cir. 2008). A defendant may choose to proceed with counsel
who has a conflict if the defendant validly waives his constitutional right to
conflict-free representation following a Garcia hearing. Id. To be valid, a
waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. United States v. Greig,
967 F.2d 1018, 1021 (5th Cir. 1992). At the Garcia hearing, the district court
must “ensure that the defendant (1) is aware that a conflict of interest exists;
(2) realizes the potential hazards to his defense by continuing with such
counsel under the onus of a conflict; and (3) is aware of his right to obtain
other counsel.” Greig, 967 F.2d at 1022. Even so, some conflicts are so
severe as to deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance of counsel
and therefore cannot be waived. See United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78,
90 (5th Cir. 1993). “We review the district court's acceptance of defendant's
waiver of conflict-free counsel for simple error.” United States v. Moore, 37
F.3d 169, 174 (5th Cir.1994).
Fields validly waived any potential conflict. The district court here
held two Garcia hearings, four weeks apart, addressing the potential conflicts
of interest. At the hearings, the district court extensively discussed the
potential conflicts that could arise at trial, including the possibility that Fields
would want to raise a reliance on advice of counsel defense, the potential that
Jefferson’s advice would be colored by concern for his own reputation, and
the fact that Jefferson’s representation of Fields would prevent him from
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testifying to explain his apparent involvement in the fraud and the use of his
IOLTA. The district court admonished Fields about his right not to testify
and that if he decided not to testify, there would be no testimony explaining
the deposits of client tax refund checks into Jefferson’s IOLTA.
At the second Garcia hearing, the district court reiterated that counsel
without potential conflicts provided the best chance of prevailing. The
district court advised Fields that he was facing 70 years in prison and that the
court could not anticipate all potential conflicts, and Fields told the court that
he understood. Thus, the district court ensured that Fields was aware of
potential conflicts and “the potential hazards to his defense by continuing
with” possibly conflicted counsel. See Greig, 967 F.2d at 1022.
At the close of the initial hearing, the district court adjourned for four
weeks to allow Fields to discuss the potential conflicts with his three defense
attorneys and to make arrangements for retaining new counsel if appropriate.
At the later hearing, the district court ensured that Fields had conversations,
outside Jefferson’s presence, with his other two defense attorneys and
confirmed that they were independent of Jefferson. The district court told
Fields that the court would appoint counsel if Fields satisfied the criteria for
appointed counsel. Fields acknowledged that he had discussed the issue with
his other two other defense attorneys and his family and that he had an
opportunity to obtain independent advice and did not wish to seek the advice
of other counsel. Thus, the district court ensured that Fields was aware of
his right to obtain other counsel. See Greig, 967 F.2d at 1022.
The record shows that district court substantially complied with
Garcia by holding two hearings advising Fields of his right to waive the
conflict, the dangers involved in making such a waiver, and his right to obtain
new counsel. See Greig, 967 F.2d at 1022. Fields has not shown that his
waiver was involuntary or unknowing. Garcia, 517 F.2d at 276.
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Even so, the determination that Fields validly waived his right to
conflict-free counsel does not end our inquiry. “An accused’s right to waive
conflict-free representation is not absolute. If the conflict is so severe as to
render a trial inherently unfair, then the integrity of the judicial system has
been undermined, and the accused has been deprived of his right to effective
counsel.” Vaquero, 997 F.2d at 90. “‘We determine whether the integrity
of the judicial system has been undermined by reference to the current
national standards of legal ethics,’ although such standards are not
controlling.” United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 511 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Vaquero, 997 F.2d at 90-91). The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibit a lawyer from representing a client when there is a significant risk
that the lawyer’s representation will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
personal interest, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that he can
competently and diligently represent the client; the representation is not
illegal; and the client gives informed, written consent. Model Rules of
Pro. Conduct r. 1.7 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2021); see Tex.
Disciplinary Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.06(b)-(c).
Fields has not shown that Jefferson’s belief that the potential conflicts
would not affect his representation of Fields was unreasonable. See Rico, 51
F.3d at 511. Jefferson maintained that his testimony was unnecessary to
explain the use of his IOLTA or inconsistencies between Fields’s
representations to the IRS and his verified pleading in the TRO litigation.
Jefferson also explained that Fields would be raising the defense of reliance
on the advice of the IRS, rather than advice of counsel and nothing in the
record indicates that the defense of reliance on the advice of counsel should
have been raised at trial. In addition, the Government explained that it had
no reason to believe Jefferson knowingly participated in the fraud, and
Fields’s other two attorneys, who were independent of Jefferson, agreed that
the conflict was waivable.
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Thus, Fields has not shown that any conflict was sufficient to impugn
the judicial system or render Fields’s trial inherently unfair, such that his
right to conflict-free counsel was unwaivable. Vaquero, 997 F.2d at 90.
III.
The record is not sufficiently developed to allow fair consideration of
Fields’s claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him to accept
the Government’s plea deal, and, therefore, we decline to consider it without
prejudice to any right that Fields has to assert it on collateral review. See
United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir. 2014). Finally, Fields asks
us to exercise our supervisory power to reverse his conviction. “The
underlying purpose of [our] inherent supervisory powers are to 1) implement
a remedy for a violation of a recognized right, 2) to preserve judicial integrity
by insuring that the conviction rests on appropriate consideration validly
before the jury and 3) as a remedy designed to deter further illegal conduct.”
United States v. Ornelas-Rodriguez, 12 F.3d 1339, 1349 (5th Cir. 1994). Fields
has not demonstrated that any of these purposes would be accomplished by
using our supervisory power to reverse his conviction. Thus, we decline to
do so.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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