St. Joseph Abbey v. Paul Castille ( 2012 )


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  •                     REVISED NOVEMBER 21, 2012
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 23, 2012
    No. 11-30756
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ST. JOSEPH ABBEY; MARK COUDRAIN
    Plaintiffs-Appellees
    v.
    PAUL WES CASTILLE; BELVA M. PICHON; CRAIG G. GILL; ANDREW
    HAYES; WALL V. MCKNEELY; MARGARET SHEHEE; KELLY RUSH
    WILLIAMS; LOUIS CHARBORNNET, in their official capacities as Members
    of the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors; PATRICK
    H. SANDERS, in his official capacity in place of Oscar A. Rollins (deceased)
    Defendants-Appellants
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, HAYNES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
    An Abbey of the Benedictine Order of the Catholic Church challenges as
    unconstitutional rules issued by the Louisiana Board of Funeral Directors
    granting funeral homes an exclusive right to sell caskets. The district court
    enjoined their enforcement, finding that they deny equal protection and due
    process of law.
    No. 11-30756
    I.
    The thirty-eight monks of St. Joseph Abbey earn their way in a pastoral
    setting. In years past, the Abbey’s timberland provided a source of income.
    After Hurricane Katrina destroyed its timber, the Abbey began looking for other
    revenue sources. For generations the Abbey has made simple wooden caskets
    to bury its monks. Public interest in the Abbey’s caskets increased after two
    bishops were buried in Abbey caskets in the 1990s. Seeing potential in this
    demand, the Abbey invested $200,000 in “St. Joseph Woodworks,” managed by
    Mark Coudrain, a deacon of the Church and an employee of the Abbey. The
    business plan was simple. St. Joseph Woodworks offered one product – caskets
    in two models, “monastic” and “traditional,” priced at $1,500 and $2,000
    respectively, significantly lower than those offered by funeral homes. The Abbey
    offers no funeral services. It does not prepare a deceased for burial and its
    monks do not participate in funerals, except as pastors.
    To be sure, Louisiana does not regulate the use of a casket, container, or
    other enclosure for the burial remains; has no requirements for the construction
    or design of caskets; and does not require that caskets be sealed. Individuals
    may construct their own caskets for funerals in Louisiana or purchase caskets
    from out-of-state suppliers via the internet. Indeed, no Louisiana law even
    requires a person to be buried in a casket.
    Nonetheless, the Abbey’s plan for casket sales faced significant regulatory
    burdens. The Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors
    (“State Board”) argues that, under state law, intrastate sales of caskets to the
    public may be made only by a state-licensed funeral director and only at a state-
    licensed funeral home.1 This stricture has two layers. First, a prospective
    1
    See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 37:831(37)-(39), :848.
    2
    No. 11-30756
    casket retailer must become a licensed funeral establishment.2 This requires
    building a layout parlor for thirty people, a display room for six caskets, an
    arrangement room, and embalming facilities.3 Second, the establishment must
    employ a full-time funeral director.4 A funeral director must have a high school
    diploma or GED, pass thirty credit hours at an accredited college, and complete
    a one-time apprenticeship.5            The apprenticeship must consist of full-time
    employment and be the apprentice’s “principal occupation.”            None of this
    mandatory training relates to caskets or grief counseling. A funeral director
    must also pass a test administered by the International Conference of Funeral
    Examining Boards.6 The exam does not test Louisiana law or burial practices.
    In Louisiana, funeral directors are the only individuals authorized by law to
    provide funeral services. In sum, the State Board’s sole regulation of caskets
    presently is to restrict their intrastate sales to funeral homes. There are no
    other strictures over their quality or use. The district court found the State’s
    scheme to be the last of its kind in the nation. The State Board had never
    succeeded in any enforcement actions against a third party seller prior to its
    effort to halt the Abbey’s consumer sales.
    II.
    Louisiana’s restriction on the sales of caskets exist against the background
    of substantial federal regulation of the funeral industry. Beginning in the early
    1980s, the FTC promulgated regulations, known as the Funeral Rule, to mitigate
    2
    See id. §§ 37:831(37), (39), :842(D).
    3
    See id. § 37:842(D)(3).
    4
    Id. § 37:842(D)(1).
    5
    Id. § 37:842(A).
    6
    Id. § § 37:842(A)(6), :831(38).
    3
    No. 11-30756
    unfair or deceptive practices of funeral providers.7 These practices included
    failing to disclose price information and “bundling” of products and services.
    Bundling forced consumers to buy a range of funeral goods and services –
    whether or not they needed or wanted the whole bundle. The FTC determined
    that it could not rely on state funeral licensing boards to curb such practices
    because the state boards were “dominated by funeral directors.”8 The funeral
    directors had organized themselves into industry groups, which lobbied state
    legislatures and made practices such as a refusal to disclose prices part of their
    professional “ethics” code. The Funeral Rule required funeral directors to
    provide consumers with itemized price lists and allow consumers to purchase
    only those goods and services they actually wanted. A principal objective of the
    Funeral Rule was to “encourage entry into the funeral market of new
    competitors seeking to attract business by offering lower prices.”9
    After the Funeral Rule forced funeral homes to disclose casket prices, the
    significant mark-ups charged by the funeral homes became apparent, and a
    market for third-party casket sales emerged. Funeral directors responded to this
    growing competition by refusing to use third-party caskets unless consumers
    paid large “casket-handling” fees. The FTC responded by amending the Funeral
    Rule to ban casket-handling fees.10 In its comments on that rulemaking, the
    FTC explained that “casket handling fees are unfair conditions on a consumer’s
    right to decline unwanted items he or she may wish to purchase elsewhere.”11
    7
    Trade Regulation Rule; Funeral Industry Practices, 
    47 Fed. Reg. 42260
     (Sept. 24,
    1982); see 
    16 C.F.R. § 453.1
     et seq.
    8
    Id. at 44289.
    9
    Id. at 42293.
    10
    Funeral Industry Practices Trade Regulation Rule, 
    59 Fed. Reg. 1592
    , 1593 (Jan. 11,
    1994).
    11
    Id. at 1604.
    4
    No. 11-30756
    In 2008, the FTC not only decided to retain the Funeral Rule but also
    expressly declined to subject third-party casket vendors to the rule because, in
    contrast to state-licensed funeral directors, “[t]he record [was] bereft of evidence
    indicating significant consumer injury caused by third-party sellers.”12 Because
    of the FTC’s interventions, Louisiana funeral homes cannot discourage consumer
    choice by applying casket-handling fees or by forcing consumers to purchase
    bundled goods and services, and Louisiana consumers can now buy caskets from
    third-party retailers – unless those retailers reside in Louisiana.
    As the district court found, a funeral director may charge a non-declinable
    service fee ranging from $3,000 to $4,000 in addition to charges for individually
    priced goods and services.13 This non-declinable service fee includes advice
    about casket selection, and the funeral director is contractually bound to assist
    the consumer if a problem arises. Thus, whenever a consumer retains a funeral
    director in Louisiana,14 the consumer pays the funeral director thousands of
    dollars to provide advice on every aspect of funeral planning, including casket
    purchase – whether the consumer is buying a casket from the funeral home or
    using a homemade casket or one purchased from an out-of-state third-party
    retailer.
    III.
    In December 2007, the State Board ordered the Abbey not to sell caskets
    to the public, and the next month, Boyd Mothe, Sr., the chair of the Legislative
    Committee for the Louisiana Funeral Directors Association and a state-licensed
    12
    
