Christen v. Vasquez ( 2002 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 01-60714
Summary Calendar
_______________________
KRISTY L. CHRISTEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JESSE H. VASQUEZ, in his official capacity as
the Director of the United States Naval Home
and DAVID LACY, in his official capacity as
the CEO of the Armed Forces Retirement Home,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
Case No. 1:00 CV 529 RG
_________________________________________________________________
March 19, 2002
Before JOLLY, JONES and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Kristy Christen disputes the entry of summary
judgment on her claims of employment discrimination and retaliation
under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and Title VII, 42
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq. Finding no reversible error of fact or
law, we affirm.
Appellant was the only attorney on staff at the Naval
Home in Gulfport, Mississippi. She asserts that her nonsupervisory
position deserved a GS-14 pay grade classification rather than the
GS-13 to which she was ultimately elevated in February 1998. Her
claim derives from a comparison with the pay grades of male
supervisors who held other types of posts, none of them as
attorneys, as the Naval Home. The district court correctly
rejected Christen’s Title VII and EPA claims, holding that her
“comparison” with the non-legal, supervisory employees is
inapposite, because she is not “similarly situated” to the others.
See Peters v. City of Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148, 1153 (5th Cir.
1987) (Equal Pay Act); Little v. Republic Refining Co., 924 F.2d
93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991) (Title VII).
The district court also properly held that Christen’s
retaliation claim failed because she suffered no adverse employment
action. She alleges only that her responsibilities were shifted to
some degree away from her in order to make her post less
significant. Such actions were not sufficiently adverse for
purposes of a retaliation claim.
Finally, Christen contends that she was the victim of
direct discrimination in the form of several gross, unflattering or
belittling comments from co-workers. The district court did not
rule on these allegations. While unfortunate, however, the crude
2
comments are not tied any way to any actionable adverse employment
decision concerning Christen. Damages are not awarded under Title
VII or the Equal Pay Act solely for hurt feelings. The “direct
discrimination” claim suffers from lack of proof of adverse
employment action and causal connection.
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
3