Peters v. Cain ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-30316
LAWRENCE PETERS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
BURL CAIN, Warden
Louisiana State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
MANUEL NELSON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
BURL CAIN, Warden
Louisiana State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(No. 00-CV-2430-B)
March 19, 2002
Before JONES, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Lawrence Peters and Manuel Nelson each petition the court
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
judge of this court previously issued both men a certificate of
appealability (COA) solely on whether the state’s withholding
exculpatory evidence violated the doctrine of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court, in adopting the
comprehensive report and recommendations of the magistrate judge,
had concluded that the state court’s refusal to find a Brady
violation was not an unreasonable application of federal law. We
agree and now affirm.
One of the witnesses in this case, Valerie Robair, at first
told police she was asleep when the first of the two murders in
this case occurred. At trial, however, Robair claimed to have
witnessed both murders. Robair’s original statement was recorded
in a police report, which was withheld from the Defendants. To
make out a Brady violation, the Defendants must prove that the
withheld evidence if admitted would have had a reasonable
probability of changing the outcome of the trial. See Little v.
Johnson, 162 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 1998). And even if this
court would have concluded that such a probability existed were
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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we looking at the case in the first instance, we cannot reverse
the state court’s determination that no violation occurred unless
it involved an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411-12
(2000).
We agree with the district court that habeas relief is not
warranted in this case. The information contained in the police
report undercuts the veracity of Robair’s later claiming to have
witnessed the first murder. But the effect of this inconsistency
would have been somewhat mitigated by the fact that Robair made
her statement to police at 2:30 a.m., and by her testimony at
trial that she was then afraid to finger Peters and Nelson. More
importantly, another witness, Mary Jenkins, also saw the first
murder, and her testimony at trial is in no way undermined by the
withheld report. We therefore conclude that the state court did
not unreasonably conclude that the outcome of the case would have
been different had the report been admitted.
AFFIRMED.
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