    73 Fed. Reg. 13740
    , 13745 (Mar. 14, 2008).
    13
    See Regulatory Review of the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices,
    
    16 C.F.R. § 453.2
    (b)(4)(iii)(C).
    14
    Indeed, it appears that all persons seeking to dispose of a deceased are obligated to
    engage a Louisiana funeral establishment. See La. Rev. Stat. § 37:848(D)(5).
    5
    No. 11-30756
    funeral director who owns several funeral homes, initiated a formal complaint
    against the Abbey. By law, the nine-member State Board must consist of four
    licensed funeral directors, four licensed embalmers, and just one representative
    not affiliated with the funeral industry.15               In 2008 and 2010, the Abbey
    petitioned the legislature to change the law to allow non-profit charitable groups
    such as the Abbey to sell caskets. Although two bills to amend the law were
    drafted, it appears neither made it out of committee. No member of the public
    opposed the bills.
    Facing these hurdles, the Abbey and Deacon Mark Coudrain filed this suit
    in the district court under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . The Abbey and Coudrain sought
    declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the Louisiana
    Embalming and Funeral Directors Act by the nine members of the State Board.
    These defendants are charged with the Act’s enforcement under state law and
    are sued in their official capacity. The complaint asserted that the licensure
    requirements confine intrastate sales of caskets to sales by funeral directors at
    funeral homes, denying the Abbey and Coudrain equal protection and due
    process under the Fourteenth Amendment because they bear no rational
    relationship to any valid governmental interest. The State Board responded
    that the challenged rules, insulating funeral directors from competition, are
    rationally related to the State’s legitimate interest in regulating the funeral
    profession. In the alternative, citing the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers v.
    Harris,16 the State Board maintained that economic protection of a particular
    industry is a legitimate state interest. After conducting a bench trial, the
    district court issued judgment for the Abbey, reaffirming its earlier finding that
    this brand of economic protectionism is not a legitimate state interest and
    15
    
