Hunt v. Barnhart , 159 F. App'x 569 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 15, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30386
Summary Calendar
ETHELENE HUNT
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
JO ANNE B BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Defendant-Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 1:03-CV-2346
Before JOLLY, DAVIS and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ethelene Hunt (Hunt) applied to the Social Security Administration for disability insurance
benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of Title II of the Social Security Act. Her application was
denied. Hunt then requested and received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The
ALJ determined that Hunt was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
before December 31, 2001, the date her disability insured status1 expired. Hunt appealed the ALJ’s
decision to the Social Security Administration Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied Hunt’s
request for benefits and held that the ALJ’s decision was the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (Commissioner).
Hunt filed suit in district court seeking review of the final administrative decision denying her
disability claim. Hunt also filed a motion to remand the case to the ALJ, arguing that her medical
condition had worsened since the hearing and new medical evidence should be considered by the ALJ.
A federal magistrate judge recommended that (1) Hunt’s appeal be denied and dismissed with
prejudice and (2) Hunt’s motion to remand be denied. The dist rict judge adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation. Hunt appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the Commissioner’s
decision to deny her application for disability benefits and motion to remand.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits to determine whether that decision
is supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards are applied.2 “A finding
of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings
support the decision.”3 This court must affirm the Commissioner’s determination unless this court
finds that 1) the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard, or 2) that the ALJ’s determination is not
1
Title II of the Social Securit y Act provides disability insurance for individuals whose
employment is interrupted or prematurely terminated by incapacitating illness or injury. Claimants
hold insured status over that period in which they accrued 20 quarters of social security coverage,
as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 413, out of the last 40 quarters. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1). Hunt meets the
disability insurance benefits requirements and is insured for disability benefits through December 31,
2001.
2
Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001).
3
Id.2
supported by substantial evidence.4 Hunt only asserts that the decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. We affirm the ALJ’s decision denying Hunt’s claim for disability insurance benefits for the
following reasons:
1. There is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Hunt was not
disabled due to depression (under Listing 12.04 of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P,
App. 1) on or before December 31, 2001, t he date her disability insured status
expired. Hunt’s claim of depression was not supported by any specialized mental
health care diagnosis or treatment. Additionally, Dr. William Bergmann, a
psychologist, expressly stated in a July 2001 residual functional capacity assessment
that Hunt’s mental status would not prevent her from successfully adapting to work.3
2. There is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination that Hunt was not
disabled due to a combination of impairments. The ALJ properly considered the
disabling effect of each of Hunt’s alleged impairments as well as the combined effect
of such impairments in making the non-disability determination. Dr. Robert Po, a
physician who conducted an orthopaedic examination of Hunt in February 2001,
concluded that she was able to: 1) occasionally lift twenty-five pounds and frequently
carry and lift ten pounds; 2) sit two hours continuously up to six hours in a workday;
and 3) stand and walk fifteen minutes continuously up to four hours in a workday.
A vocational expert testified that despite Hunt’s impairments, she was capable of
making a successful adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the
4
Id.3
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (g)(1) (“If you can make an adjustment to other work, we will find
you not disabled.”).
3
national economy.4
3. There is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Hunt could
perform light and sedentary level jobs. “Light work involves lifting no more than 20
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10
pounds.”5 “Sedentary work involves lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, small tools . . . . Jobs
are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary
criteria are met.”6 The ALJ concluded that Hunt was capable of performing light and
sedentary work, consisting of lifting and carrying twenty pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently, standing and walking fifteen minutes at a time up to four hours in
a workday, and sitting for six hours in a workday. The ALJ’s conclusion was in
accord with Dr. Robert Po’s opinion that Hunt was capable of doing such work.
We also affirm the district court’s denial of Hunt’s motion to remand. “[T]o justify a remand
[based on new evidence], the evidence must be (1) new, (2) material, and (3) good cause must be
shown for the failure to incorporate the evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.”7 “It
is‘implicit in the materiality requirement’ that ‘the new evidence relate to the time period for which
benefits were denied, and that it not concern evidence o f a later-acquired disability or of the
4
See Id.5
20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b).
6
Id. § 416.967(a).
7
Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 1054, 1058 (5th Cir. 1987).
4
subsequent deterioration of the previously non-disabling condition.’”8 Hunt’s disability insured status
expired on December 31, 2001. Consequently, to prove that she is entitled to disability benefits, Hunt
must prove that she was disabled on or before December 31, 2001.9 The medical reports that Hunt
seeks to have the ALJ review on remand, however, relate to Hunt’s condition after December 31,
2001. Because the evidence does not pertain to the time period for which benefits were denied, the
evidence fails to meet the materiality requirement for remand. Therefore, the district court did not
err in denying Hunt’s motion to remand.
AFFIRMED
8
Haywood v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1463, 1471 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Johnson v. Heckler, 767
F.2d 180, 183 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting Szubak v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 745 F.2d
F.2d 831, 833 (3rd Cir. 1984))).
9
See Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[T]o prove that she is entitled
to disability benefits, Anthony must not only prove that she is disabled, but that she became disabled
prior to the expiration of her insured status.”).
5