Dudley v. Connors , 91 F. App'x 938 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS          March 3, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 03-40649
    Summary Calendar
    GENE E. DUDLEY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    N.L. CONNORS, Warden; UNKNOWN RICE, Caseworker;
    MARIA ROSE, Counselor; KATHLEEN HAWKS, Director
    of Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.; PAUL
    NICHOLAS; JOHN 2-5 DOES; R. ROUT, Mailroom
    Personnel at El Reno Federal Correctional Institute;
    UNKNOWN WILBURN, Officer, Mailroom Personnel;
    RICHARD GOODSEAL, Mailroom Personnel; UNKNOWN
    HENDERSON; Lieutenant, SHU Housing Unit Manager;
    UNKNOWN HAMM, Officer; INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT
    SYSTEM OFFICER, El Reno Federal Correctional
    Institute Management System Officer,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:00-CV-308
    Before GARWOOD, EMILIO M. GARZA and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Gene E. Dudley, federal prisoner # 10961-045, appeals the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    dismissal of his civil rights complaint. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
    Named Agents, 
    403 U.S. 388
    (1971). Dudley filed a purported notice
    of appeal from the judgment of dismissal; however, that pleading
    did not “clearly evince” an intent to appeal, as the primary relief
    requested was reconsideration and Dudley sought to appeal only in
    the alternative.      See Mosley v. Cozby, 
    813 F.2d 659
    , 660 (5th Cir.
    1987).   The pleading therefore did not constitute a timely notice
    of   appeal   from    the   judgment       dismissing    the   complaint   with
    prejudice, and, consequently, we have jurisdiction only to review
    the denial of his FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion, from which he did
    file a timely notice of appeal, but our review is only for an abuse
    of discretion.       See Lancaster v. Presley, 
    35 F.3d 229
    , 231 (5th
    Cir. 1994).
    Dudley’s contention that his proceedings were rendered unfair
    because the district court failed to consider his objections prior
    to adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge is frivolous
    given that the district court did ultimately review the objections
    and deemed them meritless.      Also frivolous is his contention that
    we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because there was no final
    judgment; the district court adjudicated all claims against all
    defendants.
    Dudley’s   conclusional     allegations           that   the   defendants
    fraudulently misrepresented whether his claims were exhausted are
    an insufficient basis on which to grant Rule 60(b)(3) relief.              See
    2
    Gov’t Fin. Servs. One Ltd. P’ship v. Peyton Place, Inc., 
    62 F.3d 767
    , 772 (5th Cir. 1995).     Finally, with respect to Dudley’s
    argument that his unexhausted claims were erroneously dismissed
    with prejudice he has demonstrated no abuse of the district court’s
    discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief in that respect.       See
    Edwards v. City of Houston, 
    78 F.3d 983
    , 995 (5th Cir. 1996) (abuse
    of discretion is standard of review of denial of Rule 60(b)
    relief).
    AFFIRMED.
    3