Nelson v. Cauley , 200 F. App'x 315 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT September 14, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-10646
Summary Calendar
STEVEN RAY NELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KEVIN CAULEY, Etc.; ET AL,
Defendants,
KEVIN CAULEY, State Trooper; SERGIO REYES,
Officer; HANK HAVENS, Deputy; SHERIFF
DEPARTMENT OF ROCKWALL COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:04-CV-828
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Before REAVLEY, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Steven Ray Nelson, Texas prisoner # 1130776, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his excessive-force claims against
Deputy Hank Havens and the Rockwall County Sheriffs Department
(Rockwall County). He does not challenge the denial of his
defamation claims or his excessive-force claims against Officers
Cauley and Reyes, and this court declines to review such claims.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-10646
-2-
See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d at
744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
The district court concluded that Nelson’s excessive-force
claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87
(1994), because they would call into question the validity of
Nelson’s convictions for aggravated assault on a public servant.
See Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1999).
Because the district court considered evidence outside the
pleadings in denying relief, its FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
dismissal for failure to state a claim should be construed as a
summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56. See Washington v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1283-84 (5th Cir. 1990).
Nelson contends that the district court erred in dismissing
his claims against Havens because Havens’s trial testimony
indicated that he hit Nelson with his pistol at a time that
Nelson was falling out of his car. He also postulates that
Havens may have sprayed mace on him after Nelson was arrested and
handcuffed. He maintains that because these actions may have
occurred when Nelson was no longer placing the officers in
danger, his excessive-force claims would not call into question
the validity of his conviction for aggravated assault of a police
officer. See, e.g., Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952-53 (9th
Cir. 1996), cited favorably in Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 873
(5th Cir. 1996). Nelson has not presented sufficient evidence
establishing a genuine issue of material fact relating to the
No. 05-10646
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district court’s conclusion that his claims were premature
pursuant to Heck. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
324 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1994)(en banc).
Nelson also maintains that the district court erred in
dismissing his claims against Rockwall County, based on the
office’s failure to train Havens properly. Because there is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding Havens’s use of force,
Rockwall County cannot be held liable for a failure to train.
See Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 151 (5th Cir. 2004). The
judgment of the district court is thus AFFIRMED.