Ballard v. LA Democratic Party ( 2001 )


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  •                 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 00-31417
    Summary Calendar
    KAREN BALLARD; JAMES WILSON; VIRGINIA GUY;
    KENNETH GUY,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    KENNETH R. FABRÉ; DEVAN PARDUE,
    Appellants,
    versus
    LOUISIANA DEMOCRATIC PARTY; BEN JEFFERS,
    Individually and as Chairman of the Louisiana
    Democratic Party; TREY OURSO, Individually and
    as Executive Director; PATSY ARCENEAUX,
    Individually and as Chairperson of By-Laws
    Committee; MARY JO CUTRER,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 00-CV-287-C
    --------------------
    October 17, 2001
    Before JONES, SMITH and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In an appeal arising from a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     civil rights
    action, the appellants challenge the district court's grant of
    certain defendants’ motions for attorney's fees and costs pursuant
    to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1927
    .          The appellants contend
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
    circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    No. 00-31417
    -2-
    that the 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     motions were untimely and that neither
    the 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     nor the 
    28 U.S.C. § 1927
     motions were
    warranted by the record.
    A 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
     motion for attorney's fees and costs
    is timely if filed within 30 days after the movant received notice
    of entry of judgment.    See Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 
    168 F.3d 237
    , 239 (5th Cir. 1999).   While the fee motions were not so filed
    in this case, the district court did not clearly err in its
    determination that its judgment may have led to confusion regarding
    the deadline for filing the motions.    See 
    id.
         The judgment created
    a 30-day deadline for filing a "motion for reconsideration";
    however, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize such
    a motion, the 10-day deadline for filing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)
    cannot be extended, and the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion may be
    filed up to a year after judgment.     See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach.
    & Tool Works, Inc., 
    910 F.2d 167
    , 173 (5th Cir. 1990); Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 6(b), 59(e), 60(b).   Moreover, the judgment ordered the filing
    of fee motions eight days prior to the hearing on the "motion for
    reconsideration," which was never filed, without limiting the
    applicability of that deadline to fee motions relating to the
    "motion   for   reconsideration."      In   light    of   these   special
    circumstances and given that the instant fee motions were filed
    within 30 days of the expiration of the court-created 30-day period
    for filing a "motion for reconsideration," the district court did
    not abuse its discretion in deeming the fee motions timely.           See
    Walker, 
    168 F.3d at 239-40
    ; Cf. Gribble v. Harris, 
    625 F.2d 1173
    ,
    1174 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that under the "unique circumstances"
    No. 00-31417
    -3-
    exception,    an     untimely     appeal   is    allowed     when    the   appellant
    reasonably relied upon the district court's erroneous extension of
    time to file a Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 or 59 motion or the district
    court's entertaining of such motions despite their untimeliness).
    The appellants have not argued in their brief that the
    district     court    abused      its   discretion      in    finding      that   the
    plaintiffs' claims were frivolous and granting the defendants' 
    42 U.S.C. § 1988
        motions.       See    Walker,   
    168 F.3d at 239-40
    .
    Accordingly, that ground for appeal is waived. Furthermore, as the
    district     court    did   not   clearly    err   in   determining        that   the
    plaintiffs' attorneys unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the
    proceedings by moving to remand the case to state court, the
    district court       did    not   abuse    its   discretion     in    granting    the
    defendants' 
    28 U.S.C. § 1927
     motions.              See 
    id. at 240
    .
    AFFIRMED.