United States v. McCranie ( 2000 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 99-60346
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    PHILLIP McCRANIE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    USDC No. 1:98-CR-84-B-D
    --------------------
    April 3, 2000
    Before JONES, DUHÉ, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    Phillip McCranie pleaded guilty to receiving visual depictions
    of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct that had been
    transported in interstate commerce by computer.     McCranie appeals
    the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.     He argues
    that the affidavit in support of the search warrant executed on his
    residence included deliberately false or recklessly misleading
    statements made in an attempt to induce the magistrate judge to
    issue a warrant on facts which did not give rise to probable cause.
    1
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Even if it is assumed that the statements to which McCranie
    objects were recklessly made material misstatements, a common-sense
    reading of the remaining portion of the affidavit was sufficient to
    establish probable cause to believe that McCranie’s residence (more
    specifically,    his   computer)   contained   evidence   of   child
    pornography.    See United States v. Alvarez, 127 F.3d 372m 373 (5th
    Cir. 1997); United States v. Polk, 
    118 F.3d 286
    , 296 (5th Cir.
    1997); United States v. Brown, 
    941 F.2d 1300
    , 1302 (5th Cir. 1991).
    Accordingly, the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress
    is AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-60346

Filed Date: 4/5/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014