Out A Sight Pet v. Radio Sys Corp , 197 F. App'x 151 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    8-3-2006
    Out A Sight Pet v. Radio Sys Corp
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-3609
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
    Recommended Citation
    "Out A Sight Pet v. Radio Sys Corp" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 620.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/620
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-3609
    OUT-A-SIGHT PET CONTAINMENT, INC.,
    Appellant
    v.
    RADIO SYSTEMS CORPORATION, RADIO FENCE
    DISTRIBUTORS, INC.; LORI VOLWILER
    ____________
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
    (D.C. Civ. No. 01-cv-05775)
    District Judge: Honorable Louis H. Pollak
    ____________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    July 13, 2006
    Before: SMITH, WEIS and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed August 3, 2006)
    ____________
    OPINION
    WEIS, Circuit Judge.
    Defendant Radio Systems Corporation produces and sells components for
    electronic pet fences. Plaintiff Out-A-Sight Pet Containment, Inc. contracted to buy
    components from defendant. The dispute between the parties is a straightforward one:
    1
    did defendant agree to supply all of its various components as plaintiff contends, or only
    those listed in an appendix to the sales agreement?
    After scrutinizing the supply agreement, the district judge decided that it
    was ambiguous and submitted the issue to a jury. During the trial, evidence established
    that plaintiff had been particularly interested in purchasing a component labeled as “UL-
    275D,” which had not been included in the appendix. Interrogatory number one, which
    was submitted to the jury, asked whether defendant was required to supply UL-275D to
    plaintiff. The jury responded that plaintiff was not required to supply that item.
    Interrogatory two asked the jury if plaintiff had proved that defendant was required to
    allow plaintiff to buy all of the components, rather than only those listed in the appendix
    to the written agreement. Again, the jury responded in the negative.
    After deliberations began, the jury sent a note to the district judge as
    follows: “Can we the jury interpret question two to mean all products with the exception
    of the UL-275D?” After a discussion with counsel, the judge answered, “No” to the
    inquiry. The jury subsequently responded that plaintiff had not proved that the agreement
    required defendant to allow plaintiff to buy all of the defendant’s products.
    On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the judge’s answer was erroneous.
    We are not persuaded.
    We review a district court's formulation of a jury interrogatory for abuse of
    discretion. Armstrong v. Burdette Tomlin Memorial Hosp. 
    438 F.3d 240
    , 246 (3d Cir.
    2006) (citing Armstrong v. Dwyer, 
    155 F.3d 211
    , 214 (3d Cir.1998)). The only
    2
    requirement “is that the questions asked of the jury be adequate to determine the factual
    issues essential to the judgment.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Dwyer, 
    155 F.3d at 216
    ).
    Interrogatory number one directly addressed the issue raised by the jury and
    it was neither necessary nor desirable to provide further instructions.
    Plaintiff further asserts error in the dismissal of the Sherman Act § 1 claim,
    
    15 U.S.C. § 1
    , based on alleged pressure by competitive distributors to terminate the
    plaintiff’s supply contract. At the close of the evidence, the district judge dismissed that
    count because of insufficient evidence on the definition of the relevant market, and failure
    to demonstrate the required impact on competition. We find no error in the District
    Court’s ruling.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-3609

Citation Numbers: 197 F. App'x 151

Filed Date: 8/3/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023