Alvin Mead v. Burl Cain, Warden , 438 F. App'x 341 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-30964     Document: 00511578990         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/22/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 22, 2011
    No. 10-30964
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ALVIN MEAD,
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
    Respondent-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:03-CV-3058
    Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Alvin Mead, Louisiana prisoner # 310779, appeals the denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     petition challenging his conviction for possession of cocaine, for
    which he is serving a life sentence as an habitual offender. The district court
    granted Mead a certificate of appealability on the issue of ineffective assistance
    of counsel. Mead argues that counsel failed to adequately advise him regarding
    whether to accept the plea offer.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-30964    Document: 00511578990      Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/22/2011
    No. 10-30964
    Whether Mead received ineffective assistance of counsel is reviewed de
    novo. Cf. Medillin v. Dretke, 
    544 U.S. 660
    , 680 (2005). We review the district
    court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. Charles
    v. Thaler, 
    629 F.3d 494
    , 498 (2011). To establish ineffective assistance, Mead
    must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984). “Prejudice in the state sentencing context turns on whether,
    absent counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant’s
    sentence would have been significantly less harsh.” Charles, 
    629 F.3d at 499
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
    Mead argues that he was deprived of constitutionally adequate
    representation when, after the State agreed to impose the sentence the defense
    sought, counsel allowed him to reject the plea offer without adequately advising
    him of its advantages and disadvantages. Significantly, Mead does not allege
    that he was unaware that he was facing a life sentence as an habitual offender.
    See United States v. Herrera, 
    412 F.3d 577
    , 580 (5th Cir. 2005). The state record
    and allegations made for the first time in Mead’s appellate brief indicate that the
    terms of the plea offer were communicated to Mead; however, Mead, who has
    consistently maintained his innocence, exercised his right to a trial by jury.
    Mead’s assertions that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to give him
    unspecified advice and that it is reasonable likely that he would have accepted
    the plea offer had he received such advice are purely conclusional. As such, his
    allegations of prejudice are insufficient to support a basis for habeas relief. See
    Green v. Johnson, 
    160 F.3d 1029
    , 1040 (5th Cir. 1998). Consequently, Mead was
    not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Fc. United States v. Edwards, 
    442 F.3d 258
    , 264 (5th Cir. 2006).
    AFFIRMED.
    2