    Id.
     § 37:832(A)(2), (B)(1), (B)(d)(2).
    16
    
    379 F.3d 1208
     (10th Cir. 2004).
    6
    No. 11-30756
    finding no rational relationship between the challenged law and Louisiana’s
    interests in consumer protection, public health, and public safety.
    IV.
    The State timely appealed. We review the district court’s findings of fact
    for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.17 After examining the record,
    we have doubts about the constitutionality of the State Board’s regulation of
    intrastate casket sales.
    A.
    The State Board maintains that the regulation of intrastate casket sales
    enjoys the deference due classic economic regulation. Alternatively, the State
    Board contends that it is a rational draw upon the State’s police powers in
    protection of consumers and public health. The Abbey responds that no rational
    basis can or has been articulated that it has not negated.
    Chief Justice Stone’s footnote 4 in Carolene Products, etched in the brains
    of several generations of law students, both described and prescribed a
    fundamental dichotomy of judicial review; it retreated from the aggressive
    review of state regulation of business in the Lochner period while proceeding in
    the opposite direction in matters of personal liberty.18 Justice Douglas’s opinion
    in Williamson v. Lee Optical19 is generally seen as a zenith of this judicial
    deference to state economic regulation and the State Board invokes its
    protections, including its willingness to accept post hoc hypotheses for economic
    regulation. But even Williamson offers the State Board little succor.                         In
    17
    See One Beacon Ins. Co. v. Crowley Marine Servs., Inc., 
    648 F.3d 258
    , 262 (5th Cir.
    2011).
    18
    
    304 U.S. 144
    , 152 n. 4 (1938).
    19
    
    348 U.S. 483
     (1955).
    7
    No. 11-30756
    Williamson, the Oklahoma legislature forbade opticians to fit or replace eyeglass
    lenses in frames without a lens prescription from an ophthalmologist or
    optometrist, even when the replaced lens could easily be duplicated by an
    optician.20 Despite the coloration of wealth transfer to ophthalmologists and
    optometrists, the Court accepted the suggestion that the legislature might have
    concluded that some persons would benefit from seeing a doctor when replacing
    a lens and refused to strike down the legislation, in turn rejecting the opticians’
    due process and equal protection claims. It placed emphasis on the “evil at hand
    for correction” to which the law was aimed, concluding that the measure was a
    rational, if not “in every respect logically consistent,” means of addressing the
    perceived ill.21 The Supreme Court took the same approach in City of New
    Orleans v. Dukes.22 It upheld a New Orleans ordinance that permitted only
    pushcart food vendors with eight or more years of experience in the French
    Quarter to continue to operate in the neighborhood. It reasoned that reducing
    the number of pushcart vendors, and limiting their ranks to those most likely to
    have the deepest ties to the area, advanced the City’s legitimate objective of
    maintaining the French Quarter’s historic character and tourist appeal.23
    As a threshold argument, the State Board urges that pure economic
    protection of a discrete industry is an exercise of a valid state interest. It points
    to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Powers v. Harris, a case in which two members
    of the panel said as much in turning back an attack on an Oklahoma scheme
    20
    
    Id. at 485
    . The law was also challenged for exempting sellers of ready-to-wear glasses
    from the prescription requirement, barring advertising of lenses and frames, and prohibiting
    retailers from sharing commercial space with certain eye care professionals. 
    Id. at 488-89
    .
    21
    
    Id. at 487-88
    .
    22
    
    427 U.S. 297
     (1976).
    23
    
    Id.
    8
    No. 11-30756
    similar to Louisiana’s.24 Judge Tymkovich, the third member of the panel,
    refused to join the majority opinion’s broad approbation of “economic
    protectionism” as a valid governmental interest.25 Rather, he concurred in the
    judgment, persuaded that the State had otherwise identified a sufficient public
    purpose.26 The Abbey in turn points to Craigmiles v. Giles, in which the Sixth
    Circuit rejected “economic protectionism” as a rational basis for similar casket
    regulations, striking down those regulations as a denial of due process and equal
    protection.27
    These two courts gave differing answers to the question of whether the
    legislation before them, both statutory schemes quite similar to that now before
    us, drew upon a legitimate state interest. Craigmiles found that “protecting a
    discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
    governmental purpose.”28 The Powers court saw the statutory scheme before it
    as logrolling by the Oklahoma legislature, its standard fare, and in its mind
    simple economic protectionism was a permissible basis for regulation. In turn,
    it rejected the challenge to the regulations that limited the sale of caskets to
    funeral directors.29
    The Powers court claimed that only three courts have held that “‘protecting
    a discrete interest group from economic competition is not a legitimate
    governmental purpose,’”30 and criticized those courts’ holdings as having no
    24
    
    379 F.3d 1208
     (10th Cir. 2004).
    25
    
    Id. at 1225-27
     (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
    26
    
