Szymczyk v. Alliance: Texaco ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 00-20068
Summary Calendar
_____________________
HALINA SZYMCZYK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALLIANCE: TEXACO/HOUSTON
ADVANCED RESEARCH CENTER;
HOUSTON ADVANCED RESEARCH
CENTER; TEXACO; TEXACO GROUP,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston
USDC No. H:98-CV-4350
_________________________________________________________________
November 15, 2000
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The plaintiff, Halina Szymczyk, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her discriminatory discharge claims against the
defendants, Houston Advanced Research Center (“HARC”) and Texaco
Group (“Texaco”). Szymczyk alleges she was unlawfully terminated
from her employment as a lab assistant at HARC on the basis of her
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Polish ethnicity and sex. Finding no error in the district court’s
order dismissing all claims against the defendants, we affirm.
I
Szymczyk began working for Texaco in 1984. After ten years of
employment with Texaco, Szymczyk transferred to a HARC geochemistry
lab. Although the lab was built pursuant to an agreement between
HARC and Texaco, the agreement specified that HARC performed
services for Texaco as an independent contractor, not as an agent
or employee of Texaco.1
According to Szymczyk, she began experiencing discrimination
in her employment with HARC when she arrived in 1994. Szymczyk
alleges she was paid less for performing similar work as male
employees at HARC and was harassed and discriminated against by her
supervisor, Katry Bissada. Szymczyk logged three complaints with
HARC about the alleged discrimination between April 8 and April 11,
1996. On April 12, 1996, Szymczyk was terminated from her
employment at HARC. HARC contends that Szymczyk was terminated due
to her inability to perform required work in a timely manner.
1
The record reveals that HARC and Texaco are separate
corporate entities. Although Szymczyk filed her complaint in the
district court against “Alliance: Texaco/Houston Advanced Research
Center,” no such conglomerate appears to exist.
2
On June 26, 1996, Szymczyk filed a discrimination charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).2 She
received a right to sue letter from the EEOC dated May 1997,
authorizing a suit against HARC only.3 On April 7, 1998, Szymczyk
filed suit against HARC and Texaco in Texas state court, alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e) et seq (“Title VII”). Szymczyk amended her complaint
upon instruction from the court, dropping the references to state
law breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims included in her original pleading.
The defendants subsequently removed the action to federal
court. Thereafter, Texaco filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that Szymczyk failed
to obtain a right to sue letter, as to Texaco, from the EEOC as
required by Title VII. On July 9, 1999, HARC filed a motion for
summary judgment, arguing that Szymczyk’s claim was barred because
she failed to file her suit against it within the 90-day period
prescribed by Title VII. The district court granted both motions
2
The EEOC charge was filed against HARC only. Texaco was not
mentioned in the charge.
3
This letter included the standard notice of the 90-day
limitation for filing discrimination suits following receipt of a
right to sue letter from the EEOC.
3
and dismissed all claims against the defendants on November 22,
1999. Szymczyk timely appealed.
II
We review de novo a district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
for failure to state a claim. See Morin v. Claire, 77 F.3d 116,
120 (5th Cir. 1996). Rule 12(b)(6) motions should be granted only
where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-6, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957).
A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.
See National Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San
Antonio, 40 F.3d 698, 707 (5th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is
warranted if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986).
Despite the fact that the district court’s disposition of this
case addresses only her Title VII claims against the defendants, in
her brief Szymczyk attempts to revive her voluntarily dismissed
contract and emotional distress claims. We first address
Szymczyk’s Title VII claims against the defendants before
considering her state law claims.
III
4
A
HARC asserts that Szymczyk’s claim was properly dismissed on
summary judgment because she failed to file her complaint within
ninety days after receiving her right to sue letter from the EEOC.
See Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th
Cir. 1985).
The record reveals that Szymczyk undoubtedly filed her Title
VII complaint against HARC well after the statutorily authorized
time period had transpired.4 Although this time requirement is
subject to the equitable doctrines of tolling and waiver, the
district court found, and we agree, that none of these equitable
principles apply in Szymczyk’s case. Szymczyk’s only given reason
for not filing suit within the statutorily authorized time frame is
that she was “sick” and “mentally depressed.” This basis for delay
is not sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable tolling and
rescue Szymczyk’s claims. See Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1251. We
therefore affirm the district court’s granting of summary judgment
in favor of HARC.
B
4
Szymczyk’s right to sue letter is dated May 2, 1997.
Although she claims to have received the letter in July 1997, her
complaint was filed on April 7, 1998, at least 250 days after she
received written notice of the 90-day statutory limitation.
5
We now turn to her claim against Texaco. The district court
granted Texaco’s motion to dismiss Szymczyk’s Title VII claim for
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Texaco argued, and
the court found, that Szymczyk failed to file a charge against
Texaco with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
act, a statutory prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5)(e).
We agree with the district court’s finding that Szymczyk
failed to comply with the statutory requirements of Title VII.5
Moreover, she has proffered no equitable consideration that could
excuse her failing to file a charge with the EEOC against Texaco.
See Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1995). Therefore,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Szymczyk’s Title VII
claim against Texaco for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6).
IV
Finally, Szymczyk alleges in her appellant’s brief state law
breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims against both defendants. The district court did not address
5
The record shows that Szymczyk stopped working for Texaco in
1994 when she transferred to HARC. She filed her charge with the
EEOC against HARC only in June 1996, two years after she stopped
working for Texaco. While Szymczyk argues in this appeal that
Texaco and HARC are “joint employers,” she failed to plead this
claim before the district court. In any event, Szymczyk does not
allege any harassment during her employment with Texaco.
6
either claim in its disposition of the case because Szymczyk
dropped any reference to her state law claims when she amended her
pleadings before the state court. Szymczyk abandoned these claims
when she failed to plead them in her amended and final complaint.
See Tex. R. Civ. P. 65. Moreover, Szymczyk waived any such state
law claims by never presenting them before the district court.
Indeed, she references the state law claims for the first time in
her appellant’s brief before this court. Because Szymczyk failed
to present these claims before the district court, these claims are
dismissed.
V
In sum, we find that the district court did not err when it
dismissed Szymczyk’s Title VII claims against both HARC and Texaco.
We also find that Szymczyk failed to properly present her state law
claims before the district court. Therefore, the judgment of the
district court is
A F F I R M E D.
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