Roberts v. Wal-Mart Louisiana ( 2022 )

Case: 22-30067 Document: 00516571283 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/08/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 8, 2022
No. 22-30067 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Sloane Roberts,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C.; Jason Hebert, in his
individual & official capacity; Jeffery Credeur; Sonny
Stutes, individually & in his official capacity; Sammy
Inzarrella; Jason Haines; Tony Hardy, Individually;
Brannon Decou, Individually,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 6:15-cv-119
Before Higginbotham, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
Before the Court is an appeal concerning denial of a Rule 60 motion
for relief from judgment. For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED.
Case: 22-30067 Document: 00516571283 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/08/2022
No. 22-30067
I. Background
In 2015, Sloane Roberts sued Wal-Mart and several members of law
enforcement for purported injuries relating to her arrest and incarceration in
2010. In response to motions to dismiss filed by the defendants, Judge
Rebecca Doherty dismissed all asserted federal claims with prejudice and all
asserted state-law claims without prejudice. Roberts did not appeal the
dismissal.
In 2021, the Clerk of the Western District of Louisiana contacted the
parties to inform them that Judge Doherty had owned stock in Wal-Mart
while presiding over this case. Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), Judge Doherty
ought to have recused herself. On this basis, Roberts filed a motion for relief
from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 seeking a voided
judgment and a new trial.
Judge Robert Summerhays was assigned the reopened case. While
Roberts argued that the failure to recuse made the judgment “void” and that
it should be vacated under Rule 60(b)(4), Judge Summerhays correctly
applied precedent and construed the motion as arising under Rule 60(b)(6).
Judge Summerhays found that the failure to disqualify was harmless and
denied the motion. Roberts filed a timely notice of appeal, and we review.
II. Law & Analysis
“Section 455 does not, on its own, authorize the reopening of closed
litigation.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863
(1988). In the § 455(a) context, however, the Supreme Court has held that
Rule 60(b)(6) relief be analyzed according to these three factors: “the risk of
injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief
will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s
confidence in the judicial process.” Id. at 864. As “relief is ... neither
categorically available nor categorically unavailable for all § 455[] violations,”
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ibid., Judge Doherty’s failure to recuse does not automatically render her
judgment void. We have instead evaluated failures to recuse under §§ 455(a)
and (b) by determining whether or not the error was “harmless” through the
lens of the Liljeberg factors. See Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 485
(5th Cir. 2003).
We review Rule 60(b) decisions for abuse of discretion. Flowers v. S.
Reg’l Physician Servs., Inc., 286 F.3d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 2002). Applying that
standard, we see no abuse in the district court’s determinations below. Judge
Summerhays ably and succinctly applied the Liljeberg factors to the
controversy. On fresh review, we conclude likewise that after “a careful
study … of the merits,” there is no “risk of injustice to the parties in th[is]
particular case.” Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 868, 864. Judge Doherty’s ruling was
based on firm legal principles, there is no evidence of bias or favor, and
Roberts neither appealed Judge Doherty’s decision at the time nor refiled her
state law claims in state court within the time permitted her. Had Roberts
appealed Judge Doherty’s dismissal of the case, she would have received a
fair, impartial de novo review. See Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th
Cir. 2018).
As in Patterson, we find that “our holding that Judge [Doherty] erred
by failing to stand recused will serve as a cautionary note to future district
court[]” judges who may likewise have financial interests in a case. Patterson,
335 F.3d at 486. That cautionary note, combined with the de novo standard of
review for grants of motions to dismiss and the fact-intensive nature of the
ruling, suggests that this denial is unlikely to produce injustice in other cases.
Finally, we note in concert with Patterson that the public’s faith in the judicial
system may be more undermined by vacating a straightforwardly correct
decision like Judge Doherty’s, given the passing of time and Roberts’ original
decision neither to appeal nor to refile. See id. That the case was reopened
and reviewed by both an independent district judge and a panel of this court
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will likewise reassure the public that the federal judicial system takes its
recusal obligations seriously. Therefore, Judge Doherty’s error was
harmless.
III. Conclusion
There is no dispute that Judge Doherty should have recused herself
from this case. Our review, however, is not of Judge Doherty’s unfortunate
mistake but of Judge Summerhays’ decision to deny the resultant motion to
vacate. As we find no error in his denial, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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