    Id.
    27
    
    312 F.3d 220
     (6th Cir. 2002).
    28
    
    Id. at 224
    .
    29
    Powers, 
    379 F.3d at 1225
    .
    30
    
    Id. at 1218
     (quoting Craigmiles, 
    312 F.3d at 224
    ).
    9
    No. 11-30756
    direct support in Supreme Court precedents. It then stated: “In contrast, the
    Supreme Court has consistently held that protecting or favoring one particular
    intrastate industry, absent a specific federal constitutional or statutory violation,
    is a legitimate state interest.”31 However, none of the Supreme Court cases
    Powers cites stands for that proposition.              Rather, the cases indicate that
    protecting or favoring a particular intrastate industry is not an illegitimate
    interest when protection of the industry can be linked to advancement of the
    public interest or general welfare. Craigmiles and Powers rest on their different
    implicit answers to the question of whether the state legislation was supportable
    by rational basis. Craigmiles looked for rationality and found none. Powers
    found economic protection to be a traditional wielding of state power and
    rational by definition.
    As we see it, neither precedent nor broader principles suggest that mere
    economic protection of a pet industry is a legitimate governmental purpose,32 but
    economic protection, that is favortism, may well be supported by a post hoc
    perceived rationale as in Williamson – without which it is aptly described as a
    naked transfer of wealth.33 Recently, we upheld against similar challenge a
    Houston taxi cab permitting scheme that disfavored small cab companies.34
    Notably, we approved of the Craigmiles court’s reasoning, as it “confirm[ed] that
    naked economic preferences are impermissible to the extent that they harm
    31
    Id. at 1220.
    32
    See, e.g., Merrifield v. Lockyer, 
    547 F.3d 978
    , 991 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude
    that mere economic protectionism for the sake of economic protectionism is irrational with
    respect to determining if a classification survives rational basis review. . . . [E]conomic
    protectionism for its own sake, regardless of its relation to the common good, cannot be said
    to be in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest.”).
    33
    See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
    1689 (1984).
    34
    Greater Houston Small Taxicab Co. Owners Ass’n v. City of Houston, 
    660 F.3d 235
    ,
    (5th Cir. 2011).
    10
    No. 11-30756
    consumers.”35 However, we found that even if Houston had been “motivated in
    part by economic protectionism, there is no real dispute that promoting full-
    service taxi operations is a legitimate government purpose under the rational
    basis test.”36 We thus sustained the City’s measure. It follows that the State
    Board cannot escape the pivotal inquiry of whether there is such a rational basis,
    one that can now be articulated and is not plainly refuted by the Abbey on the
    record compiled by the district court at trial. We turn then to the State Board’s
    alternative argument – that the challenged restrictions are rationally related to
    protection of public health, safety, and consumer welfare, beginning with some
    settled guiding principles.
    B.
    As the Abbey points out, although rational basis review places no
    affirmative evidentiary burden on the government, plaintiffs may nonetheless
    negate a seemingly plausible basis for the law by adducing evidence of
    irrationality.37 And of course, as we earlier observed, Williamson insists upon
    a rational basis, which it found. Mindful that a hypothetical rationale, even post
    hoc, cannot be fantasy, and that the State Board’s chosen means must rationally
    relate to the state interests it articulates, we turn to the State Board’s proffered
    rational bases for the challenged law. Our analysis does not proceed with
    abstraction for hypothesized ends and means do not include post hoc
    hypothesized facts. Thus, we will examine the State Board’s rationale informed
    by the setting and history of the challenged rule.
    1. Consumer Protection
    35
    
