Goodman v. Life Insurance Compa ( 2000 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-50334
Summary Calendar
GWENDOLYN GOODMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA;
MARS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-99-CV-245
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December 15, 2000
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and JONES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Gwendolyn Goodman appeals from the summary judgment for the
defendants in her action pursuant to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. She
contends that the four-year limitations period was tolled by her
mental condition. She states that denial of access to state
court is a state-law constitutional issue and that federal courts
may fashion equitable-tolling provisions when appropriate.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-50334
-2-
Texas’s four-year statute of limitations for contractual
actions applied to Goodman’s case. See Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969
F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1992). Absent tolling, the limitations
period began to run on January 24, 1995, when her claim for
benefits was denied. See id.Goodman bore the burden of showing that there was a genuine
issue of material fact that the limitations period was tolled.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986);
Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 894-95 (5th Cir. 1998). In
Texas, when a person is of unsound mind at the time her cause of
action accrues, the applicable statute of limitations will be
tolled until the disability is removed. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 16.001 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Helton v. Clements, 832 F.2d
332, 336 (5th Cir. 1987). In this context, a plaintiff suffers
from an unsound mind if her mental condition renders her unable
to manage her affairs or comprehend her legal rights, id. at 336,
and the plaintiff must offer proof “that she did not have the
mental capacity to pursue litigation for a definite period of
time, or produce a fact-based expert opinion to that effect.”
Grace v. Colorito, 4 S.W.3d 765, 769 (Tex. App.–Austin 1999, pet.
denied).
The evidence submitted by Goodman in support of her tolling
argument contained conclusory statements of her physician and her
attorney regarding her disability and its effect; the evidence
was unsupported by any medical records or detailed explanations
that might have supported the opinions of the physician and the
attorney. Goodman’s evidence was insufficient to defeat the
No. 00-50334
-3-
summary-judgment motion. See Boyd v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 158
F.3d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[A]n expert affidavit must
include materials on which the expert based his opinion, as well
as an indication of the reasoning process underlying the
opinion.”); Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308,
312 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[C]onclusory allegations unsupported by
concrete and particular facts will not prevent an award of
summary judgment.”); Galindo v. Precision American Corp., 754
F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that affidavits
asserting ultimate or conclusory facts or legal conclusions will
not defeat a summary judgment motion).
Goodman does not present her state-law constitutional and
equitable-tolling arguments beyond merely listing them. By
failing to provide any legal argument on these issues, she has
abandoned those issues. See Justiss Oil Co. v. Kerr-McGee Ref.
Corp., 75 F.3d 1057, 1067 (5th Cir. 1996).
AFFIRMED.