    Id. at 240
    .
    36
    
    Id.
    37
    See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 
    508 U.S. 307
    , 314-15 (1993).
    11
    No. 11-30756
    The State Board argues that the challenged law is rationally related to
    consumer protection because it restricts predatory sales practices by third-party
    sellers and protects consumers from purchasing a casket that is not suitable for
    the given burial space. Of course, this is a perfectly rational statement of
    hypothesized footings for the challenged law. But we question whether it is
    betrayed by the undisputed facts as pretextual.
    For one, the State Board’s argument obscures the actual structure of the
    challenged law. No provision mandates licensure requirements for casket
    retailers or insists that a casket retailer employ someone trained in the business
    of funeral direction. Rather, the licensure requirements and other restrictions
    imposed on prospective casket retailers create funeral industry control over
    intrastate casket sales.        The scheme is built on the statute’s interlocking
    definitions of “funeral establishment” and “funeral directing”:
    “Funeral establishment” means any place or premises duly
    licensed by the board and devoted to or used in the care and
    preparation for burial of the body of a deceased person or
    maintained or held out to the public by advertising or otherwise as
    the office or place for the practice of funeral directing.38
    “Funeral directing” means the operation of a funeral home, or, by
    way of illustration and not limitation, any service whatsoever
    connected with the management of funerals, or the supervision of
    hearses or funeral cars, the purchase of caskets or other funeral
    merchandise, and retail sale and display thereof, the cleaning or
    dressing of dead human bodies for burial, and the performance or
    supervision of any service or act connected with the management of
    funerals from time of death until the body or bodies are delivered to
    the cemetery, crematory, or other agent for the purpose of
    disposition.39
    38
    LA. REV. STAT. § 37:831(39) (emphasis added).
    39
    Id. § 37:831(37) (emphasis added).
    12
    No. 11-30756
    In other words, because a funeral establishment includes any “office or place for
    the practice of funeral directing,” and “funeral directing” includes “the purchase
    of caskets or other funeral merchandise and the retail and display thereof,” a
    casket retailer must comply with all the statutory requirements for funeral
    directors and funeral establishments. No rule addresses casket retailers or
    imposes requirements for the sale of caskets beyond confining intrastate sales
    to funeral homes. But, it is urged, this exclusivity will assure purchasers of
    caskets informed counsel.
    The district court found that the extensive training the law requires of
    budding funeral directors does not include instruction on caskets, or how to
    counsel grieving customers. Given that Louisiana does not require a person to
    be buried in a casket, restrict casket purchases in any way by Louisianans over
    the internet or from other sources out of state, nor imposes requirements on any
    intrastate seller of caskets directly to consumers, including funeral directors,
    regarding casket size, design, material, or price, whatever special expertise a
    funeral director may have in casket selection is irrelevant to it being the sole
    seller of caskets. This is because customers pay funeral directors a non-
    declinable service fee, which contractually binds a funeral director to assist the
    customer with funeral and burial logistics, including, for example, casket
    selection, even if the customer does not purchase the casket from the funeral
    director. As a consequence, the customer should receive the benefit of the
    funeral director’s experience in matters of casket selection, including
    complexities that arise from burial conditions in any given area. Indeed the FTC
    has found that “[b]y allowing a basic services fee, the Rule ensures that
    consumers get the benefit of choosing goods and services among a variety of
    options – including the option to purchase goods from the funeral provider’s
    13
    No. 11-30756
    competitors . . . .”40 A customer of a funeral home receives the same service
    whether or not he purchases the casket from the funeral home, and because only
    funeral homes can sell funeral services, and all disposing of dead bodies must be
    “through a funeral establishment,” he must engage their service.41
    Moreover, like the district court and consistent with its findings, we find
    it doubtful that the challenged law is rationally related to policing deceptive
    sales tactics. In declining to expand the Funeral Rule’s scope to cover third-
    party sellers of caskets and urns, the FTC found “there is insufficient evidence
    that . . . third-party sellers of funeral goods are engaged in widespread unfair or
    deceptive acts or practices.”42 In fact, the Commission found the record “bereft
    of evidence indicating significant consumer injury caused by third-party
    sellers”43 and recognized that third-party sellers do not have the same incentive
    as funeral home sellers to engage in deceptive sales tactics.44
    But, even if independent third-party sellers pose a risk of engaging in
    deceptive sales practices, and assuming arguendo that the state legislature could
    so conclude, there is a disconnect between restricting casket sales to funeral
    homes and preventing consumer fraud and abuse. Putting aside the fact that
    funeral homes, not independent sellers, have been the problem for consumers
    with their bundling of product and 400% markups of caskets, Louisiana’s Unfair
    Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law already polices inappropriate
    sales tactics by all sellers of caskets. Louisiana’s Unfair Trade Practices and
    40
    73 Fed. Reg. at 13747.
    41
    See LA. REV. STAT. § 37:848(D)(5).
    42
    73 Fed. Reg. at 13742.
    43
    Id. at 13745.
    44
    Id. (“Indeed, third-party retailers have a strong economic incentive to display their
    prices to the public at large because offering a lower price is the primary way they compete
    against funeral providers for sales of funeral goods, such as caskets.”).
    14
    No. 11-30756
    Consumer Protection Law declares that “[u]nfair methods of competition and
    unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are
    . . . unlawful” and empowers the state attorney general to make “rules and
    regulations” to interpret the provisions of the Chapter.45 Under the section of
    Louisiana’s administrative code implementing the law, the state attorney
    general is authorized to regulate unfair trade practices in casket sales, whether
    or not those sales are made by state-licensed funeral homes, but must do so
    consistent with rules promulgated by the FTC and court decisions interpreting
    those rules.46 In short, Louisiana’s consumer protection regime reaches the sales
    practices of all intrastate sellers of caskets and can strike at any unfair practices
    but interestingly only in a way complementary and consistent with the Federal
    Trade Commission Act.
    To be clear, the FTC’s Funeral Rule has not preempted Louisiana from
    making its own independent assessment of consumer abuse by third-party
    intrastate sellers. But, were the attorney general to promulgate a rule that, as
    the State Board’s enforcement action here aims to do, shut out third-party
    sellers, implementing Louisiana’s ability to create a consumer protection scheme
    45
    LA. REV. STAT. § 51:1405.
    46
    See LA. ADMIN. CODE 16, § 501 (2012). Section 501 provides:
    These rules and regulations shall be consistent with Section 5(a)(1) of the
    Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)], as from time to time
    amended, any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, and any finally
    adjudicated court decision interpreting the provisions of said act, rules, and
    regulations. This consistency shall be, therefore, the same as the Federal Trade
    Commission’s responsibility over both:
    1. anti-trust or other restraint of trade types of activities; and
    2. unfair or deceptive types of activities relating to trade and commerce as it
    affects consumer and business interests.
    Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act is the provision under which the FTC
    enacted the Funeral Rule, and under which it declined to extend the Funeral Rule to third-
    party sellers of caskets and urns. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 13742 & nn. 1-2, 13745.
    15
    No. 11-30756
    would be in tension with the rules of the FTC – rules that compel funeral homes
    both to accept caskets purchased from others and to not charge fees for doing so.
    Nor would such a rule square with FTC findings or rulemaking resting on the
    conclusion that third-party sellers do not engage in consumer abuse. This
    matrix of Louisiana law, while not dispositive of our inquiry, sheds much light
    on the disconnect between the post hoc hypothesis of consumer protection and
    the grant of an exclusive right of sale to funeral homes. That grant of an
    exclusive right of sale adds nothing to protect consumers and puts them at a
    greater risk of abuse including exploitative prices.
    2. Public Health and Safety
    Relatedly, we doubt that a rational relationship exists between public
    health and safety and restricting intrastate casket sales to funeral directors.
    Rather, this purported rationale for the challenged law elides the realties of
    Louisiana’s regulation of caskets and burials and causes us to doubt its
    rationality. That Louisiana does not even require a casket for burial, does not
    impose requirements for their construction or design, does not require a casket
    to be sealed before burial, and does not require funeral directors to have any
    special expertise in caskets makes us doubt that a relationship exists between
    public health and safety and limiting intrastate sales of caskets to funeral
    establishments.47
    V.
    The great deference due state economic regulation does not demand
    judicial blindness to the history of a challenged rule or the context of its adoption
    47
    Cf. Merrifield v. Lockyer, 
    547 F.3d 978
    , 989 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he singling out of a
    particular economic group, with no rational or logical reason for doing so, was strong evidence
    of an economic animus with no relation to public health, morals or safety.”).
    16
    No. 11-30756
    nor does it require courts to accept nonsensical explanations for naked transfers
    of wealth. We insist that Louisiana’s rules not be irrational – the outer-most
    limits of due process and equal protection – as Justice Harlan put it, the inquiry
    is whether “[the] measure bears a rational relation to a constitutionally
    permissible objective.”48 Answering that question is well within Article III’s
    confines of judicial review. That said, we should not undertake to strike down
    a law when doing so can be avoided by resolution of uncertainty in the state
    statutory scheme. Under well-settled precedent, this Court must avoid deciding
    a constitutional issue “if there is also present some other ground upon which the
    case may be disposed of.”49
    It is not within our province to here decide state law. But in the discharge
    of our duty to avoid constitutional decisions we are to inquire if state law can
    reasonably be read to offer a state law footing for our judgment. As we read it,
    such a state law ground may well exist. Specifically, to our eyes it is unclear
    whether, under Louisiana law, the State Board has authority to regulate casket
    sales in and of themselves when such sales are not incidental to the seller’s
    provision of any other funeral services.50 Such a concern is rooted in the common
    understanding that “[a]n administrative board or agency only has the power and
    48
    Ferguson v. Skrupa, 
    372 U.S. 726
    , 733 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
    49
    Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
    297 U.S. 298
    , 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
    concurring), reh’g denied 
    297 U.S. 728
     (1936). See also County Court of Ulster County v. Allen,
    
    422 U.S. 140
    , 154 (1979) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They have the
    authority to adjudicate specific controversies between adverse litigants over which and over
    whom they have jurisdiction. In the exercise of that authority, they have a duty to decide
    constitutional questions when necessary to dispose of the litigation before them. But they have
    an equally strong duty to avoid constitutional issues that need not be resolved in order to
    determine the rights of the parties to the case under consideration.”); Burton v. United States,
    
    196 U.S. 283
    , 295 (1905) (“It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional
    nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”).
    50
    Our uncertainty is heightened by prior findings that the State Board had exceeded
    its statutory authority. See, e.g., La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 09-0151, 
    2009 WL 3641003
     (July 29,
    2009); La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 02-0170, 
    2002 WL 1483928
     (June 20, 2002).
    17
    No. 11-30756
    authority granted by the constitution or statutes”51 and in the Louisiana
    Attorney General’s insistence that the State Board’s claimed authority be located
    in specifically stated grants of power.52 One could interpret Title 37 Chapter 10,
    the portion of the Louisiana code creating the State Board, as only vesting the
    State Board with authority to regulate casket sales when made by someone who
    operates a funeral establishment or provides funeral services.
    We see support for this reading of the State Board’s authority in the
    language and structure of Chapter 10. Although Chapter 10 unquestionably
    gives the State Board power to regulate funeral directors and funeral
    establishments, the circularity in the structure adopted to regulate intrastate
    sales of caskets – requiring intrastate sellers of caskets to be licensed as funeral
    homes to bring their business within the State Board’s regulatory reach –
    suggests an unspoken awareness that the State Board only has authority to
    regulate funeral establishments and funeral directors. In addition, the language
    of Chapter 10 suggests that it may only vest the State Board with authority to
    regulate casket sales by funeral establishments and funeral directors. For
    example, the 2008 amendment to the statute’s pre-need provision defined “pre-
    need funeral contract” primarily by reference to the selling entity, as opposed to
    its activities, arguably indicating that the State Board has authority over
    specific entities – funeral homes and funeral directors – not discrete activities
    like the sale of caskets.53 Under this interpretation of the statute, the State
    Board would only have authority to regulate the sale of caskets when made by
    someone who operates a funeral establishment or provides funeral services.
    51
    Realty Mart, Inc. v. Louisiana Board of Tax, 
    336 So.2d 52
    , 54 (La. Ct. App. 1976).
    52
    See, e.g., La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 09-0151, 
    2009 WL 3641003
     (July 29, 2009).
    53
    LA. REV. STAT. § 37:831(63).
    18
    No. 11-30756
    This limitation gains more persuasive possibility when related statutory
    provisions are considered. The State Board regulates the business of funeral
    directing, and specifically here, Section 848 (“Unlawful practice”), states “[n]o
    person, not certified and registered under the provisions of this Chapter, shall
    . . . conduct the business of funeral directing . . . .”54 That prohibition, in turn,
    raises the question of whether the monks, as carpenters making and then selling
    caskets, are conducting the business of funeral directing. To answer that
    question, we read Term 37 of Section 831 that explains that “‘[f]uneral directing’
    means the operation of a funeral home . . . .”55 This, the monks may not be
    doing, nor want to. As “illustration and not limitation,” Term 37 clarifies that
    operating a funeral home encompasses: “any service whatsoever connected with
    the management of funerals,”56—not what the monks want to do; “any service
    whatsoever connected with . . . the supervision of hearses or funeral
    cars,”57—still not; “any service whatsoever connected with . . . the purchase of
    caskets or other funeral merchandise,”58—still not, but telling, because the broad
    interpretation of State Board authority, suggested by the State Board, would
    give it not just a monopoly on selling but also on buying, which cannot be correct;
    and “any service whatsoever connected with . . . the retail sale and display
    thereof . . . .”59 This is it, but not exactly. The monks do not offer a funeral home
    “service . . . connected with . . . retail sale and display . . . .”60 Indeed, with the
    54
    LA. REV. STAT. § 37:848(A).
    55
    Id. § 37:831(37).
    56
    Id.
    57
    Id.
    58
    Id.
    59
    Id.
    60
    Id. (emphasis added).
    19
    No. 11-30756
    statute’s phraseology in mind, Term 37 defines funeral directing as “the
    operation of a funeral home,” and then, only by illustration, lists supervisory and
    management examples, plus “any service . . . connected” with such operations.
    This regulatory scope limitation is congruent with the acknowledgment that
    State Board enforcement has never been completed against in-state retailers for
    selling only, as distinct from in-state entities that offer funeral home services.
    In fact, the remainder of Term 37 then lists services that unquestionably, like
    “hearses,” are part of the “operation of a funeral home,” such as “cleaning and
    dressing of dead human bodies . . . .”61 From this standpoint, we perceive again
    that the statute may not extend State Board authority to casket sales
    unconnected to funeral services. The monks, as carpenters, would not be
    regulated, nor would they, as vendors of their wares, doing nothing that equates
    to operating a funeral home.
    Moreover, in reading the statutory grant of authority, it would not be
    surprising that the Louisiana legislature was cautious in granting regulatory
    power to an agency tasked with self-regulation of its industry. Thus, our
    uncertainty is further fueled by the reality that the legislature, in crafting the
    statutory grant of authority in conformity with state law strictures imposed
    upon delegation of legislative power,62 may have confined the authority of the
    State Board to authority over its own industry – including funeral
    establishments, funeral directors, and embalmers – instead of granting it broad
    61
    See id.
    62
    See State v. Alfonso, 
    753 So.2d 156
    , 161 (La. 1999) (“Guided by the principles set forth
    in Schwegmann and inherent in the constitutional separation of powers, this court has
    fashioned a three-prong test for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a statute
    unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority, as opposed to administrative or ministerial
    authority, to an administrative agency. Under this test, a delegation of authority to an
    administrative agency is constitutionally valid if the enabling statute (1) contains a clear
    expression of legislative policy; (2) prescribes sufficient standards to guide the agency in the
    execution of that policy; and (3) is accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards to protect
    against abuse of discretion by the agency.”).
    20
    No. 11-30756
    powers to reach into other markets and regulate industry competition. In short,
    we question whether the State Board’s regulatory power extends beyond
    authority to regulate the operations of certain actors – funeral establishments
    and funeral directors.           Because a ruling on the constitutionality of the
    challenged regulation could be avoided by interpretation of Louisiana law, we
    must give due consideration to this non-constitutional ground for decision.
    Resolution of the statutory uncertainty surrounding the State Board’s
    authority must come at the hand of the Louisiana Supreme Court, whose
    determination of state law is supreme. When constitutional avoidance requires
    interpretation of a state statute, federalism concerns mandate “that state courts
    provide the authoritative adjudication of questions of state law” and thus “a
    federal court should await a definitive construction by a state court.”63
    Therefore, we conclude that this appeal presents a critical issue of Louisiana law
    which is appropriate for resolution by certification to the Supreme Court of
    Louisiana and, in the interest of federalism and constitutional avoidance, defer
    final decision in this matter to allow the Louisiana Supreme Court to rule on the
    statutory uncertainty.
    The parties have not requested certification, but pursuant to Rule 12 of the
    Rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court, this Court may certify upon its own
    motion.64 And, because the doctrine of constitutional avoidance is rooted in basic
    63
    Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 
    472 U.S. 491
    , 508 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
    (“Although federal courts generally have a duty to adjudicate federal questions properly before
    them, this Court has long recognized that concerns for comity and federalism may require
    federal courts to abstain from deciding federal constitutional issues that are entwined with the
    interpretation of state law . . . . The doctrine of abstention acknowledges that federal courts
    should avoid the unnecessary resolution of federal constitutional issues and that state courts
    provide the authoritative adjudication of questions of state law. Attention to the policies
    underlying abstention makes clear that in the circumstances of these cases, a federal court
    should await a definitive construction by a state court rather than precipitously indulging a
    facial challenge to the constitutional validity of a state statute.”).
    64
    SUP. CT. OF LA. R. XII.
    21
    No. 11-30756
    considerations of federalism, the Abbey’s failure to raise the statutory issue does
    not preclude us if doing so will avoid the constitutional issue.65
    VI.
    CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
    OF LOUISIANA, PURSUANT TO LA. REV. STAT. § 13:72.1 AND RULE 12
    OF THE RULES OF THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
    It appears to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit that
    the above-styled case in this Court involves a question or proposition of the law
    of the State of Louisiana, which will be determinative of all state law issues in
    this cause,66 which is beyond the province of this Court to resolve, and for which
    there appears to be no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the
    Supreme Court of Louisiana. Should the Louisiana Supreme Court accept the
    certification and find a lack of authority its ruling will resolve the case in its
    entirety. Should it reach a contrary conclusion, this Court will no longer stay its
    hand but will promptly proceed to judgment. This Court certifies the following
    65
    See, e.g., Neese v. Southern Railway Co., 
    350 U.S. 77
    , 78 (1955) (per curiam) (“[I]n
    reversing on the above ground we follow the traditional practice of this Court of refusing to
    decide constitutional questions when the record discloses other grounds of decision, whether
    or not they have been properly raised before us by the parties.”); Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-
    Detroit Axle Co., 
    329 U.S. 129
    , 132 (1946) (“We find now, however, that the Circuit Court of
    Appeals had before it, not only the constitutional question, which was decided, but also a
    nonconstitutional question, which might properly have alone served as an adequate ground
    on which to dispose of the appeal. This non-constitutional question was neither considered nor
    decided by the court below, nor argued here. We have concluded, therefore, that we should not
    pass on the constitutional question at this time, but should vacate the judgment of the Circuit
    Court of Appeals, and remand the case to it for decision of any non-constitutional issues
    material to the appeal.”).
    66
    See Murray v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 
    821 F.2d 272
     (5th Cir. 1987), certification accepted
    
    514 So.2d 21
     (La. 1987) (accepting certification in a case in which the panel was left to
    determine whether the damage award below was excessive after the Supreme Court of
    Louisiana answered the certified question regarding assumption of risk).
    22
    No. 11-30756
    question of law to the Supreme Court of Louisiana for rendition of a judgment
    or opinion concerning such question of Louisiana law, such case being on appeal
    to this Court from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Louisiana.
    STYLE OF THE CASE
    The style of the case in which this certification is made is St. Joseph
    Abbey; Mark Coudrain, Plaintiffs-Appellees versus Paul Wes Castille; Belva M.
    Pichon; Craig G. Gill; Andrew Hayes; Wall V. McKneely; Margaret Shehee; Kelly
    Rush Williams; Louis Charbornnet, in their official capacities as Members of the
    Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and Funeral Directors; Patrick H. Sanders,
    in his official capacity in place of Oscar A. Rollins (deceased), Defendants-
    Appellants, case no. 11-30176, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
    Circuit, on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District
    of Louisiana.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
    A complete statement of the facts in this case, the nature of the cause, and
    the circumstances out of which the questions or propositions of law arise is set
    forth in full above and will not be repeated in this certification.
    QUESTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
    For the above stated reasons, we hereby certify the following
    determinative question of Louisiana law to the Supreme Court of Louisiana:
    Whether Louisiana law furnishes the Louisiana State Board of Embalmers and
    Funeral Directors with authority to regulate casket sales when made by a
    retailer who does not provide any other funeral services.
    23
    No. 11-30756
    HAYNES, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
    I fully concur in the judgment of the court certifying the question to the
    Louisiana Supreme Court and in Sections I–III, V, and VI of the opinion. I
    conclude that it is unnecessary to discuss the issues in Section IV of the opinion
    at this point other than to note that there are substantial federal constitutional
    questions presented which might be obviated depending upon the Louisiana
    Supreme Court’s answer to our question. I agree with my colleagues that
    concerns of federalism and state sovereignty strongly support certifying the
    question.
    24